Latest Launch by Tehran Reflects Regime Interest in Longer-Range Missiles

A bird, a plane, a ballistic missile?

Late last week, Iranians took to social media to post pictures and video of what appeared to be the plume, or the high-temperature exhaust gases, of a ballistic missile in flight. The unpublicized nature of the launch by Iranian authorities, coupled with various images of the projectile’s odd trajectory, led to a guessing game as to whether the test failed and what kind of projectile was deployed. Was this an older missile with a poor flight-test track record, a newer missile with a different warhead, a space-launch vehicle (SLV), or, as one parliamentarian alleged, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)?

More recent open-source analysis indicates that the launch was an SLV test from a known space launch pad in Semnan province, while the projectile’s white plume points to the use of solid-propellant, a type of fuel for missiles that Israel targeted in the past due to its military utility.

Several angles of the projectile’s flight path, coupled with images of small bursts of smoke seen dotting the sky, hint at a technical malfunction, namely combustion issues. But even a failed test provides Tehran with information about the performance and reliability of its projectiles, while also signaling a continued interest in growing its missile program following the 12-Day War with Israel.

Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program Pre- and Post-12-Day War

Beyond serving as the delivery vehicle for a potential nuclear weapon, Iran’s ballistic missiles play a key role in the Islamic Republic’s defense and security strategy, enabling it to deter and coerce adversaries. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, Tehran has long been home to the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, most of which are road-mobile and stored in underground bunkers dispersed across Iran. Prior to the 12-Day War, Iran possessed an arsenal of roughly 2,500-3,000 ballistic missiles of various ranges and propellant types, as well as around 300-400 transporter erector launchers (TELs) used to move and fire these weapons.

After the war, Iran’s launchers and missiles were cut by roughly half, with a TEL count now estimated at 150-200, and an overall ballistic missile stockpile of about 1,300-1,500. Recent reports indicate that Iran is undertaking a sustained effort to restore its ballistic missile production facilities that Israel destroyed.

Iran’s Space Program in Focus

Even if it is a genuine SLV test by Tehran, the recent launch ought not to be written off. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (IRGC-AF), which is in charge of Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal, also oversees Tehran’s development of solid-propellant SLVs. Less than one month after the 12-Day War, Iran publicly launched an SLV, marking its first missile test since the conflict. Iran’s interest in space is not divorced from its quest for longer-range missiles, including those that could reach the U.S. homeland or European continent. Despite a reported self-imposed range of 2,000 km, Iran can use SLV launches to work towards an ICBM. U.S. intelligence has assessed that Iran could use SLVs to build “a militarily-viable ICBM,” noting that by 2035, Tehran could have as many as 60 ICBMs.

A Wake-Up Call for Washington

Iran’s continued testing of SLVs indicates a desire to expand the regime’s radius of punishment and coercion using missiles beyond the Middle East to include the European continent and the American homeland. Per National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2), denying Iran an ICBM is official U.S. policy. Yet Washington will need to do more to impede this outcome, beginning with keeping the matter in the political limelight.

Thus far in 2025, the Trump administration has levied only two rounds of sanctions against Iran’s ballistic missile propellant and technology procurement networks. Nor is it clear if the administration met the reporting requirements in a bill that became law last year to better counter Iranian missile proliferation. With Iran using ballistic missiles more often, focusing on exposing and handicapping their sources of support will need to remain a top priority.

Behnam Ben Taleblu is the senior director of the Iran Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he is also a senior fellow. For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Behnam on X @therealBehnamBT. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_Iran. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.