February 5, 2026 | Policy Brief

Sudanese Army Breaks Key Siege as U.S. Leads Humanitarian Aid Push

February 5, 2026 | Policy Brief

Sudanese Army Breaks Key Siege as U.S. Leads Humanitarian Aid Push

A military breakthrough by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has ended the years-long siege of Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan state. Isolated by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied militias since the outset of the latest civil war in April 2023, the city’s reopening potentially offers relief from the humanitarian crisis that has driven the mass displacement of civilians across the region.

The collapse of the siege also signals a potential inflection point in Sudan’s civil war as it nears the three-year mark.

Meanwhile, as conditions in Darfur deteriorate past recognized famine thresholds, the United States is accelerating a humanitarian aid drive. At a February 3 gathering, the United States pledged $200 million in aid, while the United Arab Emirates committed an additional $500 million, underscoring the scale of the crisis.

Sudanese Armed Forces Gain Battlefield Momentum as RSF Falters

The lifting of the siege on Kadugli and the SAF’s advances toward the city of Dilling to the north suggest that the balance of military momentum is beginning to shift. The SAF’s gains have weakened the RSF’s control over strategic population centers in South Kordofan by disrupting the rebel group’s supply lines.

Those areas which remain under RSF control have been brutally exploited by the group. The RSF has relied on predation, looting civilian property, and the occupation of churches and hospitals to sustain its rule. As humanitarian access expands in SAF-held areas, the conflict increasingly reveals a divide between battlefield success and the ability to govern, further eroding the RSF’s claims of legitimacy.

Regional Powers Increasingly Invested in War’s Outcome

Sudan’s shifting battlefield dynamics are drawing deeper regional engagement. Egypt views instability in Sudan as a direct national security threat, particularly along its southern border and in relation to Nile water security. A recent report indicates that for at least six months, Cairo has operated an airbase on its shared border with Sudan and used it to carry out strikes on the RSF. In January, the Egyptian air force reportedly carried out an airstrike on a convoy bound for RSF forces on the Libyan border.

Saudi Arabia remains aligned with Egypt in backing the SAF, viewing the army as the more viable bulwark against fragmentation and extremist resurgence. The United Arab Emirates, by contrast, has provided significant support to the RSF, viewing its commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo — widely known as Hemedti — as a key intermediary for Sudan’s gold exports and a pathway to Emirati ambitions for port development along the Red Sea coast.

Turkey, another U.S. regional partner, has also expanded its footprint in Sudan, reflecting Ankara’s broader strategy of leveraging military, commercial, and ideological influence across Africa. Turkish firms, violating U.S. and EU sanctions, have reportedly sold weapons to both the SAF and RSF.

U.S. Should Align Allies and Pressure Warring Parties

Washington’s current approach, focused on humanitarian assistance and ceasefire diplomacy, has not kept pace with the conflict’s evolving realities. The United States should therefore adopt a two-track strategy focused on pressure and alignment.

First, it should intensify efforts to disrupt the RSF’s financial networks and weapons supply chains, further constraining the militia’s ability to sustain the war. At the same time, Washington should apply pressure on the SAF to continue purging its ranks and affiliated networks of hardline Islamists, while warning that backsliding may bring further sanctions and diplomatic isolation.

Second, Washington should work to align Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey around core goals that include preventing Sudan from becoming a hub for militias and transnational criminal networks, as well as countering any return to a government dominated by Islamists. Coordinated pressure would provide Washington with greater leverage to shape ceasefire terms, marginalize spoilers, and influence Sudan’s post-war trajectory without direct U.S. military involvement.

Mariam Wahba is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Mariam and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Mariam on X @themariamwahba. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.