January 29, 2026 | Policy Brief
Syrian President Al-Sharaa Deepens Relationship With Putin During Latest Moscow Visit
January 29, 2026 | Policy Brief
Syrian President Al-Sharaa Deepens Relationship With Putin During Latest Moscow Visit
Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa was in an upbeat mood following his meeting in Moscow with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on January 29 — the second encounter between the two leaders since October last year.
“Russia, of course, plays a major role in Syria, in stabilizing the situation, not only in Syria but also in the region,” Sharaa stated appreciatively. Putin responded in kind, signaling that Russia was willing to cooperate with Sharaa in much the same way that it did with his predecessor, the former dictator Bashar al-Assad, who is now exiled in the Russian capital.
Sharaa’s overtures to the Russians are especially notable given that Moscow was a full partner in the mass atrocities committed by Assad’s regime during the Syrian civil war. The Syrian leader has concluded that Russia’s primary interest is in maintaining its foothold in Syria, chiefly the Hmeimim Air Base and the Tartus naval facility. In return, Sharaa is positioning Syria to extract tangible benefits from Russia that include military, energy, and grain imports.
Syria and Russia Consolidate Ties in Assad’s Wake
Sharaa’s pragmatic approach to Russia began during his campaign to overthrow the Assad regime. As he later recalled, “When our forces arrived at Homs, the Russians stepped back from the battle entirely, withdrawing from the military scene under an agreement.” By that point, Moscow had shifted its focus from propping up Assad’s collapsing rule to preserving its military footprint in Syria. That laid the groundwork for a productive relationship between Damascus and Moscow based on tangible interests.
Since taking power, the Syrian leadership has allowed Russia to retain access to both the Hmeimim and Tartus military bases. In return, Moscow has continued supplying Syria with oil delivered by sanctioned ships, along with grain stolen from occupied territories in Ukraine. The relationship has also extended into the diplomatic arena, with Russia providing cover at the UN Security Council to remove designations for terrorism imposed on Sharaa.
More consequential is Sharaa’s potential pursuit of military capabilities that only Russia appears willing to provide. Israeli strikes in December 2024 destroyed roughly 85 percent of Syria’s military capabilities. Turkey, Sharaa’s main backer, has offered some support but has remained cautious about transferring heavier weaponry, fearing this could provoke an Israeli response. This has pushed Damascus back toward Moscow.
Syrian Bases Remain Critical to Russian Operations
According to Arab media reports, Hmeimim hosts squadrons of fighter jets that have enabled Russia to conduct air operations across the Mediterranean. The Tartus Naval Base includes storage facilities and equipment and has housed S-300 air-defense systems.
As Russia’s only naval base in the Mediterranean, Tartus has provided critical surveillance and monitoring capabilities, allowing Moscow to track maritime traffic and closely observe NATO and Western military activity. The base has also functioned as a logistical hub for the supply and sustainment of Russia’s Africa Corps, a paramilitary force that supports Russian political influence across parts of Africa.
For Russia, securing the status of these bases is central to its power projection in the Mediterranean. Doing so also preserves Moscow’s foothold in Syria as a potential long-term partner and the accompanying strategic and economic benefits.
Sanctions Remain a Tool of U.S. Policy
The Trump administration has been ambivalent on punishing countries for their economic ties with Moscow. Yet Congress can move to reimpose sanctions if Syria acquires weapon systems directly from Russia and its state-owned arms exporter. Many of the systems under discussion would meet the “significant transaction” threshold under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Washington should also signal to the Syrian government that it can sanction entities in Syria that provide material support to a Russian economy geared towards the war in Ukraine.
Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Ahmad and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Ahmad on X @AhmadA_Sharawi. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.