Decision or stagnation in Gaza?

On June 4, 2026, the Board of Peace, established in the wake of the US-brokered Gaza ceasefire in October 2025, highlighted Egypt’s contributions to the International Stabilisation Force (ISF). The ISF is intended to be a key feature of the plan to enable Gaza to return to normal after years of war and more than a decade and a half of Hamas rule.

“Egypt’s contributions will help the #ISF scale up operations to create a safer & more secure Gaza. As a country sharing a border with Gaza, the participation & leadership of Egypt in this shared effort is critical to mission success,” the Board of Peace posted on social media platform X. Photos accompanying the post showed a member of the International Stabilisation Force presenting an Egyptian officer with a patch for the ISF. Egypt is the latest country to commit to the ISF, after Kosovo and Albania sent a delegation to Gaza in April.

The ISF appears to have only begun its first steps in terms of bringing together the 20,000 personnel once envisioned by the ceasefire plan. The reasons for this are complex. Indeed, every plan of this type is complex and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has always been one of the most difficult conflicts to solve. The October 7 Gaza War was tremendously destructive. As of early June 2026, around two million Gaza civilians continue to live under Hamas rule in around 40% of Gaza. The rest of Gaza is controlled by the Israel Defence Forces. The two parts of Gaza are separated by what Israel calls the “Yellow Line”.

There is a lot of uncertainty about what might come next in Gaza. 

Recently, Israel’s 252nd Division completed a four-month rotation in Gaza. The IDF often has elements of two divisions deployed in the enclave. The 99th Division is continuing its mission in Gaza, patrolling the Yellow Line and eliminating Hamas threats with precision strikes.

The uncertainty and lack of clear, large commitments to the ISF and other operations from the international community have made it hard for real change to happen. Instead, there has been stagnation and weekly precision strikes by the IDF targeting Hamas leaders and commanders.

In late May, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu hinted that Israel might launch a new offensive in Gaza to obtain control over 70% or more of the area. “We are now in 60% of the territory of the Gaza Strip. We were at 50%. We moved to 60%… My directive is to move to – take it step by step – first of all, 70. Let’s start with that,” he said. He did not spell out what would happen to the civilians in Gaza, who continue to live under Hamas rule. Asked about the comments about Israel taking 70% of Gaza, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told members of Congress on June 2 that the current US-backed plan does not envision changes in Gaza. “We have a plan, it doesn’t call for that… And, at the end of the day, we understand that what we want, and I think what the Israelis would ultimately want, is a Gaza that is governed by a non-Hamas entity.”

High Hopes

There were high hopes for Gaza when the US brokered a ceasefire deal in October 2025. At the time, there had been two years of difficult war. It’s worth looking back at how we got to the current situation in Gaza, in order to understand why the situation appears to have stagnated over the last months. The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023 was devastating for Israel. With more than 1,000 people murdered and 250 taken hostage, Israel was faced with no choice but a huge invasion of Gaza. 

This was an operation Israel had attempted to avoid ever since the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007. Hamas had always been strong in Gaza. Men like Yahya Sinwar came from Khan Younis and joined the Muslim Brotherhood-linked movement in the 1980s.

By the time of the Hamas takeover in 2007, much had changed. Israel had left Gaza in the Disengagement of 2005. Chaos followed. Hamas captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006. Rather than resuming control over Gaza until he was released, Israel chose to fight a short conflict and then negotiate. Five years later, Shalit was released in exchange for 1,027 prisoners. Sinwar, who became the architect of the October 7 attack, was released in that deal. 

Israel preferred to manage the conflict in Gaza between 2011 and 2023. Funds flowed to Gaza, Hamas thrived, on the eve of October 7, there were four Israelis already held in Gaza (two deceased soldiers from the conflict in 2014, and two civilians).

The October 7 War was incredibly destructive. Even though Israel deployed more than five IDF divisions to fight Hamas and was able to defeat most of the Hamas brigades and battalions in Gaza, Hamas continued to cling to power. US President Donald Trump came into office with the goal of bringing the Israeli hostages home and ending the conflict. He deduced that this long war was not good for Israel or anyone else in the region. Success came in September 2025 when the Trump Administration was able to push regional countries towards a deal. Instead of a trickle of hostages being released, Hamas released all the remaining Israeli hostages, alive and deceased in October 2025.

