Ankara Is Baiting Israel, Not the Reverse

Before dawn on August 18, Israeli jets destroyed the runway at Syria’s Abu al-Duhur air base in Idlib. Within hours, America’s ambassador in Ankara, Tom Barrack, pronounced the raid an unnecessary escalation. Days later he floated the theory that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was baiting the Turks for his political advantage ahead of Israel’s October election. The entire episode reveals how badly Washington has mismanaged the rise of Turkey amid profound changes taking place across the Middle East.

Israel struck because it had intelligence, that it shared with Washington six days beforehand, implicating Turkey’s intention to place radar, air defenses, and troops at the base. In the wake of calls by the Turks to raise a pan-Islamic army to attack Israel, not to mention Ankara’s support for Hamas, the Israelis were not inclined to look the other way. This is the “October 8 mentality” touted by the Israeli defense establishment. No longer will the Jewish state allow for threats to gather on its doorstep.

But Israeli strikes on Turkish interests in Syria are not exactly new. In March 2025, Israeli jets hit the T4 and Palmyra airfields hours before Turkish military survey teams were due to arrive. Ankara’s plans for T4 included Hisar air defense batteries and armed drones at a base roughly halfway between Turkey and Israel. The logic on both sides is no mystery: Turkey intends to stay, and Israel intends to keep Syrian skies clear of threats.

Ankara’s reply is lawyerly, arguing that its troops are in Syria at Damascus’s invitation, whereas Israel isn’t. Turkey’s defense ministry denies any deployment was underway at all.

This assertion defies credulity. Ankara launched three offensives into Syria between 2016 and 2019: “Euphrates Shield,” “Olive Branch,” and “Peace Spring.” Each proceeded over Damascus’s explicit objection, and each was justified as a counterterrorism operation. Human Rights Watch has found that the Turkish military today controls vast stretches of Syria’s Kurdish north, where the Turks have an interest in suppressing Kurdish nationalism. Defense Minister Yasar Guler said in February that Turkey has no intention of vacating those bases.

The Turkish doctrine is perhaps best summed up this way: Syrian sovereignty constrains everyone except Ankara.

The Israelis are not playing by these rules. The threat posed by Turkey is not hypothetical. In 2024, Turkish strongman Recep Tayyip Erdogan boasted that Turkey might enter Israel as it had “entered Karabakh and Libya.” He reiterated this in April. Ankara’s defenders call this domestic theater. Israel’s defense establishment, amid a multifront war that has dragged on for nearly three years, is not convinced.

In March, Turkey stationed six fighter jets in occupied Northern Cyprus, less than 300 miles from Israel. The move was intimidation dressed as air defense. And the continued support that Ankara provides to Hamas cannot be ignored.

Ankara’s widening military footprint across the Middle East should be cause for the United States to take note. In Somalia, Ankara has sent fighters, “donated” battle tanks, and begun an aerospace complex near Mogadishu built for missile and satellite launches. On August 7, Erdogan signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. This further expands the security arrangements that Turkey enjoys with Qatar, Libya, and Syria.

Seen through the lens of hard power, Turkey now has bases across three continents. Syria could be the most crucial one, within reach of Israel.

Syrians don’t love the new reality that is coming into focus. Riots against Turkish rule swept the north in 2024, and that resentment hasn’t dissipated. Nor is there appetite for the confrontation with Israel that Ankara is courting. Polling conducted in Damascus and Homs found just 5 percent of Syrians favor a purely military answer to foreign incursions, while half prefer diplomacy. Every instance of Turkish expansion invites Israeli ordnance onto Syrian runways, and Syrians absorb the cost of a rivalry they didn’t choose.

Israel’s methods can be heavy-handed. But its red lines in Syria are stated, consistent, and telegraphed to Damascus and to Washington. Turkey’s are not.

Ambassador Tom Barrack’s first instinct to defend Turkey’s behavior has been met with backlash in Washington. Upon further reflection, and amid reports that he required a shorter leash, he is now trying to cool the temperature. The new trilateral deconfliction mechanism between Israel, Syria, and Turkey is one worth pursuing. But the devil is in the details. Deconfliction that disciplines a single party isn’t worth the effort. President Donald Trump needs to recalibrate American foreign policy in the Middle East to look past the current war with Iran and to prepare for the very real potential of an aggressive Turkey. That’s for the long term. For now, he should simply ask his trusted advisers why an alleged Turkish radar at a base near Aleppo was worth striking before concluding that it wasn’t.

Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Sinan and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Sinan on X @SinanCiddi. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.