Israel and Syria close to a security agreement

On September 23, US Special Envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack claimed that Syria and Israel “are close to striking a ‘de-escalation’ agreement in which Israel will stop its attacks while Syria will agree not to move any machinery or heavy equipment near the Israeli border.”

According to Barrack, the Syrians are demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops that pushed into southern Syria. Following the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in December 2024, Israeli units deployed near the Quneitra area in southern Syria and positioned themselves within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) established in 1974 to separate the Israeli and Syrian sides of the Golan Heights. Israel then moved forces into the DMZ itself, seizing control of the Syrian side of Mount Hermon—the highest point in Syria—and establishing multiple posts on the mountain.

From these positions, Israeli troops have occasionally launched raids deeper into southern Syria to confiscate weapons and arrest Hamas-linked militants and members of Iranian-backed militias. The Syrians view Israel’s incursions as a violation of the 1974 disengagement agreement, which separated Syrian and Israeli forces with UN peacekeeping missions deployed to the area separating both countries and returned Mount Hermon to Syrian control. Israel, however, considered the agreement void after the fall of the Assad regime.

The Syrians reportedly seek to apply the 1974 disengagement agreement as the model for a new Israel-Syria security agreement. Syrian President Ahmad al Sharaa has repeatedly emphasized that negotiations are focused on the adoption of this plan. However, Israel’s proposal appears to go further.

According to Israel’s Channel 12, the Israeli proposal to the Syrian government includes:

1. “Dividing southern Syria into three zones—A, B, and C—each with defined security arrangements depending on proximity to the Israeli border.” This arrangement mirrors the principles of the 1979 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, which divided the Sinai into three separate zones.

2. Each of the three strips southwest of Damascus would have a specific arrangement that deals with the type and scope of Syrian forces and weapons allowed.

3. Expanding the buffer zone on the Israel-Syria border by two kilometers into Syria. In this zone, Syrian armed forces and heavy weapons would be prohibited, though internal security forces can be deployed.

4. The area from southwest of Damascus to the Israeli border will be a no-fly zone for the Syrian Air Force.

5. Preserving an Israeli air corridor through Syria to Iran for use in a potential future conflict.

6. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from Syrian territory, except for maintaining an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) post on the “Hermon Crown.”

Syrian leaders could view Israel’s proposal as problematic. Their insistence on using the 1974 disengagement plan as the framework would require Israel’s complete withdrawal from Syrian territory and impose no restrictions on Syrian military deployments in the south. By contrast, Israel’s plan effectively turns southern Syria into an area outside of the state’s control and prohibits the Syrian army from operating in a vast area that is just 20 kilometers south of Damascus. However, Syria may also view any arrangement with Israel as a net positive if it curtails Israeli airstrikes and incursions.

The agreement could also pave the way for greater Israeli-Syrian cooperation against their common adversary, Iran. Southern Syria long served as a stronghold for Iranian proxies during the country’s civil war, and remnants of those networks remain. On September 12, the IDF announced that individuals operating in southern Syria were linked to Assad’s 4^th Armored Division and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force. Additionally, anti-Sharaa militias claiming affiliation with the “Axis of Resistance,” Iran’s collection of regional proxies, such as the Islamic Resistance in Syria-Awli al Bas, continue to use southern Syria as a base of operations.

Ahmad Sharawi is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies focused on Iranian intervention in Arab affairs and the levant.