How Hamas’s hostage tactic checkmated Israel’s war strategy

Much has been thought, said, and written about the atrocious attack that Hamas carried out on October 7, 2023. As we take stock of the situation some two years later – even though, as of writing this, Hamas has not been completely defeated – the security situation along the Gaza border is fundamentally improved, and the severity of the military threat emanating from Gaza has been significantly reduced.

On a regional level, Israel’s security situation is also much better, particularly after Israel exposed the vulnerability of its nemesis, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and defeated the most severe threat on its border from Hezbollah.

These military achievements, however, have come at a hefty strategic, diplomatic, and financial price. 

According to most assessments, Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu finds itself at arguably its lowest point in terms of Western public opinion since 1967.

Western powers are stumbling over each other to denounce Israel and recognize a fictitious “Palestinian” state. Israel faces an unprecedented perfect storm of lawfare, boycotts, delegitimization, and seclusion that threatens to undo the advances it has made over the past decades.

Most importantly, the longer the war against Hamas in Gaza drags on, the more time Israel’s enemies and adversaries have to inflict strategic and reputational damage against the Jewish state.

Prolonging the war

The central factor that has enabled Hamas to prolong this crisis more than anything else, the one asset that Hamas has used to curtail IDF operations and to drive a wedge through Israeli society and politics, is the 251 Israeli and international hostages that it abducted on October 7.

If Hamas had not been able to deny Israel the ability to rescue live hostages from Gaza, despite its overwhelming military power and battlefield success, Hamas would have been defeated many months ago, and the war would have been over.

Hamas’s hostage-taking strategy has evolved to prolong the duration of the war in order to force Israel to agree to its terms, mainly by leveraging international and domestic pressure against Israel’s actions.

Hamas is aware of the civilian suffering in Gaza and leverages it through a corrupt UN system and largely biased international media. That strategy would have been fruitful, and the hostages would likely have been the key to Hamas’s victory, had it not been for the election of US President Donald Trump in November 2024, which provided Israel with a credible counterweight against European and Arab pressure.

Never again

Whatever happens now, there is one element that Israel and other Western states can learn from this stalemate, and that is to apply a set of preventive measures to make it less likely that any terror organization or rogue state (think Iran/Turkey/Yemen/Libya or others) will try to emulate the actions of Hamas in the future.

It is actually quite surprising that Israeli legislators have not yet found the time to address this burning issue. To be successful in preventing future strategic hostage-taking by its enemies, Israel needs to revise legal, military, political, and diplomatic practices. And it shouldn’t be doing it alone, since it is likely that other Western countries and their civilian population will be targeted by jihadi abductors as well.

Needless to say, yet difficult to achieve perfectly, Israeli security organizations must adjust intel collection, combat operations, and responses to prevent their enemies from abducting Israelis in Israel or abroad. This is mostly a matter of priorities within existing capabilities.

Legally, Israel needs to make it illegal and impossible for elected officials with executive power to fulfill the demands of terrorists in order to release hostages. Israel also needs to declare to its current enemies, neighbors, and detractors that the abduction of its civilians is an act of aggression that will be met with disproportionate and punitive measures that will extend well beyond the combatants who actually abducted Israelis. Anything and anyone that supports or facilitates the abduction or incarceration of Israeli hostages will be a legitimate military target.

A future Israeli government with better international standing should focus on building a global coalition to deprive terrorists of the benefits reaped from hostage-taking, which includes severe punitive measures against any state that supports such crimes.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Israeli leaders and institutions need to adapt to the reality that this and the next war will be fought and won primarily on the cognitive battlefield, where local, enemy, and international media, including and increasingly more on social media, is where reality is forged and decided.

Israel may be able to maintain its qualitative military advantage over its many enemies, but without monumental improvements in all facets of soft power, Israel will find it increasingly challenging to exist, thrive, and enjoy its past military victories.

Jonathan Conricus is a retired IDF lieutenant colonel, and Senior Fellow at the DC-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). He served as a combat commander in Lebanon and Gaza and was the IDF’s international spokesman. He is politically unaffiliated.