KMT Risks Missing the Lessons of the Wars in Ukraine and Iran

Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang has the chance to prove to voters – and to skeptical partners in Washington and beyond – that they take Taiwan’s national security seriously and can pass a meaningful defense budget. They are uncomfortably close to blowing this opportunity in a pivotal vote tomorrow. 

The KMT leadership this week advocated to limit funding to NT$380 billion in already-announced arms sales and told legislators to fall in line. A larger, NT$800 billion package promoted by KMT legislator Hsu Chiao-hsin and others represents a better alternative. But even that one fell short of including key items for domestic drone manufacturing, missile defense, and AI-enabled command and control – capabilities that are of critical importance to Taiwan’s defense, as the wars in Ukraine and Iran should have made clear. 

If it fails to pass a budget for U.S. Foreign Military Sales, the Legislative Yuan risks sacrificing capabilities such as the HIMARs long-range missile system that has been so useful to Ukraine. This and other items would instead flow to other U.S. partners, depriving Taiwan of needed capabilities for years. 

In the spirit of the ongoing debate, we would like to explore a few lessons Taiwan should take to heart from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. If Taiwan’s legislature – and especially its divided opposition – can apply these lessons when they cast votes tomorrow, they will enhance Taiwan’s ability to deter aggression and to deal with Beijing from a position of strength. 

First, Taiwan’s opposition should remember how Ukraine and Iran’s mass production of aerial and sea drones helped deny two of the world’s most powerful navies – Russia’s and America’s – from operating in the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf, respectively. The PLA Navy is also vulnerable to such capabilities in the Taiwan Strait, but only if Taiwan urgently manufactures drones in massive quantities, with the ability to build more and adapt their designs quickly. Given this, Taiwan’s opposition parties must seriously reflect on why they are cutting drones from the special defense budget. These are cheap and effective capabilities that superpowers struggle to defend against. 

Second, Taiwan lawmakers should notice how important a multi-layered air-defense system has been for Ukraine and Middle Eastern countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. A multi-layered air defense is comprised of expensive interceptors like Patriot missiles, but also cheaper solutions such as unmanned anti-drone systems, electronic jammers and specialized anti-drone rockets. These are capabilities the U.S. military failed to field at the scale needed for the war in Iran.

The king of drone and counter-drone warfare is Ukraine. The failure by Washington to adopt Ukraine-style capabilities is one of the Pentagon’s most regrettable mistakes of the last four years. Taiwan must not repeat that mistake and should roll out the red carpet to host Ukraine’s leading drone makers and the military technicians who use them to such impressive effect – and then build a comparable industrial capability inside Taiwan. 

Third, lawmakers must recognize the wisdom of having formidable offensive capabilities – not just defensive ones. U.S. and Israeli offensive strikes against Iran probably did more to protect regional bases and infrastructure from Iranian missiles and drones than purely defensive systems alone. Without those offensive strikes, it seems likely Iran would have exhausted allied inventories of defensive interceptors within days.

Taiwan should buy HIMARs rockets and develop more longer-range missiles and drones that can strike targets on the Chinese mainland. If Beijing is willing to strike Taiwan, it is both natural and necessary that Taipei should have the means to “return the favor”.

The notion that cross-Strait peace can be achieved with Beijing through dialogue alone without a credible military deterrent is inconsistent with the core principles of deterrence. 

Deterrence requires assurances – like those Taiwan’s opposition has sought to provide Beijing in cross-Strait dialogue – but it also requires credible military threats. The wars in Ukraine and Iran have shown lawmakers in Taipei what weapons to buy and build, and what steps to take to protect Taiwan’s democracy and prosperity. Now they must take them. 

As the 2026 and 2028 elections approach, Taiwan’s opposition cannot afford to be seen as weak on defense. Taiwan’s voters and its overseas partners expect more. 

Matt Pottinger served as President Donald Trump’s Deputy National Security Advisor 2019-2021, is Chairman of FDD’s China Program, and the co-author of The Boiling Moat: Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan. Seamus Boyle is a Senior Associate at Garnaut Global researching the Chinese economy, elite politics, and cross-Strait security.