Prisoner Exchange Between Central Government and Druze Factions is an Opportunity To Cement Stability in Syria

After the July 2025 Syrian government offensive in the south of the country that resulted in the deaths of at least 1,000 members of the Druze minority, reconciliation between Damascus and the Druze appeared all but impossible.

A glimmer of hope arrived in the form of a February 26 prisoner exchange in which 25 government soldiers were swapped for 61 Druze detainees. This represented a small but meaningful shift after one of the bloodiest episodes in Syria since the overthrow of former dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The negotiations were reportedly led by Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s brother, Maher, alongside representatives of Druze factions aligned with spiritual leader Hikmat al-Hijri.​

The exchange stems from principles outlined in the September 2025 U.S.-brokered stability plan for southern Syria, which aimed to narrow the divide between the central government in Damascus and the Druze, up to 1 million of whom reside in Syria. The plan called for expanded humanitarian aid, accountability for perpetrators of massacres, and the entry of government forces into the Druze-majority province of Suwayda to establish a locally composed security force.

Progress, however, has been limited. Key obstacles — including accountability for the massacres and persistent Druze demands for greater autonomy — have continued to hinder meaningful steps towards the reintegration of the community.

Druze Demands for Autonomy Amid Lack of Government Accountability

Although the Syrian government pledged accountability for members of its armed forces who carried out extrajudicial killings against the Druze in July 2025, little has materialized beyond a fact-finding mission. Accountability for the massacres of the Alawite minority in March 2025 has also been limited. Only two trials have been held, involving seven individuals affiliated with the government, and none have yet been sentenced. 

At the same time, under the leadership of Hikmat al-Hijri, the Druze have increased their calls for self-determination, staging weekly protests and establishing parallel governance structures in areas under their control. These include a civilian administrative body, the “Supreme Legal Committee in Suwayda,” and an armed faction known as the National Guard.

Damascus Elevates Marginal Pro-Government Druze Figures

Although the city of Suwayda itself remains under the control of the National Guard, the Syrian government holds sway over more than 30 villages across the wider province. The government continues to regulate access to the city, including the flow of humanitarian aid, which has been inadequate thus far.

​Damascus has so far avoided a full-scale military push to retake Suwayda, despite recurring flare-ups between government forces and Druze factions. This restraint is likely due to their concern over Israeli intervention. The Israeli government has vowed not to “allow harm to the Druze community in Syria,” having intervened during the clashes in July and striking the Defense Ministry’s headquarters in Damascus.

Instead of a direct assault, Damascus appears to be pursuing a co-optation strategy, elevating Druze figures who lack broad local support, such as Layth al-Balous, a leader of a small Druze faction named Guest House of Dignity, and Suleiman Abdul Baqi, the leader of a small Druze faction named Ahrar Jabal al-Arab and the current head of security in Suwayda. Both have been labeled as “traitors” within the Druze community for siding with the government.  Earlier this month, Abdul Baqi declared: “For those asking when we will enter the city of Suwayda — the city where we were raised — the answer is: soon, God willing. There is wide communication from inside, and many want stability and a normal life.”

​Washington Should Pressure Damascus To Hold Perpetrators Accountable

The United States should make clear to Damascus that lasting stability depends on the central government demonstrating to Syria’s ethnic and religious groups that it can be trusted. That begins with meaningful accountability within the ranks of its own forces for crimes committed against the Druze and other groups.

Washington should also press all parties to fully implement the southern Syria stability plan agreed to last September. This requires pushing the Syrian government to integrate the Druze into the political process, expand humanitarian aid to Suwayda, and establish a locally composed security force formally affiliated with the state.

 Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), focusing on Iranian intervention in Arab affairs and the Levant. Ron Nuriely Kimel is an intern at FDD. For more analysis from Ahmad and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Ahmad on X @AhmadA_Sharawi. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.