South Africa Wants BRICS To Become a Global Naval Force

Ties between South Africa and Iran continue to strengthen. On September 6, Iranian state media reported that Iranian naval commander Captain Hassan Maqsoudlou confirmed that his country’s navy would participate in an upcoming BRICS bloc naval exercise off the coast of South Africa. The news followed a preparatory briefing for the “Mosi III” naval exercises in Cape Town with representatives from South Africa, Russia, China, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Iran in attendance. The Mosi naval exercises are open to all BRICS countries, but only China, Russia, and South Africa participated in previous drills in 2019 and 2023.

The announcement follows South Africa’s decision earlier this month to postpone the exercises, originally scheduled for November, likely in a bid to entice President Donald Trump to attend the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Johannesburg that same month. Iran’s inclusion in the naval exercise, announced just days after its postponement, might seem inconsistent with that goal, but it clearly signals South Africa’s desire to increase military cooperation among BRICS countries.  

From the Gulf to the Cape

Russia, China, and Iran have held combined drills in the Gulf of Oman and northern Indian Ocean since 2019 as part of the “Maritime Security Belt” naval exercise series. By welcoming naval exercises into southern African seas, South Africa is using Mosi III to deepen Russian, Chinese, and Iranian naval presence along Cape shipping routes. These sea lanes became more crowded when the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea in 2023. The new route around Africa’s cape adds 10 to 14 days of travel time and has jammed South African ports. South Africa’s welcoming of Iranian naval ships into these waters creates additional sanctions risks — potentially heightening already high insurance costs.

The ANC Is Practicing ‘Misalignment’

South Africa’s ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), says it practices nonalignment — engaging all sides while avoiding bloc politics. Its defense ties tell a different story. On June 10, South Africa’s defense chief, Rudzani Maphwanya, met China’s defense minister in Beijing and vowed to expand Chinese military cooperation — likely as a means to address longstanding naval readiness issues. On August 14 in Tehran, he echoed Iranian regime rhetoric, saying “The Republic of South Africa and the Islamic Republic of Iran share common goals and will always support the oppressed and defenseless people of the world.” South Africa’s Foreign Ministry later distanced itself from the remarks — not by disputing the content, but by stating that Maphwanya was not authorized to make foreign policy statements. Then, on August 26, South Africa’s navy chief received a Russian Federation medal for strengthening naval cooperation.

These are not neutral signals. They reflect a growing affinity for and alignment with China, Iran, and Russia, falling far from the ideals of former President Nelson Mandela and his antiapartheid movement.

South Africa Should Face Consequences for Its Choice of Friends

The Trump administration should dispatch a high-level diplomatic delegation to South Africa to clearly signal its opposition to the Mosi III exercises. South Africa’s deepening defense ties with China, Russia, and Iran should also be a central consideration in ongoing tariff negotiations and in any deliberations regarding the renewal of trade preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

The administration should also establish an interagency task force to investigate links between ANC officials and U.S.-sanctioned entities from Iran, China, and Russia and apply targeted sanctions and visa restrictions where applicable. The task force should specifically assess whether there are sanctionable ANC or South African financial or commercial links to the already-sanctioned Mosi participants, including state-owned enterprises or defense contractors. The task force should report its findings to Congress as part of a mandatory briefing on South Africa’s defense cooperation with adversarial regimes.  

Finally, the administration should coordinate with like‑minded democratic partners to downgrade G20 representation at the Johannesburg summit. The ANC should not be permitted to portray itself as a global leader while participating in Russian, Chinese, and Iranian military coordination — a message the United States should reiterate when it takes over the G20 presidency from South Africa in November.

Daniel Swift is a senior research analyst for economics, finance, and trade for the Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). He is a retired U.S. diplomat and was most recently the Acting Coordinator for Prosper Africa — a presidential-level national security initiative to increase two-way trade and investment between the United States and Africa. For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD.