December 19, 2025 | Policy Brief
With Sham Election, Myanmar Junta Seeks To Give Foreign Governments Pretext for Engagement
December 19, 2025 | Policy Brief
With Sham Election, Myanmar Junta Seeks To Give Foreign Governments Pretext for Engagement
Myanmar will hold national elections starting on December 28. Myanmar’s ruling junta is selling this vote as a step toward stability, but nothing in the country’s political or economic landscape supports that view. The National League for Democracy (NLD), which won landslide victories in both the 2015 and 2020 elections, is banned. Its leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, remain imprisoned. The country’s economy is collapsing, fighting continues across multiple fronts, and the military has failed to win legitimacy at home or abroad.
Myanmar’s sham election won’t restore internal stability or legitimacy, but it may provide countries like India diplomatic cover to reengage the junta — fracturing international pressure at a moment when Myanmar is working actively with China against U.S. interests.
A Controlled Election Designed To Maintain the Military in Power
Myanmar has spent most of the past 60 years under military rule. A brief democratic opening began in 2011, allowing the NLD to win two landslide election victories. When the military launched its 2021 coup, the country returned to a familiar pattern of repression and conflict.
December’s election mechanics ensure the junta’s preferred outcome. Only 202 of 330 townships will vote, with dozens deemed too dangerous for polling. Media controls, martial law in about 60 townships, and the exclusion of major opposition parties ensures the outcome. This will not be a free and fair election. The precoordinated outcome is a handpicked parliament that reelects General Min Aung Hlaing as president.
Conflict and Economic Crisis Will Continue After the Vote
The world’s longest running civil war will not pause for an election — especially one that excludes the country’s most popular political party. Fighting continues in nearly all of Myanmar’s “ethnic states.” Resistance forces and ethnic armed groups show no intention of accepting a junta-led political process. The military, despite small territorial gains supported by forced conscription and Chinese pressure on some armed groups, remains unable to sustain control of about 75 percent of the country.
The economic crisis is just as severe. Myanmar’s economy remains in free fall, burdened by capital flight, currency depreciation, collapsing investment, and widespread poverty. No credible roadmap for recovery exists while the conflict continues and the junta governs through coercion.
Foreign Governments’ Response May Be Split, Creating New Strategic Risks
While the December elections are unlikely to change dynamics inside Myanmar, they may shift the diplomatic landscape. According to former U.S. Ambassador to Myanmar Scot Marciel, China, Russia, Cambodia, Belarus, and possibly India could treat the vote as sufficient justification for deeper engagement.
India matters most because it is a democracy, and its endorsement would give the junta a level of legitimacy autocratic partners cannot. For India, the election offers convenient cover to expand engagement without endorsing the junta outright. New Delhi is increasingly concerned about Chinese influence in Myanmar, including the potential for a Chinese-built submarine base on Myanmar’s Indian Ocean coast.
But legitimizing the junta would ultimately be self-defeating for India. Military rule in Myanmar facilitates China’s core aim of obtaining access to the Indian Ocean via roads, rails, and pipelines from Yunnan Province. Increased Indian engagement would fracture international pressure on the junta while simultaneously strengthening the China-Myanmar relationship that New Delhi seeks to counter — giving Beijing both strategic infrastructure access and a weakened coalition of democracies opposing its regional ambitions.
Shaping the Post-Election Landscape
The United States should reject the election results as illegitimate. At the same time, the United States should intensify sanctions on the junta’s foreign exchange channels, which facilitate military purchases from China and Russia. Finally, Washington should counter efforts by countries inclined to treat the elections as “progress” — engaging India as part of larger U.S. concerns about New Delhi’s increasing alignment with Russia, China, and Iran.
Dan Swift is a senior research analyst for economics, finance, and trade for the Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Dan and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.