Vučić Welcomes Zelensky in Serbia: Turning Point or Tactical Gambit?

On Saturday, Volodymyr Zelensky made his first official visit to Serbia, a country long seen as one of Russia’s closest European partners. For some in the West, it was proof that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić was finally moving toward Europe and away from Moscow.

That celebration is likely premature.

Vučić has long sought to play East and West off each other. Currently facing the biggest protests of his decade-long rule, he craves the appearance of European legitimacy to help shore up his hold on power. For Vučić, hosting Zelensky is a tactical gambit rather than a sign Belgrade has fundamentally changed its geopolitical strategy.

Despite being a nominal candidate for EU accession, since Moscow launched its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Vučić’s political machinery has cast the conflict in a light favorable to Russia. Pro-government media have repeated Kremlin narratives that Ukraine attacked Russia, promoted Russian propaganda about supposed Ukrainian bioweapons, and amplified fears of that Western aid for Kyiv could lead to World War III.

At the same time, Vučić has turned the war into a lucrative business opportunity. Serbian ammunition has reached Kyiv through third countries, prompting former US Ambassador to Serbia Christopher Hill to describe the arms trade as evidence of a “lasting and sustainable relationship” between Serbia and Ukraine. But Serbia’s weapons trade has never been about choosing geopolitical camps. Its defense industry sells to whoever will pay, from Western partners to Azerbaijan, the Gulf states, and African countries. Reportedly, Serbia’s weapons also reached the authoritarian regime in Myanmar, Sudan and armed groups in the Sahel.

Meanwhile, Belgrade has continued to receive arms from Russia and China. Last year, Serbia conducted its first combined exercise with China and acquired Chinese drones and air defense systems.

While Serbia suspended military exercises with Russia after the invasion, deeper intelligence ties survived. Serbian intelligence has maintained contacts with Russia’s foreign intelligence service, or SVR. Aleksandar Vulin, a close ally of Vučić who is under US sanctions and until recently served as intelligence chief and then deputy prime minister, cultivating a particularly close relationship with SVR head Sergey Naryshkin. In March 2025, as mass protests shook Serbia, Vulin said Russian intelligence had assisted Serbian authorities in confronting what Belgrade portrayed as a potential “color revolution.”

Leaked documents show that Serbian intelligence and Russia’s FSB jointly test anti-protest sound cannons on dogs last year shortly after demonstrators in Belgrade reported being struck by a mysterious sonic blast. Russian intelligence has used Serbia as a permissive hub for operations in Europe, from training paramilitaries to destabilize Moldova to recruiting agents for provocations in France.

Likewise, the Serbian Orthodox Church remains one of Moscow’s key channels of soft power in the Balkans. Serbian Patriarch Porfirije has publicly thanked Vladimir Putin for Russia’s support on Kosovo, while Vučić awarded Russia’s Patriarch Kirill Serbia’s highest state decoration in 2025.

Energy is a perfect example of how Belgrade balances between East and West. Serbia remains heavily dependent on Russian gas even as Vučić promises Western partners that Belgrade will diversify. His latest pitch is a US-Serbia energy partnership centered on the planned Đerdap 3 hydropower project. Yet after the United States sanctioned Serbia’s Russian-owned oil company, NIS, Vučić has sought to buy time by securing sanctions waivers and attempting to restructure the company’s Russian ownership.

Then there is Kosovo, which helps explain why Russia remains so useful to Vučić. Russia rejects Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence, and Belgrade depends on Moscow to wield its veto at the UN Security Council to block full international recognition of Kosovar sovereignty. While Vučić insists that he will never recognize Russian control over occupied Ukrainian territory, he does so not out of loyalty to Kyiv but to defend Serbia’s own claim to Kosovo.

Brussels and Washington want Serbia closer to Europe and less dependent on Moscow. The Kremlin wants Serbia as a foothold in the Balkans. Vučić wants all the two sides to keep competing for his attention, and none to demand too high a price for it.

That strategy is particularly valuable now. Serbia’s opposition protests have presented Vučić’s greatest political challenge in years. A high-profile visit by Zelensky allows him to demonstrate relevance to Western governments at precisely the moment his domestic legitimacy is under strain. And it costs him relatively little: welcoming Zelensky does not require him to impose sanctions on Russia, abandon Russian energy or sever intelligence ties.

Washington has tolerated Belgrade’s antics because US officials fear that taking too hard a line would push the country into Moscow’s bear hug. In July, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Foreign Minister Marko Djuric held the inaugural US-Serbia Strategic Dialogue, pledging to deepen relations even as Vučić continues to balance between the two sides.

That approach needs to change. Washington should consider imposing Global Magnitsky sanctions on Serbian officials involved in repression, corruption, and cooperation with Moscow, Beijing and Tehran.

Zelensky’s visit should not be measured by the handshake in Belgrade, but by what comes next. If Vučić wants the legitimacy and benefits of the West, he should be asked to make real choices – not simply promises. Until then, Washington and Brussels should stop mistaking his balancing act for a strategic turn toward the West.

Daniel Vaynshteyn is Associate Director of Government Relations at FDD Action. Dr. Ivana Stradner serves as a research fellow with FDD’s Barish Center for Media Integrity.