February 26, 2026 | Policy Brief
Hamas Turns to Seaborne Arms Smuggling
February 26, 2026 | Policy Brief
Hamas Turns to Seaborne Arms Smuggling
Hamas has increased the scope of its tactics to rearm in Gaza, using the Mediterranean Sea’s undertow as its instrument.
Israeli media have reported that Hamas is using drift-containers that float just below the waves to smuggle contraband from the Sinai Peninsula to Gaza. Hamas-affiliated operatives drop the packages offshore, which eventually reach Gaza’s coast near the southern cities of Deir al-Balah and Khan Yunis. The packages carry prohibited materials, including rocket fuel components. Concurrent drone flights over the Egyptian border are also reportedly used to draw the IDF’s resources and attention away from countering sea-based smuggling.
While drift-container smuggling is not a new endeavor, its reemergence as a strategy by Hamas represents an innovative threat at just the time that the Iran-backed group is supposed to be disarming in accordance with U.S. President Donald Trump’s 20-point ceasefire plan. Hamas is doing the opposite, and its sea-based smuggling efforts indicate that the group is unlikely to disarm as required by the truce.
Advanced Rocket Fuel Components Smuggled From Egypt
Hamas is reportedly smuggling materials for its depleted rocket arsenal, including hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB), though the terrorist group has predictably denied this claim. HTPB can be used as a key ingredient in solid rocket fuel that, when paired with ammonium perchlorate, can be considered a composite propellant for rockets. The material has long been prohibited from import into Gaza.
Historically, Hamas has relied heavily on short-range projectiles like the domestically produced Qassam rockets, which utilize crude propellants typically made from sugar and an oxidizing agent, usually potassium nitrate.
However, HTPB allows Hamas to produce more advanced rocket propellants that, when paired with missile-making know-how from Iran, allow the group to build longer-range, more advanced projectiles than the standard Qassam rocket. Iran has long used HTPB as its binder in solid propellants for its own missile arsenal after developing the necessary production capabilities in the early 2000s.
Smugglers Using Drones In Conjunction With Sea Routes
Drone smuggling from Egypt continues to strain Israel’s security apparatus. Though drone smuggling has largely remained criminal in nature, Israeli security elements have now warned that Hamas is co-opting the drones for rearmament as well as using them as diversions from its sea-based efforts.
Recent incidents underline the situation’s severity. On February 19, the IDF intercepted several M16 rifles being smuggled via drone over the border with Egypt. Five days earlier, the IDF intercepted four more M16s, while in January the IDF intercepted a drone carrying 10 Glock pistols. Last December, the IDF downed a drone carrying 20 M16s. Israeli officials have referred to the airborne smuggling as a “strategic threat to Israel.”
U.S. Should Track Smuggling Efforts Closely
Given Hamas’s ongoing noncompliance with the Trump administration’s disarmament requirements in Gaza, the U.S.-led Board of Peace (BOP), which monitors the ceasefire, should track all rearmament activities closely.
In the past, Egyptian police officers in the Sinai have accepted Hamas bribes in exchange for allowing weapons to be smuggled through tunnels along the Philadelphi Corridor near Rafah. In 2009, the United States, Canada, and several European governments developed a joint tactical plan to inspect vehicles in the Sinai suspected of transferring arms to Hamas. The BOP should establish a similar mechanism focused specifically on disrupting coastal smuggling networks in the Sinai before drift-containers can be launched toward Gaza.
Separately, enhanced intelligence sharing with Israel — which sits on the BOP — would allow for documentation and attribution of Hamas’s seaborne smuggling efforts. This would provide legal and diplomatic legitimacy for IDF counter-smuggling actions within the truce’s framework. Together, these preventive and reactive strategies can enable the BOP to address seaborne smuggling comprehensively and stymie Hamas’s rearmament.
Aaron Goren is a research analyst and editor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Aaron and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Aaron on X @RealAaronGoren. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.