Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring and NPT Safeguards Reports — June 2026

Excerpt

This report summarizes and assesses information in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) quarterly report, dated June 4, 2026: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement (“Safeguards report”) and relevant provisions of the United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  It also includes information from the June 4, 2026 Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Verification report”).  The analysis adds context and commentary on aspects not included in the report.

The IAEA’s report presents a picture of near-total, ongoing loss of monitoring of Iranian nuclear sites due to Iran’s suspension of access nearly one year ago, an unaccounted-for enriched uranium stockpile, key activities that cannot be verified, and the persistence of long-standing compliance failures.

At a Glance

• In its latest safeguards report, the IAEA continues to declare Iran in violation of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement.
• The IAEA is unable to verify the suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, and heavy water production programs, as required under UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions reimposed in October 2025, and Iran is denying the IAEA access, information, and cooperation.
• The IAEA is unable to report on Iran’s stocks of enriched uranium and their size, location and chemical composition, and the status of centrifuges and related equipment.
• The IAEA clearly identifies the Esfahan, aka Isfahan, tunnel complex as a storage location for 20 and 60 percent enriched uranium and reports its concern about activity at the site in early February 2026.
• According to the Verification report, after February 28, 2026, the IAEA “stopped conducting verification activities in Iran in accordance with the NPT safeguards agreement.
• Overall, the report lacks sufficient information.  It provides much less detail on the location of enriched uranium than Director General Rafael Grossi has reported in media interviews, and no information on the other candidate sites where the material may be entombed, including Fordow, a tunnel site built in 2007 at Natanz, and Pickaxe Mountain near Natanz.
• The report does not address Iranian nuclear weapons related sites that were struck by the United States and Israel during the June 2025 and February to April 2026 conflicts, despite publicly available information on the nuclear weapons relevance of the sites and the fact that some of them had capabilities the IAEA was mandated to monitor under Section T of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
• Despite publicly available information on the extent of damage inflicted on nuclear sites, the IAEA continues to report nothing more than a list of declared sites “affected by the attacks.”
• The IAEA does not report its observations of the status of known centrifuge manufacturing sites, such as TESA Karaj and Kalaye Electric; both were attacked in June 2025.  The IAEA does report an additional attack on the former in the recent phase of the conflict.  The IAEA Verification report states in a footnote that the Karaj site was struck again during the 2026 phase.
• The Verification report does list the Heavy Water Production Plant and the Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant as attacked in phase two of the conflict.
• The Board of Governors should instruct the IAEA to increase reporting to the member states in its safeguards report  regarding Iranian activities observed at nuclear sites, especially with regard to the recovery of equipment and enriched uranium from the destroyed sites, the possible current locations of enriched uranium or diversion of that material, and the status of nuclear weaponization sites and other key assets.
• A draft resolution reportedly sponsored by the United States and the European Union, demands Iran provide the IAEA with “precise information on nuclear material accountancy and safeguarded nuclear facilities” and grant inspectors full access to verify that information “without delay.” 

Andrea Stricker is deputy director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and an FDD research fellow.