The Trump Administration showed it was serious about keeping the peace in Gaza. US Central Command deployed forces to a large warehouse in the southern Israeli city of Kiryat Gat. Dubbed the Civil-Military Coordination Centre, the warehouse brought together military personnel and civilians from a number of partner countries and international organisations to support stabilisation in Gaza. Initially, this was about getting humanitarian aid into Gaza and within days, trucks were crossing in very large numbers. This was important because during the war Israel had sometimes prevented or limited aid entering Gaza at times. Even after the ceasefire deal in mid-October 2025, Israeli officials claimed they would stop aid deliveries to Gaza on October 19 after Hamas violated the ceasefire. The Trump Administration made it clear aid would continue to enter the enclave and the decision was reversed.

With the Trump Administration in the driver’s seat of the Gaza deal, the White House was able to notch a number of early successes. This included UN support for a 20-point Gaza roadmap, including the ISF. The US established the Board of Peace and a Palestinian technocratic committee, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), which was supposed to run Gaza. The White House spoke about “lasting peace, stability, reconstruction, and prosperity in the region.” A High Representative for Gaza, former UN official Nickolay Mladenov, was appointed. However, the optimism has turned to stagnation.

The US and Israeli strikes on Iran beginning on Feb. 28 of this year shifted focus from Gaza. Israel has also been fighting Hezbollah in Lebanon, moving the spotlight from Gaza to Beirut. In late May, the IDF killed Hamas’ Gaza leader Mohammed Odeh days after eliminating his predecessor, Izz al-Din al-Haddad. As of June 2026, the IDF is said to be ready for a possible new offensive in Gaza. At the same time, even though there appears to be a Hamas leadership vacuum in Gaza, there is no clear strategy for removing Hamas from power or enabling civilians in Gaza to live under non-Hamas rule in an area of the Strip.

The situation in Gaza has remained largely unchanged over the last few months. The IDF carries out almost daily strikes on Hamas. For instance, on June 5 the IDF struck a Hamas terrorist in northern Gaza who posed a threat to Israeli troops. It also struck “senior members of Hamas’ General Security Apparatus.” On June 4, the IDF said it “eliminated the terrorist Ahmed Abu Mughaysib, the head of a rocket-launching cell in the Islamic Jihad terrorist organisation.” 

Hamas appears to be firmly in control of around 40% of Gaza. Even though some small anti-Hamas militias have emerged in areas under IDF control, they don’t appear to offer a real challenge to Hamas so far. There have been no reports of major opposition to Hamas within the 40% of Gaza where Hamas is in charge. Hamas has appeared to be able to rebuild its networks, even though IDF precision strikes have killed Hamas commanders. This is not a surprise. Hamas has done this in the past. In the 1990s and early 2000s, it also saw its leadership killed, expelled and detained and each time it regrew its networks and even emerged stronger. 

Hamas has maintained its control through executions, according to a UN report released in early June. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights documented Hamas abuses. “These cases involved executions, kneecapping, bone-breaking with metal pipes or cement bricks and beatings and were framed by the perpetrators as punishments for alleged collaboration with Israel, looting humanitarian aid, theft, drug-related offences, or affiliations with internal rivals,” it said. Hamas has often used a mix of terror and patronage networks to maintain control in Gaza. 

Meanwhile, aid continues to flow into Gaza. The Israel Defence Forces have prevented some smuggling, including of tobacco products to Gaza. Sources in Gaza told The Guardian that they continue to lack many items, such as spare parts for things like generators and engine oil. On June 14, head of Israel’s Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), Maj. Gen. Yoram Halevy, met with UNICEF Special Representative Jonathan Veitch. The meeting focused on water issues relating to Gaza, including “improving access to water for the population.” COGAT, which deals with humanitarian aid entering Gaza, also noted on June 14 that “Israel continues to allow and facilitate the entry of humanitarian supplies on a large scale. If there is a need for additional equipment and supplies, the approvals are already in place and the organisations have the ability to utilise them.”

As of now, the IDF continues to confront threats in Gaza using limited strikes on Hamas. These are precision strikes but in terms of a long-term strategy it is not clear what will happen in Gaza. With only a handful of personnel committed to the ISF and with the new Palestinian technocratic committee unable to govern anything in Gaza, it appears the status quo will remain for now. 

Dr Seth J. Frantzman is the senior Middle East Correspondent and analyst at the Jerusalem Post. He is the author of three books including, most recently, The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza (2024).