September 19, 2013 | Policy Brief

Saudi Strategy in Syria

September 19, 2013 | Policy Brief

Saudi Strategy in Syria

Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, issued a direct order earlier this month: “we demand that the international community does the action required” to “stop the aggression on the Syrian people before they’re exterminated”.  One week later, Secretary of State John Kerry trumpeted Saudi support for a potential military strike.  But the Saudis are unlikely to be satisfied with anything short of regime change in Damascus, and their frustration is mounting as the likelihood of a U.S. strike recedes.

Strike or no strike, Saudi Arabia has been among the most active governments arming Syria’s rebels.  In late 2012, the Saudi government financed a major transfer of infantry weapons from Croatia to the rebels.  Reuters reports that Saudi Arabia has sent a new batch of anti-tank missiles that gave rebels in southern Syria a tangible boost on the battlefield last month.  In the aftermath of the chemical weapons attack in Ghouta, reports suggest the Saudi pipeline has only increased.

The Saudi motivation for intervening in Syria is three-fold. The Saudis want to be viewed as the protectors of Arab Sunnis region-wide.  After all, they view themselves as a regional Islamic power. But they are also working to weaken Iran and keep the Muslim Brotherhood in check. 

The Saudis have watched with alarm in recent years as Tehran amassed influence in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. According to a classified cable leaked in 2010, King Abdullah even urged U.S. officials that they should crush Iran’s nuclear program to “cut off the head of the snake.” 

Riyadh’s policy is also driven by deep antipathy for the Muslim Brotherhood, which combines religion and politics – an affront to the Kingdom, which seeks a monopoly on both.   The Saudis backed the ouster of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt, and they “say no to the Brotherhood” in Syria, as well. They strive to dilute the power of the Brotherhood among the opposition, which explains their effort to expand the opposition coalition in May. Additionally, Saudi Arabia helped its protégé Ahmed Jarba beat out a pro-Brotherhood candidate for coalition president.

Moving forward, Saudi Arabia will undoubtedly work to weaken Assad, the Brotherhood, and Iran. But the question is whether it will draw on Syria’s jihadi groups to do so.  Saudi Arabia supported such groups before and suffered blowback as a result.  The Saudis reportedly prefer regime defectors, independent tribesmen, so-called “quietist Salafis,” and even liberals over the more extreme jihadi groups in Syria, but they have also tried buying off some of the more Islamist rebel groups.  Video has also surfaced of fighters for Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and other militant Islamists using the Croatian weapons purchased by Riyadh. How hard the Saudis work to keep such weapons out of the hands of jihadi groups will be an important indicator of their post-Ghouta strategy.

David Andrew Weinberg is a senior fellow at Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Issues:

Syria