February 19, 2026 | Policy Brief
Gaza’s New Police Force Must Exclude Hamas
February 19, 2026 | Policy Brief
Gaza’s New Police Force Must Exclude Hamas
“There will be 5,000 Palestinian police officers deployed in Gaza,” declared Ali Shaath, chairman of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), during a Board of Peace meeting on February 19. On the same day, the NCAG posted an announcement to recruit “qualified candidates for a professional, accountable, transparent, and merit-based transitional police force in Gaza.” To join the NCAG’s police force, applicants must meet three conditions: be Gaza residents between the ages of 18 and 35, have no criminal record, and demonstrate good physical fitness.
The announcement does not address whether past or present membership in Hamas or similar organizations would disqualify the applicants. This omission is troubling given reports that Hamas is seeking to integrate its estimated 10,000 police officers into the NCAG’s force. If Hamas can influence or even control the transitional police force, the NCAG’s ability to govern may be seriously compromised.
Hamas Operates Repressive Police Force
Outside its military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas has for decades operated a police force under its Ministry of Interior, which created Gaza’s security apparatus following the terrorist group’s violent takeover of the coastal enclave in 2007. Hamas has frequently used the force to arrest political dissidents and commit human rights abuses against local Gazans who defy the terrorist group. During the post-October 7 war between Israel and Hamas, Jerusalem targeted members of its leadership for their alleged role in planning terrorist attacks against Israel.
Without Hamas Disarmament, NCAG Cannot Govern Effectively
The NCAG’s mandate to administer Gaza, facilitate humanitarian aid, and oversee reconstruction cannot succeed without a credible plan to disarm Hamas. Even if the NCAG’s proposed police force ultimately excludes Hamas members, there is no indication that it would confront Hamas militarily. Hamas continues to be the most powerful armed faction in Gaza, and any intra-Palestinian clash would likely strengthen its hand rather than weaken it, allowing it to further entrench its control.
Disarmament of Hamas must precede any discussions of a technocratic governorate or reconstruction projects in Gaza. Absent that, the enclave risks repeating the same failed cycle of receiving international funds while Hamas retains its weapons, as was the case historically in Hamas’s previous wars with Israel.
The U.S. Must Pressure Hamas’s Enablers To Secure Disarmament
The United States must ensure that the NCAG does not incorporate Hamas or other terrorist affiliates into its police force, and the NCAG should require this explicitly in all recruitment criteria. The NCAG must establish a rigorous vetting mechanism, conducted in coordination with the United States and Israel, to prevent such an infiltration.
At the same time, Washington should press Hamas’s external backers on the Board of Peace, especially Qatar and Turkey, to secure the unconditional disarmament of Hamas and the dismantlement of its security apparatus. Without these steps, Gaza risks the emergence of a parallel armed structure that would undermine any new governing authority from the outset.
Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Ahmad and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Ahmad on X @AhmadA_Sharawi. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.