Erdogan Leaves Washington Empty-Handed on F-35s?

While the results of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent White House visit remain ambiguous, one thing is clear: his top priorities appear to have stalled.

Following their meeting both Erdogan and Trump projected personal warmth at a joint press conference. Even Trump’s jab that Erdogan “knows about rigged elections better than anybody” failed to sour the atmosphere. Trump dangled the prospect of sanctions relief, suggesting the U.S. could lift restrictions blocking Ankara from acquiring the F-35 fighter jet “almost immediately” if talks went smoothly.

But the reality is less rosy. Erdogan secured a handful of smaller deals—civil nuclear cooperation, jetliner sales—while the F-35 and other high-stakes items –– specifically Ankara’s desire to acquire production licenses for F110 engines to power its domestically produced fifth generation ‘Kaan” fighter jets, remains unresolved.

For a visit billed as Erdogan’s big chance to leverage his relationship with Trump into advanced defense acquisitions, the outcome fell flat, and the Trump administration by no means should not rush to satisfy Erdogan’s urge to acquire advanced military capabilities from the United States.

Erdogan’s Wish List Meets Washington’s Red Lines

Turkey’s failure to secure the F-35 and F110 engines is both frustrating and self-inflicted. By purchasing Russia’s S-400 air defense system in 2019, Ankara triggered automatic U.S. sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The move cost Turkey its place in the F-35 program and irreparably damaged its reputation inside NATO and Washington policy circles. Since acquisition, Turkey has made no effort to divest itself of this adversarial technology.

In addition to the problems raised by a NATO member having S-400 missiles is heightened fears that Ankara would use F-35s against U.S. allies. Turkey’s belligerence toward Greece and Cyprus is well documented. It has long challenged the two Mediterranean countries’ sovereignty in an overtly brazen and militarist fashion. Then there is Israel, another key U.S. ally, which Ankara continues to spar with inside Syria for strategic supremacy, leading analysts wondering if the two states could engage in military confrontation.  

Despite the existence of prolonged and complex problems with Washington and its allies, that calls into question Turkey’s bona fides as an ally, Erdogan continues to insist on Turkey’s right to acquire the F-35 (and other currently proscribed defense equipment) mainly because it has made a down payment, and considers this to be the only relevant criteria for delivery of advanced military equipment.

This argument ignores how U.S. foreign military sales actually work. As defense practitioners know, payment is a necessary but insufficient condition for acquisition. Laws, regulations, and the influence of U.S. domestic stakeholders all weigh heavily. As one observer put it, Ankara’s approach reflects an “extremely narrow and entitled” view of defense procurement.

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reinforced this posture after the visit, warning that unless the U.S. lifts sanctions, Turkey would “seek alternatives in the international system.” What Fidan did not offer was equally telling: no plan to divest from the S-400s, no pledges to address NATO concerns over Turkish adventurism in the eastern Mediterranean, and no acknowledgment that Turkey harbors Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist group responsible for killing Americans and Israelis. The message from Ankara remains blunt: give us your most advanced kit, and don’t ask questions.

The underlying and relatively unsubtle message from Ankara should be heard loud and clear by Washington and the Trump administration: Turkey is not seeking to acquire American military technology because it is interested in becoming a more robust and formidable NATO ally. It is interested in doing so, so that it can go its own way, develop its own capabilities and eventually, compete with the United States. As Fidan pointed out on October 5, it is his government’s perception that Turkey is being encircled by alliances in the easter Mediterranean (presumably by Greece, Cyprus and Israel and the United States) and if such matters cannot be resolved diplomatically, then “you refer the matter to your military and security institutions.”

Despite Turkey’s disingenuous disposition, Trump still offered a lifeline to Ankara. He identified Turkey’s dependence on Russian oil and gas as the most serious obstacle to any sanctions relief or F-35 deal. He hinted that if Erdogan quit Russian energy, “rapid sanctions relief” might follow. In theory, if sanctions were lifted, Turkey could find a pathway to acquire both the F-35 and F110 engines for its Kaan fighters.

But the facts on the ground are sobering. Turkey remains deeply tied to Russian gas via two pipelines, and its imports hit record highs in early 2025. Under Erdogan’s rule, Turkey’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels has only grown, making the country the third largest importer of Russian fossil fuels after China and India. Erdogan may talk about diversification, but unwinding that dependency is not his chosen policy. Erdogan confirmed his unwillingness to end importing Russian fossil fuels on October 3. Turkey’s energy policy does not simply reflect a geographic and economic reality of energy dependence on Russia. It is a broader policy of Turkey’s incremental strategic alignment away from the United States and NATO towards since that has resulted in the purchase of the S-400 missiles, its refusal to participate in the international sanctions regime against Russia in response to starting its illegal war against Ukraine, and Turkey’s ongoing desire to become a member of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Ankara would like Washington to ignore such strategic maneuverings, lift existing sanctions that would clear the way for Turkey to acquire advanced military capabilities from the United States, allowing Ankara to become not a formidable partner for Washington, but a future competitor –– even adversary.

There are essentially two main frameworks preventing Turkey from getting what it wants and they should be maintained for the foreseeable future: existing CAATSA sanctions and Section 1245 of the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) prohibits F-35 sales to Turkey unless Ankara removes its S-400s and associated personnel. No such commitment surfaced in Thursday’s talks. Even if Trump wanted to engineer an emergency waiver, the legal and political obstacles would be steep.

What Comes Next

Erdogan left Washington with symbolic wins but none of the defense breakthroughs he sought. His long-standing personal rapport with Trump may buy him time, but it seems for now, it won’t erase the structural mistrust in Washington or the legislative hurdles codified in law.

As matters stand, the United States has no interest in handing over advanced strategic weaponry to a country that is, by most measures, drifting into the ranks of emerging adversaries. Supplying Ankara with boutique military capabilities would only embolden Turkey to chart its own course, with little regard for U.S. concerns or alliance obligations. And when Washington declines, Turkish leaders threaten to shop elsewhere for their defense needs. The answer should be clear: let them. A government that consistently undermines U.S. interests and NATO unity cannot credibly be called an ally.

Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow at FDD and director of the Turkey program. William Doran is an intern at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).