For the Sake of the US-Crafted Ceasefire in Gaza, Israel Should Fortify the Yellow Line Immediately

The Gaza ceasefire buckled last weekend. A Palestinian terrorist crossed the “Yellow Line” — which demarcates Israeli-held Gaza from territory held by Hamas — and fired at Israel Defense Forces (IDF) troops from a humanitarian access road.

Israel eliminated five senior Hamas figures in response, and the strikes were fully backed by the United States. The violence highlighted a key vulnerability for Israel: its exposed positions along Gaza’s Yellow Line.

To minimize the violence — and the chance of the ceasefire blowing up at the hands of Hamas terrorists — Israel needs to provide its soldiers with protection in the form of a strong barrier along that line.

The line was designed to serve as a temporary withdrawal point for the IDF, while Hamas released all remaining living and deceased hostages, according to President Donald Trump’s 20-point peace plan. The terrorist group still holds the remains of one hostage, weeks after the 72-hour deadline set in the ceasefire terms.

On November 22, Qatar urged the “full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza” — but Israel is not required to do so until Hamas has taken further steps toward peace, including disarming. An International Stabilization Force (ISF) is also supposed to be ready to take Israel’s place in Gaza, operating under a temporary Board of Peace, which would govern the Strip.

Instead, Hamas rejected the UN-endorsed plan.

In a statement on November 17, the terrorist group claimed that “assigning the international force with tasks and roles inside the Gaza Strip … strips it of its neutrality, and turns it into a party to the conflict in favor of [Israel].”

Hamas has also made it clear that the group likely will not agree to full disarmament, as stipulated by the Trump administration’s plan.

Instances of Palestinian terrorists firing across the Yellow Line at IDF troops have become a near-daily occurrence since the ceasefire’s inception on October 10. Palestinians have violated Phase One of the truce at least 32 times, according to IDF data, with a majority of those violations occurring when militants cross into Israeli-controlled areas east of the Yellow Line.

Despite some concerns about the potential for a permanent IDF presence in Gaza, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that Israel wants to “pass [Gaza] to a civilian governance that is not Hamas,” and doesn’t seek to “keep” Gaza long term.

For now, the situation leaves the IDF encamped in elevated positions along the Yellow Line. The border between those positions and the hornet’s nest of Hamas’ remaining forces in Gaza is marked with yellow cement blocks, while the IDF sits several hundred yards back from the line in positions dotted with large sand berms, supported by tanks and some electrical and water infrastructure. This is not like the high-tech border “Iron Wall” that separated Israel and Gaza before the October 7, 2023, attacks. Of course, even that was easily breached. But without something similar, the region is just one successful Hamas assault away from a return to war.

For the sake of the ceasefire, especially since Hamas continues to violate its terms, Israel should strengthen the Yellow Line: not to establish a permanent presence, but to provide cover for its troops in the near term, the ISF’s troops in the medium-to-long term, and to avoid the ceasefire’s collapse.

Israel’s reinforced border with Lebanon could serve as an example. The IDF could easily install concrete barriers along the Israeli side of the Yellow Line to reduce terrorist infiltration, while establishing checkpoints to lower troop exposure and allow Gazan residents to return to rebuilt homes in the future, in line with the Trump administration’s reconstruction plan for the areas of the enclave not under Hamas control.

The border could also isolate Hamas, piling diplomatic pressure on the terror group from mediators like Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey, to comply with the ceasefire to get Israel out of Gaza as soon as possible, per Doha’s demands. The border would protect troops from other nations involved in a future ISF, should it materialize. These nations have made it clear that they don’t want to volunteer soldiers to fight in armed engagements with Palestinians, and a fortified border may provide the necessary solution.

Aaron Goren is a research analyst and editor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).