November 14, 2026 | National Review
Israel’s Arab Parties Face a Difficult Bargain
The country’s Arab voters made history. Now comes the hard part.
November 14, 2026 | National Review
Israel’s Arab Parties Face a Difficult Bargain
The country’s Arab voters made history. Now comes the hard part.
*This op-ed was originally posted in the National Review online
In the Israeli city of Rahat, as residents streamed toward the polling station in late October, one Arab voter said, “I’ve voted dozens of times and never seen a crowd like this.” He hoped that Arabs in Israel “want to be part of the government.”
But entering government demands a bargain for Israel’s Arab parties. The benefit is having more influence over their constituents’ main priorities, like funding infrastructure and policing, while helping remove Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who oversees the police. But Gadi Eisenkot, whose Yashar party leads the opposition bloc, has set conditions for prospective coalition partners: recognizing Israel as a “Jewish, democratic, liberal and egalitarian state,” accepting compulsory military or civilian service, and supporting the dismantling of Hamas’s military and governing capabilities in the Gaza Strip.
For Arab parties, these are hardly small concessions. Agreeing to them means abandoning long-standing positions on Palestinian national rights and disagreements over Israel’s Jewish identity. For Eisenkot, setting a high price reflects the need to court prospective Zionist coalition partners who pledged not to form a government reliant on Arab support.
With Arab turnout at 80 percent, October’s election nearly doubled Arab representation in the Knesset, from ten seats in 2022 to 19 today. The Ra’am party, led by Mansour Abbas, won eight; the Joint List, an alliance of left-wing and Arab nationalist factions, took eleven. Netanyahu’s bloc won 53 seats; the Jewish-led opposition won 48. An arrangement with the Arab parties could put the opposition over the top.
On November 8, President Isaac Herzog tasked Eisenkot with forming a government after 67 lawmakers, including all 19 representatives of the Arab parties, recommended him for prime minister.
For Israeli Arabs, the need for a change in government has become a priority. In 2025, 252 people were killed in criminal violence in Arab society, with most killings unsolved. Arab leaders accuse police under Ben-Gvir of failing to confront organized crime, and authorities have also stepped up demolitions of homes built without permits in unrecognized Bedouin villages. A survey in May found that 71 percent of Arabs listed crime and violence as their top concern, while 77 percent wanted an Arab party in government.
Abbas, the Ra’am leader, has shown what participation in government might yield for the Arab community. In 2021, he joined Naftali Bennett’s coalition and obtained commitments for billions of shekels in development and anti-crime spending. This year, Abbas placed Yoav Segalovitz, a Jewish Zionist and former police commander, second on his electoral list, signaling his willingness to work with Jewish politicians and his focus on combating crime. The Ra’am leader once said Israel was born Jewish and would remain so. Yet in August, he described that Jewish identity as a reality “imposed upon us,” rather than something Arab citizens had chosen.
Polls show that nearly 76 percent of Arab respondents support voluntary civil (i.e., non-military) service. Abbas has endorsed that approach but opposes the existing national-service framework, which is at odds with Eisenkot’s compulsory-service condition. Hamas is another obstacle to Ra’am’s inclusion. Abbas condemned the October 7 massacre but declined to demand Hamas’s destruction. Asked why in a 2025 interview, he responded: “Maybe I don’t want them to assassinate me.” On election night, asked whether he would call Hamas a terrorist organization, Abbas deferred the issue to coalition negotiations. Eisenkot wants a commitment on Hamas before a coalition agreement. Abbas wants an agreement before committing. On November 10, however, Israeli media reported that Abbas had privately agreed in principle to recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization in exchange for genuine political partnership.
Even with Ra’am’s support, the opposition bloc would control only 56 seats, five short of a majority. But if the Joint List’s 11 members abstained from the initial vote of confidence in a new government, those 56 votes could defeat Netanyahu’s 53. That would install a minority government dependent on the Joint List’s continued cooperation, particularly on budgets and legislation. Renewed fighting in Gaza could put that arrangement under severe strain.
Unlike Ra’am, the Joint List rejects compulsory military and civilian service, calling for an end to “all forms of conscription.” It also advocates for Palestinian statehood. Its leader, Yousef Jabareen, refuses to join a government that will be responsible for policies in Gaza or the West Bank but is willing to support Eisenkot from outside. He argues that Eisenkot’s coalition conditions do not apply to outside supporters, allowing the Joint List to help install a government without endorsing all its policies.
Signs suggest the desire to be in government extends to Joint List supporters. After the election, former Joint List lawmaker Osama al-Saadi dedicated the victory to Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and “occupied Jerusalem.” Suhail Malham, an Arab local council chairman, responded: “Wasn’t this victory for our people here, who came out in large numbers to vote?”At least 51 percent of Arabs indicated that they want the Joint List to be part of the government.
Participation may be what many Joint List supporters want right now, when bringing down Netanyahu and Ben-Gvir seems within reach. But renewed fighting in Gaza could lead to a Joint List defection. In 2020, senior Joint List figure Ahmad Tibi warned that Israeli strikes on Gaza would be a red line for supporting a minority government. Although he has now pledged not to help Netanyahu bring down an alternative government, keeping that promise may be easier said than done.
The coalition negotiations will force both sides to compromise on some of their electoral promises and ideological commitments. The Arab parties will have to decide whether gaining influence over their voters’ priorities justifies yielding their principles. The opposition parties must decide whether relying on Arab support would compromise their security commitments, or whether rejecting it is worth another election.
Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on Middle East affairs.