August 5, 2026 | Policy Brief

Syria’s Break With Russia Must Go Beyond Oil

August 5, 2026 | Policy Brief

Syria’s Break With Russia Must Go Beyond Oil

Syria’s current leaders and Russia once stood on opposite sides of the battlefield. Yet since the overthrow of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Moscow’s longtime ally during the Syrian civil war, the government of President Ahmad al-Sharaa has relied heavily on Russia to meet Syria’s critical energy needs.

In May, Russian oil deliveries to Syria reportedly reached roughly 60,000 barrels a day, all transported aboard U.S.-sanctioned vessels. Now Damascus appears prepared to loosen that dependence.

Reuters reported that the Syrian government agreed to “drastically reduce imports of Russian oil” after Washington made the issue part of negotiations for removing Syria from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism — the last major American sanctions regime still imposed on the country.

Pulling Syria out of Russia’s sphere of influence would be an important step in aligning it more closely with American goals, especially after the diplomatic engagement and sanctions relief that the United States has extended to Damascus over the past year. Moscow has long used Syria’s economic dependence to preserve its foothold in the country. But reducing that dependence will not, by itself, remove Russia’s influence over the country. Russia still retains access to its two principal military facilities on Syria’s coast, the naval facility at Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base in Latakia.

Syria’s Economic Relationship With Russia

Domestic energy production in Syria has been limited since the fall of the Assad regime. Domestic oil production stands at around 35,000 barrels per day, while national demand has reached 150,000 barrels per day. That gap gave Moscow an opening, and Russia became Syria’s principal foreign energy supplier.

Russia has supplied Syria with approximately 16.8 million barrels of oil in 2025, covering approximately two-fifths of Syria’s estimated daily requirements and exceeding the country’s production by nearly two to one. In March 2025, Russia delivered diesel to Syria aboard the sanctioned tanker Prosperity. Days later, two additional sanctioned tankers, Aquatica and Sakina, offloaded Russian oil at Syria’s Baniyas port in Western Syria. The most recent identifiable delivery involved the Russia-flagged AKHILL, a U.S. sanctioned tanker that arrived at Baniyas on July 22.

Syria’s dependence on Moscow has also extended to grain stolen from Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine. In April, a Russian bulk carrier loaded 27,400 tons of wheat in Crimea before docking and unloading at Tartus.

Growing Russian-Syrian Military Cooperation

While Moscow’s current military relationship with Damascus is not comparable to the extensive relationship between the Assad regime and Russia, both countries have actively worked on sustaining a Russian military presence in the country. Arab media reports have claimed that the Syrian Ministry of Defense is transforming the Hmeimim Air Base into a training facility for the Syrian army staffed by Russian advisers. The Wall Street Journal separately reported that Moscow had begun sending cargo ships from Russia to Syria to resupply the airbase, where it has retained hundreds of personnel.

Sharaa has remained deliberately ambiguous about the future of Russia’s military presence. In his latest interview with the Qatari-owned broadcaster Al Jazeera, the Syrian leader said negotiations over the bases were still ongoing but acknowledged that Damascus had agreed to preserve Russia’s “deployment at Hmeimim Air Base and part of the base in Tartus.”

Washington Should Press Syria to Further Break With Moscow

Washington has shown some ambivalence about pressuring Damascus over its growing ties with Moscow.

Some members of Congress, however, have expressed concern that was reflected in the House National Defense Authorization Act report language directing the Pentagon to examine options for reducing Russia’s military presence in Syria. Although Damascus is seeking to reduce its dependence on Russian oil, Washington should also press Syria to stop purchasing grain seized from Ukraine. The United States should make clear that Syrian entities purchasing from, or otherwise materially supporting, Russian actors involved in the war against Ukraine could themselves face U.S. sanctions.

Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Ahmad and FDD, please subscribeHERE. Follow FDD on X@FDD. Follow Ahmad on X@AhmadA_Sharawi. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.