November 16, 2026 | Insight

Deterrence in the Balance: The Future of U.S. Force Posture in Europe

November 16, 2026 | Insight

Deterrence in the Balance: The Future of U.S. Force Posture in Europe

America’s NATO allies are anxiously awaiting the outcome of the Pentagon’s Europe force posture review, expected to be released in December. Unfortunately, reports suggest that the review could result in further cuts to U.S. forces in Europe after a year of reductions under the Trump administration. Cutting U.S. forces too quickly or too deeply could lead the Kremlin to question whether Washington has the will or the ability to resist further Russian aggression.

The review, originally announced in June, comes as Washington balances military operations in the Middle East, efforts to increase deterrence in the Pacific, and resource constraints across both theatres. Perhaps more significantly, it also comes amid persistent Russian hostility toward Europe as Moscow continues its war against Ukraine and conducts a so-called hybrid warfare campaign against NATO.

To counter this aggression, the United States should maintain a robust force posture in Europe, focusing on three lines of effort. First, the administration should uphold the longstanding U.S. commitment to providing NATO in potential crises with unique American military capabilities that Europe would struggle to replace. This commitment is crucial, even if some assets are too strained by demand in other theatres to be permanently stationed in Europe. Second, the Pentagon should avoid making further cuts to U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in Europe and increase the number of BCTs along NATO’s eastern flank. Finally, the administration should retain U.S. forces in Europe required to project power to other regions, including the Middle East. These steps should form an integral part of a broader effort to strengthen the Joint Force, which will require Congress to dramatically increase defense spending to meet growing threats across multiple theatres amid readiness shortfalls and a munitions crisis.

Cuts to U.S. Forces in Europe Under the Trump Administration

When it entered office in 2025, the Trump administration inherited an increased U.S. force posture in Europe that its predecessor had enhanced to deter Russian aggression against NATO in the wake of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since then, the administration has reduced America’s combat power on the continent to roughly pre-2022 levels. The administration’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) presaged some of these cuts by explicitly prioritizing the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific over Europe and calling on NATO allies to take “primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense, with critical but more limited U.S. support.”

These reductions have largely focused on cuts to U.S. Army BCTs along NATO’s eastern flank. While these formations may be the easiest for Europe to replace, cutting them risks undermining the Kremlin’s perception of Washington’s political will to defend the alliance and thereby invites additional Russian aggression.

Since Russia’s full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the United States had generally maintained five U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) on the continent, including three on the eastern flank:

  1. The permanently forward-stationed 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR) Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) in Vilseck, Germany;
  2. The permanently forward-stationed 173rd Airborne Brigade, headquartered in Italy;
  3. A rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in Poland, starting in 2017, following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea;
  4. An additional rotational ABCT in Poland, following Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine; and
  5. A rotational Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) in Romania, following Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Over the past year, however, the Trump administration has reduced the number of BCTs in Europe and along the eastern flank to pre-2022 levels. Last fall, the administration ended the rotational IBCT deployments to Romania. Then, in May, the administration announced that it would withdraw roughly 5,000 troops from Germany amid a political spat between Washington and Berlin over the Iran war, with reports suggesting it would likely impact 2CR. Weeks later, the administration halted the deployment of a rotational ABCT to Poland, leaving only one ABCT along the eastern flank for the first time since 2022.

These rotational ABCTs, which regularly rotate subordinate units through the Baltics, are central to American deterrence in Europe because they allow U.S. forces to respond rapidly to contingencies along NATO’s eastern flank. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, the commander of U.S. European Command (EUCOM), described them as “essential to our current deterrence posture” just two months before the administration’s decision to halt the next rotation.

While the administration announced in late May that it would maintain the pre-2022 level of three BCTs in Europe, the fates of 2CR and the ABCT in Poland remain in flux amid the ongoing posture review. For now, U.S. Army units have restored a rotational presence in the Baltic states, likely drawing on battalions from the remaining rotational ABCT in Poland, but it is unclear whether that presence will be sustained.

Underlying these cuts is the Pentagon’s understandable concern about resource constraints across multiple theatres amid the threat of simultaneous great power wars and the need to increase deterrence in the Pacific. Still, it is difficult to justify many of these cuts with that logic. U.S. Army formations designed for large-scale ground combat, such as ABCTs and SBCTs, are more valuable for deterring Russia in Europe than countering China in the maritime-dominated Pacific.

Maintaining ‘Critical Support’ for NATO

While the administration’s NDS makes clear that Europe must bear most of the burden of conventional defense of the continent, it commits to maintaining what it describes as “critical support.” That presumably means unique American military capabilities and enablers that Europe would have difficulty fully replicating in the near to medium term, such as long-range fires; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); aerial refueling; strategic airlift; air and missile defense (AMD); and command and control (C2).

Unfortunately, that is exactly what some of the administration’s cuts have targeted. Take long-range fires, for instance. In May, the Pentagon reportedly canceled the planned deployment of the long-range fires battalion (LRFB) of the 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force (2MDTF), which includes critical long-range strike capabilities. Elements of 2MDTF are already stationed in Germany, and in a 2024 joint statement with Berlin, Washington committed to begin “episodic deployments” of the LRFB to Germany in 2026. Though other U.S. artillery, air, and naval units can partially compensate, the LRFB’s absence weakens 2MDTF’s long-range precision strike capabilities and, by extension, those of NATO. The alliance, which already needs more long-range strike capacity, depends overwhelmingly on the United States for these capabilities. European allies will require years to catch up, which is why Germany viewed the 2024 agreement as a “temporary bridge.” The administration is reportedly considering transferring additional elements of the MDTF from Europe to the Pacific, where U.S. Army Pacific already maintains multiple MDTFs.

