August 23, 2024 | Insight
Saudi Official Views of Hamas
August 23, 2024 | Insight
Saudi Official Views of Hamas
It is common these days in the Arab world to hear that Riyadh isn’t supporting the Palestinians enough, a comment on the noticeable shift in Saudi official views of Hamas since its October 7 invasion of Israel. The government-funded media describe Hamas operatives killed by Israel as terrorists. Local clerics state that Hamas is committing not “jihad” but a “devilish act.” Neither a royal family member nor a foreign ministry official has issued a statement mourning the death of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.
Saudi policy since October 7 seeks to dissociate Riyadh from the terrorist group. Instead, the Kingdom hosts Palestinian Authority officials from Ramallah, issues statements that condemn Israeli military mistakes in Gaza, sends humanitarian aid to Gazan civilians, and calls for a ceasefire and a two-state solution.
Saudi disapproval of the October 7 atrocities began immediately after the massacre. When Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal appeared on the Saudi state-owned Al-Arabiya, an anchor asked him, “Would you apologize for what was done to Israeli civilians on October 7?” When he refused to give a clear answer, the anchor pressed him: “You say this is legitimate resistance in your view, but what the people saw on Western TV screens were transgressions by Hamas against civilians.”
Saudi public figures occasionally promote Egypt’s late President Anwar Sadat, who signed a peace deal with Israel despite the opposition of much of his public. The CEO of Al-Arabiya, Mamdouh Al-Mhuainy, argued that leaders like Sadat face attacks and character assassination, but they “move their people to a better future.” By contrast, he added, leaders of resistance movements (implying Hamas and Hizbullah) leave their people to “face the hell of missiles descending from the sky.”
Pro-Saudi government writer Abdul Rahman al-Rashad described Gaza as a “livable city” in 1998, with an airport, airline, and seaport. But all of this ended in 2000 when the Palestinians launched their second intifada, prompting Israeli retaliation.
Saudi antipathy to Hamas stems not only from the group’s behavior inside Gaza. When Hamas spokesmen such as Abu Obeida threaten non-Muslims on social media, it reminds Saudis of Al-Qaeda, whose founder, Osama bin Laden, was a Saudi national who committed the terrorist attack of 9/11, stigmatizing the Kingdom in the West.
The Islamization of the conflict is also a major Saudi concern. Pro-regime intellectuals blame Hamas for the radicalization sweeping the region. Al-Mhuainy for instance, argued that Palestinians who die in Gaza should not be called “martyrs” but “dead” in order to avoid eliciting religious emotions. Saudi television programs discuss the dangers of Muslim Brotherhood ideology.
Saudis make a distinction between religious extremism and nationalism, rejecting the former but welcoming the latter. Since Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s ascendance to power seven years ago, the government stopped funding pan-Islamist causes overseas. Former Saudi ambassador to Washington Prince Turki Al Faisal called on Hamas last March to replace its leadership, join the Palestine Liberation Organization, and embrace a two-state solution.
It is unclear, however, if Palestinians will have a unified voice. The recent unity declaration signed in China by Fatah, Hamas, and 12 other Palestinian factions was met with skepticism in Saudi Arabia, which has hosted similar Palestinian conferences and Fatah-Hamas mediation efforts in the past. The Jeddah-based Okaz newspaper questioned its durability. If history is a guide, Hamas will not join a Palestinian unity government because the terrorist group opposes negotiations with Israel for a two-state solution.
Regardless, Riyadh is likely to continue lobbying on behalf of the Palestinians for a two-state solution. Its hostility to Hamas, however, is unlikely to change.
Haisam Hassanein is an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow him on X, @HaisamHassanei1.