The EU’s Flawed Framework for Sanctions on Lebanon

The Council of the European Union announced on July 30 that it has adopted a framework that “provides for the possibility of imposing sanctions against persons and entities who are responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Lebanon.” Whether the framework will be activated, however, is far from certain, as its criteria for imposing sanctions are highly subjective, which could animate lingering EU divisions. What is more certain is that the European Union will not be targeting Hezbollah.

The EU framework outlines three criteria for possible designations: (1) hampering the formation of a government or upcoming elections; (2) obstructing the implementation of critical reforms; (3) serious financial misconduct and the unauthorized exportation of capital.

If imposed, sanctions for designated entities would entail an asset freeze, while sanctions for designated individuals would consist of both an asset freeze and a travel ban excluding them from the European Union. But that is a big if. For instance, it is unclear how various European nations will come to a common determination as to who among Lebanon’s sectarian leaders is responsible for blocking the government’s formation, assuming such blockage continues. Identifying those responsible for holding up critical reforms is an equally subjective exercise, especially when Lebanon’s entire political class is not only implicated in corruption but also regularly engages in blame trading for political purposes.

Regardless, if the Europeans can agree on whom to target, it will not be Hezbollah. French President Emmanuel Macron has openly met with Hezbollah in his efforts to stand up a new Lebanese government. Likewise, France is the European Union’s principal opponent of the argument for designating Hezbollah in toto as a terrorist organization. Not only will France, first and foremost, not alter its longstanding position on this issue, but it also will not cross Hezbollah while French soldiers are serving in the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah regularly employs threats, backed with action, as a means of intimidation. Finally, France will not jeopardize its existing and potential investments in Lebanon.

Instead, France appears to have a much lesser target in mind for EU sanctions. Before the EU framework was adopted, a senior European official told Reuters that the designee Paris is considering is Gebran Bassil, Lebanon’s former foreign minister and the current president’s son-in-law, whom the Trump administration designated for corruption in 2020. While Bassil is a fully deserving target for sanctions, such a narrow designation, should it even happen, might appear hard-hitting but would in fact be secondary. Moreover, it would conform European policy to the political games of Lebanon’s oligarchs.

Ultimately, the European sanctions framework is not only not intended to target Hezbollah; it is not even intended to punish or sideline the country’s corrupt political class. Rather, it aims to prod sectarian leaders to press ahead with forming a government with which the European Union can then deal, and to hold elections, which will see those same leaders re-elected. Like their American counterparts in both Republican and Democratic administrations, European policymakers continue to draw a distinction between Hezbollah and the so-called Lebanese “state,” in addition to their false distinction between Hezbollah’s so-called political and military “wings.” Consequently, U.S. and EU policy boils down to preserving the Hezbollah-run order in Lebanon.

Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he also contributes to FDD’s Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP). For more analysis from Tony and CEFP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Tony on Twitter @AcrossTheBay. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.