The administration has also made cuts to critical capabilities allocated to the alliance through the NATO Force Model (NFM), whereby Washington commits certain forces stationed in the United States to NATO in a crisis. This allows the United States to maintain a relatively modest force posture in Europe — certainly compared with the Cold War — while retaining the ability to surge forces to the continent in a conflict, reassuring allies and signaling to Moscow that the American “cavalry” is coming in a crisis.

However, in June, the administration informed NATO allies of its intention to significantly reduce critical NFM contributions. The cuts would reportedly include one of two carrier strike groups (CSGs), eight of 17 destroyers, 11 of 26 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, six of 12 MQ-4 and MQ-9 drones, 16 of 79 KC-135 and KC-46 aerial refueling tankers, one of two strategic bomber groups, and roughly a third of the 150 American F-15s and F-16s allocated to Europe in a crisis. While Grynkewich noted that some of these cuts involved assets that allies could backfill “now and in the near term,” such as fighter aircraft, many of them are in areas that Europe would struggle to replace.

To be sure, the administration is right to point out that many areas of critical U.S. support are stretched thin and are in high demand across multiple regions. These include long-range strike and AMD capacity, aerial refueling tankers, strategic lift aircraft, U.S. Air Force fighter squadrons, and U.S. Navy vessels. These resource constraints, which existed before Operation Epic Fury, have also been exacerbated by the munitions shortages and readiness strains resulting from the Iran war. Nevertheless, the need to meet demands in multiple theaters should not become an excuse for rushed or poorly crafted cuts in Europe.

Sizing U.S. Force Posture in Europe To Meet Today’s Threats

Despite demands in other regions, the administration should remain committed to providing critical American capabilities to the NFM that are needed for the alliance to function properly in a conflict. Even if some are too strained to be permanently stationed on the continent, it is easier to surge many of these critical capabilities to Europe in a crisis than it is to move entire armored brigades across the Atlantic. However, because many of these capabilities would be called upon for a conflict with China, the Pentagon will need to scrutinize its strategic assumptions about the resources required to maintain America’s security commitments in Europe and the Pacific amid the risk of simultaneous great power conflicts. This is not a problem the Pentagon can solve without the required resources. The need remains for Congress to swiftly authorize and appropriate sufficient funding to begin addressing the munitions shortfalls and readiness strains that are central to this challenge. 

Additionally, to maintain deterrence, the Pentagon should avoid making further cuts to BCTs in Europe and strengthen U.S. Army force posture along NATO’s eastern flank, where Russia’s threat to the alliance is most acute. While this obviously would not fully compensate for any potential reductions to “critical” U.S. support, it would be highly visible and useful for deterring the Kremlin and reassuring allies. This should include permanently stationing at least one ABCT in Poland and working with Warsaw to maintain and defend pre-positioned stockpiles to field additional ABCTs that could be surged in a crisis. This would signal an increased U.S. commitment to eastern flank allies and further enable U.S. forces to operate effectively with their Polish and other NATO counterparts. Additionally, permanent forces are generally less costly than regular rotational deployments. The Trump administration has already made progress on this front by reportedly nearing a deal to establish a permanent American base in Poland.

Likewise, rather than withdrawing 2CR from Europe entirely, the Pentagon should move 2CR farther east to the Baltics or Poland, where it would provide a visible American deterrent alongside other U.S. and NATO formations along the eastern flank. Because the training and logistical value of Vilseck and the nearby Grafenwoehr Training Area are too great to give up, the U.S. Army should maintain a presence there. Depending on EUCOM’s requirements, the Pentagon should consider whether it would be valuable to backfill 2CR with an additional BCT in Vilseck. This could provide EUCOM with options to employ additional ground forces from behind the eastern flank, where other U.S. and NATO units would be tied down defending against attacking Russian forces in a large-scale conflict.

Finally, the administration should retain critical Air Force and Navy capabilities in Europe that are essential to defending American interests there and projecting power to the Middle East, Africa, and the Arctic. This should include the U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) in Rota, Spain. In addition to supporting NATO, these destroyers also play a pivotal role in the Middle East by defending U.S. forces, Israel, and other allies and partners from ballistic missiles. If these destroyers were pulled from Spain, it would take years for Europe to replace them, and U.S. forces and partners in the Middle East, including Israel, would be deprived of a critical part of their integrated AMD architecture.

As the administration weighs the future of American force posture in Europe against priorities in the Pacific and the Middle East, it should consider the lessons of history. Since 1945, a robust force posture in Europe has prevented the type of aggression that forced millions of Americans to cross the Atlantic and fight two costly world wars. Today, excessive or premature reductions risk inviting additional Russian aggression, which would be a disaster for American interests in Europe, and undermining efforts to increase deterrence in the Pacific.

Cameron McMillan is a senior research analyst for the Center on Military & Political Power (CMPP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he focuses on U.S. military readiness, posture, operations, defense production, and security cooperation, as well as European and Middle Eastern security. Before joining FDD, Cam served as a U.S. Army field artillery officer in the Massachusetts Army National Guard, deploying to Iraq in 2021 as a C-RAM (counter rocket, artillery, mortar) battle captain. He holds an M.S. in global studies and international relations from Northeastern University and a B.A. in history from Boston University. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.