Is the Trump plan an outcome or a solution?

In his 1986 book on the history of Zionism and Israel, The Siege, the late Irish intellectual Conor Cruise O’Brien famously stated that “conflicts don’t have solutions. They have outcomes.” This was true, he said, of both his native Ireland and of the State of Israel, which has faced sustained Palestinian and Arab efforts to eliminate it throughout its existence.

O’Brien’s observation is worth bearing in mind as the Middle East looks to U.S. President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan as a roadmap for ending the war in Gaza, opening the horizon for a more hopeful future. Trump’s initiative, announced following his White House meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sept. 29, offers the best chance for ending this harrowing two-year war, which has seen Gaza reduced to rubble in the aftermath of the Hamas-led pogrom in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Still, the plan is better understood as an “outcome”—hopefully, a more sustainable one that will draw a line under the series of wars against the Jewish state launched by Hamas since 2008—than a “solution,” if by “solution” we mean a permanent end to all grievances on all sides for all time.

Trump’s plan unfolds over time—from the conditions necessary to halt the war right through to the reconstruction of what the text calls “New Gaza,” along with the deradicalization of its population. Early on in its life, it will face severe tests of its viability. Trump has already given his blessing to Israel pursuing the war should Hamas decline his plan, but even if the terrorist group accepts it, it will nevertheless maneuver for the smallest advantage, seeking to frustrate Israeli expectations. Hence, the timetables and milestones in the plan need to be followed exactly as they are laid out, and Hamas should pay a military price for any deviation in that regard.

Arguably, the most helpful aspect of the plan is that it isolates Hamas from two key constituencies. First, the Arab and Islamic world, where eight leading countries have declared their support for the plan, leaning on Hamas to follow suit. Hamas’s rejection will be looked upon dimly by them, though perhaps less so in the cases of Qatar and Turkey, the two countries in the group that need to be watched most closely, because of their ideological and operational alignment with the terror organization.

Secondly, rejection would place Hamas squarely at odds with the Palestinian civilian population in Gaza. I will address their attitudes to Israel later on, but there is little doubt that the vast majority want the war to end because of the hardship they continue to endure.

The Trump plan makes clear that “full aid” will be restored once Hamas accepts the plan. Practically, that means that aid will be distributed through traditional channels, such as the U.N. agencies and the Red Crescent, as well as new ones, like the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, whose valiant efforts to supply Palestinians with food at appointed distribution centers have placed them on a collision course with Hamas and with the long-established humanitarian organizations. Up until now, those organizations have decided that pelting Israel with false accusations is more important than efficiently distributing the tons of aid collected on the Gaza side of the Kerem Shalom border crossing with Israel.

The Trump plan will quickly enable the provision of aid to those who require it most, particularly mothers and young children who not only need food but other crucial items, such as diapers, sanitary products and baby formula. It also guarantees that “no one will be forced to leave Gaza” and indeed encourages civilians to remain there to participate in building “a better Gaza.” The exhausted population has enough reasons to embrace the plan; as periodic protests in the coastal enclave against Hamas rule over the last year have demonstrated, many of them will look unfavorably on Hamas’s wrecking tactics that prevent them from feeding their families and accessing safe accommodation, all while unleashing its brutal “Arrow” internal security unit against dissenters.

As well as thinking through the days, weeks and months ahead, the plan’s horizon stretches much further. The intention seems to be to win the Palestinians over to a peace strategy that includes Israel, rather than violently eliminating it, with economic incentives designed to persuade Gaza’s population that their livelihoods and those of their children should not be sacrificed in another war, which, like this one, they will lose. Among the long-standing advocates of this “peace through commerce” approach is Tony Blair, the former British prime minister, who is likely to occupy a high position in the transitional authority for Gaza envisaged under the Trump plan.

Such an approach has been tried before, and it hasn’t worked; it may have a better chance of success now, given that the situation in Gaza is far worse than at any previous time. However, commercial ties are not in enough in themselves to engineer a desire for peace with Israel within Palestinian hearts and minds, as opposed to a mere tactical and temporary compromise. That is why O’Brien’s distinction between an “outcome” and a “solution” is so helpful in this context.

This brings us to the issue of deradicalization, the one element that is fundamentally necessary if Palestinians are to reject the prospect of another Oct. 7-style invasion with its attendant savagery. No one should underestimate the enormity of the task here. It means transforming the character of Palestinian politics, currently dominated by nationalist, Marxist and Islamist factions who disagree on much, but agree on the imperative of destroying Israel in order to erase its so-called colonial presence. It also means questioning and even rejecting much Islamic thinking about the region, especially the false contention that Jews are not indigenous to the Land of Israel and the theological principle that it is haram to grant non-Muslims sovereign government in a territory defined as belonging to the “Domain of Islam” (“Dar al-Islam”).

Ask most Israelis whether such a task is achievable, and you’ll get a sarcastic laugh in response. Ask most Palestinians whether they can agree to a radical break with their contentious past—meaning no more demonization of Zionism, no more denial of the Holocaust, no more school textbooks and cartoons depicting Jews as sub-human, and so on—and you’ll at least receive furrowed eyebrows in response.

Those seeking to climb that mountain, which lies at the heart of a “solution” as opposed to an “outcome,” must know that right now, they are at base camp.

Ben Cohen is a senior analyst with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) and director of FDD’s rapid response outreach, specializing in global antisemitism, anti-Zionism and Middle East/European Union relations.