Canceled Briefings Underscore CISA’s Departure From Election Security Efforts

Foreign adversaries have long been targeting the U.S. midterm elections — but instead of rising to the challenge, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has taken a step back. Just one day before the midterm elections, CISA canceled the press briefings it traditionally holds on Election Day.

The cancellations represent a departure from the past decade of election security efforts and are the latest in a series of cutbacks in the agency’s approach to election security this year. This puts America’s most critical democratic process at risk by limiting access to key threat information and failing to identify election security as a strategic objective.

As Election Threats Increase, CISA Disengages

Multiple cyber and information attacks have already targeted the midterm elections. Hackers attempted to access the Federal Election Commission’s electronic filing system in the week before the midterms, and classified assessments have warned that Russia is running covert online operations aimed at undermining confidence in this year’s election. Threat intelligence researchers and fact-checkers have also exposed new AI deepfake campaigns.

Since Washington designated election security as a critical infrastructure subsector in 2017, CISA has served as its Sector Risk Management Agency, tasked with securing the sector against threats through proactive analysis and preparation. Historically, hundreds of CISA employees supported election security preparedness nationwide by providing free cyber assistance, information sharing, and expertise to election offices and technology vendors. These efforts included providing the threat briefings CISA held in 2018, 2020, 2022, and 2024 but canceled this year.

Workforce Cuts Threaten To Shutter CISA’s Election Security Shop

These cancellations are part of a larger pattern by the agency of moving away from election security, in part because of political pressure and workforce cuts by the Trump administration. Since January 2025, CISA’s workforce has fallen by about 1,100 people, from 3,300 to 2,200, and the fiscal year 2027 request would eliminate roughly 870 more positions.

Election security efforts are also noticeably absent from the agency’s recently released CISA 2030 Strategy, which assesses risks, identifies weak points, and lays out a plan to better secure the United States from malicious actors targeting critical infrastructure. Instead, CISA released a separate election security plan in September, just two months before the election. Yet the plan identifies no dedicated funding or staff beyond existing regional directors. Releasing the plan so close to Election Day minimizes its effectiveness for the midterms, especially given that the earliest mail-in ballots became available in early September and that election officials start preparations many months in advance. State election officials have reported that CISA’s support is coming too late in the process of their preparations.

CISA Should Prioritize Election Security, and Congress Should Give It the Tools It Needs

To fulfill its mission to secure U.S. elections, CISA needs adequate strategy, workforce, and resources. First, the agency should write election infrastructure into the 2030 strategy’s 180-day implementation plan. This includes defining resources and metrics to restore the core responsibility and principles of its election strategy in the agency’s overall operational plan. As part of the plan, CISA should prioritize mechanisms for timely information sharing on election security threats by restoring Election Day briefings for future cycles. Doing so can provide mission continuity through 2030, including the 2028 presidential race.

Second, Congress should reject the Trump administration’s proposed elimination of CISA’s election security program and restore its election security advisers. Congress should also require that CISA complete a force structure assessment so that the workforce can be sized to the efforts that the agency’s strategy and mission describe.

Election security requires enduring commitment and relationships — and the agency charged with protecting it must have the priority and resources to match.

Sophie McDowall is a research associate for the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Elisa Montgomery is an intern. For more analysis from the authors and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Sophie on X @SophieMcDowall_. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CCTI. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.