October 3, 2024 | Policy Brief
U.S. Investigates Russian-Chinese Nuclear Cooperation
October 3, 2024 | Policy Brief
U.S. Investigates Russian-Chinese Nuclear Cooperation
The United States Department of Energy (DOE) confirmed to Reuters last month that it is investigating whether China is helping Russia circumvent a ban on U.S. imports of Russian enriched uranium. Beijing’s efforts are the latest example of expanding Russia-China nuclear cooperation.
President Joe Biden signed the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act in May after the bill passed the House and Senate by unanimous consent. The law prohibits importation of low-enriched uranium from Russia and went into effect 90 days after Biden’s signing. The administration has used a waiver provision in the law to allow some companies to import limited quantities of Russian uranium to prevent disruption of the fuel supply for U.S. reactors while the industry finds alternative sources.
The administration believes that Russia is getting around the ban by exporting enriched uranium to China for Beijing’s domestic use, which allows China to send its own excess enriched uranium to the United States. Yet the law specifically prohibits any scheme “designed to circumvent the restrictions,” such as swapping products.
According to Reuters, the administration launched its investigation after observing a dramatic increase in imports of enriched uranium from China by U.S. utilities. In December 2023, imports from China increased to 242,990 kilograms after no Chinese exports to the United States from 2020 to 2022.
This is not the first instance of problematic Russia-China nuclear cooperation. In March 2023, the Biden administration confirmed that Russia shipped highly enriched uranium to China for its breeder reactors that produce plutonium for Beijing’s nuclear weapons program. That plutonium will be used for China’s nuclear weapons expansion, which the Department of Defense expects will position Beijing to possess over 1,000 operational warheads by 2030.
The U.S. law that bans imports of Russian uranium is part of a larger DOE effort to rebuild U.S. production of enriched uranium fuel for reactors and incentivize exports by American companies and international consortiums in the United States.
DOE is also working to eliminate dependence on Russian nuclear supplies. More than two years into the war in Ukraine, according to DOE, America still imports some 35 percent of its enriched uranium from Russia, the world’s largest supplier. As a result, Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy company, continues to earn record revenues and has not been sanctioned by the United States or the European Union.
Last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested that Russia could limit exports of uranium in retaliation for the ban. However, U.S. utility companies have stockpiled fuel over the last two years in case Russia cuts exports, and Moscow would lose revenue that is aiding Putin’s war effort.
One of the U.S. companies focused on rebuilding domestic enrichment capabilities, Centrus, urged the U.S. Trade Representative to increase tariffs on imports of China-origin uranium from 7.5 percent to 20 percent. An industry group recommended 50 percent tariffs, and both presidential candidates support tariffs on China. This bipartisanship is likely to pave the way for significant increases.
The administration should also use its executive orders regarding Russian aggression in Ukraine to sanction Chinese companies and individuals that circumvent the uranium export ban. The administration should also finally sanction Rosatom. This would be a clear sign to China and Russia that efforts to violate U.S. laws and sanctions have consequences.
It is not surprising that China and Russia are engaged in nuclear cooperation that threatens U.S. national security objectives. The question is whether the administration will let it continue or move to end these activities.
Anthony Ruggiero is an adjunct senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). He previously served in the U.S. government for more than 19 years, including as senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense on the National Security Council (2019-2021). He was sanctioned by Russia in August 2024. Andrea Stricker is a research fellow at FDD and deputy director of FDD’s Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program. For more analysis from the authors and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Anthony and Andrea on X @NatSecAnthony and @StrickerNonpro. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.