Israeli Strikes Target Iran’s Chemical Weapons Program

Israel has been systematically striking key Iranian facilities that support or could support the development of chemical weapons. 

In its latest sorties, on April 7, Israel struck the Marvdasht Petrochemical Complex near Shiraz, while on the previous day, it struck Iran’s Asaluyeh (South Pars) Petrochemical Complex, though the IDF publicly linked both sites primarily to ballistic missile production. Two days earlier, Israel struck facilities in the Mahshahr Special Petrochemical Economic Zone, which produce chemicals and precursors usable in weapons programs. The IDF stated that Mahshahr’s petrochemical facilities produce “chemical materials for the regime’s weapons.”

Israel has also struck military-owned universities previously sanctioned by the United States for their role in chemical weapons research and development (R&D), including Imam Hossein University and Malek Ashtar University of Technology. An additional target was the Tofigh Daru Research and Engineering Company at the Pasteur Institute in Tehran, a facility accused of supplying fentanyl to the regime for chemical weapons development. 

The dual-use nature of these sites underscores Iran’s longstanding practice of deliberately intertwining military and civilian infrastructure, rendering such facilities legitimate military targets. 

Weaponizing Fentanyl and Other Powerful Anesthetics

Iran began developing chemical weapons in the 1980s, primarily for potential battlefield use during the war with Iraq. Over the past two decades, the program has increasingly focused on weaponized pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and other substances suitable for riot control or incapacitation. The United States assesses that Iran is developing methods to aerosolize fentanyl and other anesthetics into PBAs. These agents — which can be deployed in combat using grenades as well as against any domestic protests — severely disrupt the central nervous system, potentially incapacitating or killing victims. Tehran is suspected of using such agents to suppress Iranian protesters in January 2026. Use of chemical agents is also linked to mysterious attacks on hundreds of Iranian schoolgirls in 2022 and 2023. 

According to U.S. State Department assessments, since 2005, Imam Hossein University and Malek Ashtar University of Technology — military-controlled facilities affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Defense — have “researched chemical agents intended to incapacitate.” In 2014, the chemistry department at Imam Hossein University procured large quantities of the potent sedative medetomidine from Chinese exporters and has been working to aerosolize and weaponize such PBAs.

Meanwhile, the Israeli strike on Tofigh Daru aimed to disrupt the supply of fentanyl to Iran’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), the entity responsible for chemical and nuclear weapons development. Although co-located with legitimate civilian medical functions, the facility served as a key supplier of the deadly synthetic opioid to SPND for its work on weaponized PBAs. 

Israel previously targeted another SPND-linked subsidiary and U.S.-sanctioned chemical weapons site associated with “fentanyl-based tactical munitions” — the Shahid Meisami Research Complex — in June 2025. 

Degrading Chemical Weapon Supply Chains

Several facilities targeted in the Mahshahr zone have long been associated with Iran’s chemical weapons efforts. These include Fajr Petrochemical, Bandar Imam Petrochemical, and Bu Ali Sina Petrochemical, all sanctioned by the United States for supporting weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. Israel also struck Amir Kabir Petrochemical, which the United Kingdom has listed as an entity of concern for WMD-related procurement. Another targeted site was Razi (also referred to as Rejal or Redzhal) Petrochemical, which Japan has identified as an entity of concern in connection with chemical and nuclear weapons development.  

Strikes on Chemical Weapons Assets Must Continue 

Israel and the United States should continue degrading Iran’s chemical weapons-related facilities and disrupting pathways to weaponization. A number of additional sites and companies potentially involved in such activities may still be untouched.

Sustained action against these capabilities will help ensure that Iran cannot deploy them during the conflict against the United States, Israel, neighboring countries — or its own population. 

Should the current conflict end with the Tehran regime still in power, Washington and Jerusalem will need to monitor foreign supply chains and disrupt Iranian attempts to reestablish chemical weapons capabilities.

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Andrea on X @StrickerNonpro. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.