Post-Assad Syria Is Mending Fences With Russia

The new Syrian leadership has signaled openness to the West and has even demonstrated cooperation with Ukraine — Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in April. Yet beneath this diplomatic realignment, Syria has continued to depend heavily on Russia for critical needs. Moscow is increasing its military support to Damascus and remains a key supplier of wheat and oil, suggesting that Russia’s influence in Syria did not dissipate with the overthrow of its ally, former President Bashar al-Assad.

Damascus’s growing relationship with Moscow is especially notable given that Russia was a full partner in the mass atrocities the Assad regime committed against its own subjects during the Syrian civil war. Sharaa has apparently concluded that Russia’s primary interest is in maintaining its foothold in Syria, chiefly the Hmeimim Air Base and the Tartus naval facility. “Russia, of course, plays a major role in Syria, in stabilizing the situation, not only in Syria but also in the region,” Sharaa stated appreciatively during a visit to Moscow. In return, Sharaa is positioning Damascus to extract tangible benefits from Russia, including military, energy, and grain imports.

Russian Military Presence in Syria Works to Mutual Advantage

According to Arab media sources, the Syrian Ministry of Defense is transforming the Hmeimim Air Base into a training facility for the Syrian army staffed by Russian advisers. According to the source, the base retains military infrastructure “in excellent condition,” while much of the Syrian military’s surviving equipment remains Russian-made.

Damascus does not want to abandon these remaining Russian weapons systems, especially those that survived Israel’s campaign to degrade Syria’s military capabilities following the fall of the regime. Damascus understands that it needs to maintain the military relationship with Moscow to maintain and train Syrian personnel on legacy Soviet and Russian equipment.

For Russia, sustaining a presence on the Syrian coast, especially at Tartus, remains a priority. The base provides Russia with monitoring capabilities across the eastern Mediterranean and surveillance of military activity by NATO and Western states. Additionally, in November 2025, Israeli sources claimed that Russia “submitted a proposal to Damascus for Russian patrols … to act as a separation force between Syrian and Israeli troops” in southern Syria.

Syria Imports Oil From Russia and Grain Stolen From Ukraine

The relationship between Damascus and Moscow has extended well beyond the military sphere.

In May, Reuters reported that Russian oil shipments to Syria “have jumped 75% to about 60,000 barrels per day this year.” Much of this trade has relied on U.S.-sanctioned vessels. In March 2025, Russia delivered diesel to Syria aboard the sanctioned tanker Prosperity. Days later, two additional sanctioned tankers, Aquatica and Sakina, offloaded Russian oil at Syria’s Baniyas port. Open-source maritime research has also identified the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia as primary destinations for grain Russia looted from occupied Ukrainian territories. In one documented case, the Russian bulk carrier Matros Pozynich, which the European Union designated, loaded 27,500 tons of wheat in occupied Sevastopol before arriving in Syria to deliver its cargo.

U.S. Can Use Sanctions To Stymie Syria’s Alignment With Russia

By lifting almost all sanctions on Damascus, Washington has given Syria’s government an opportunity to rebuild the country and align itself with the West, but that opening is not without limits.

While the United States has shown some ambivalence toward penalizing countries that maintain economic ties with Moscow, congressional pressure to reimpose sanctions could grow if Syria begins directly acquiring weapons systems from Russia or engaging with Russia’s state-owned arms exporters. Washington should make clear to Damascus that Syrian entities purchasing from and materially supporting Russian actors tied to the war in Ukraine could themselves become targets for sanctions. That warning should extend in particular to Syrian entities involved in the importation and handling of grain looted from occupied Ukrainian territories.

Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Ahmad and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Ahmad on X @AhmadA_Sharawi. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.