Missionary Man in Damascus

Last week, the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the nomination of Robert Ford as the new ambassador to Syria. While Ford's confirmation still awaits a full Senate hearing, which has yet to be scheduled, the nominee's statements painted a problematic picture of what the Obama administration's Syria policy is premised on.

Despite repetition by administration officials that they are “under no illusions” when approaching Syria, comments made at the hearing betrayed a line of thinking focused on what the administration believes Syria's “real interests” to be, rather than what Syria sees them to be. This was evident in the discussion of Syria's relationship with Iran and Iraq.

The tone was set by committee chairman Senator John Kerry, a leading advocate for a new Syria policy: “I believe [Syrian President Bashar al-Assad] understands that his country's long-term interests… are not well served by aligning Syria with a revolutionary Shiite [sic] regime in Iran and its terrorist clients.” This is the driving logic behind Obama's Syria policy: the old – and repeatedly failed – objective of prying Syria away from Iran.

Ford echoed this line in his prepared testimony: “[W]e must persuade Syria that neither Iran nor Hezbollah shares Syria's long-term strategic interest in… peace.” Paradoxically, Ford followed this assertion by expressing uncertainty as to “whether the Syrians are truly interested in negotiating that peace agreement with Israel.”

Such reasoning betrays an inability, or an unwillingness, to understand Syrian behavior spanning over 30 years; it also misconstrues the nature of the Syrian-Iranian alliance. Tehran and Damascus' relationship was never reactive and defensive, as is commonly held – a tactical convergence against common enemies such as Iraq. It was always based on the two states' conception of their role in the region and their shared desire to shape events in the Middle East to their advantage.

For Assad, the alliance allows Syria to project its influence well beyond what its real stature would allow, and to bolster its position vis-à-vis its Arab rivals and the Arab Gulf States. These are critical aims for a second-tier country that nevertheless regards itself as a primary Arab political player. The alliance is even more valuable with an Iran on the verge of becoming a nuclear power, therefore the dominant actor in the Gulf.

The idea that it is possible to split Syria from Iran has been incirculation for three decades. For example, in 1986 to 1987, there was a concerted international effort to entice Syria out of the alliance and into the so-called “Arab mainstream”. At the time it was thought, much like today, that there was ample reason for then-President Hafez al-Assad to accept the offer: Syria's economy was in dire straits, the country was diplomatically isolated and under scrutiny for its role in the Hindawi affair, its relations with many Arab states were hostile, and even its alliance with Iran was under some stress. Western observers thought that Assad's choice was an easy one to make, and in Syria's best interests. And yet to their befuddlement Assad refused. The Syrian-Iranian alliance not only survived, it was consolidated during the subsequent two decades.

Yet the West never learned that lesson. Similar stubborn certitude was evident in Ford's analysis of Syria's relations with Iraq. The ambassador described how the task of engagement with Syria was “to make clear its stake” in Iraq's stability. That position displayed confusion about Syrian motives. What Assad does not want is destabilization of his own regime, which Syria's export of instability to Iraq since the American invasion in 2003 has permitted him to avert. The costs of a policy of blackmail next door were never as high as the potential benefits for Damascus.

In fact that is precisely why Syria has long been viewed as a regional “spoiler”, as Ford described it in his hearing. Thus, it was paradoxical to hear the ambassador say that he “do[es] not see how instability in the region serves Syrian interests.” If political sabotage has been Syria's modus operandi, as indeed it has been for decades, then clearly it is the result of the regime's rational calculation of its interests.

This is made obvious by the purpose of engagement, as articulated by Ford. After all, it is destabilization that affords Damascus relevance. Syria possesses no inherent foundation for influence commensurate with its ambitions, such as valuable natural resources. Had Syria not hosted Hamas leaders, supported Al-Qaeda and the insurgency in Iraq, and transferred advanced weapons to Hezbollah, would it have mattered politically at all? Destabilization is Syria's only foreign policy currency to force others to the bargaining table, or capitulation.

Washington's proposed approach to dealing with Syria seems almost tailor-made to Assad's advantage. Not only is it based on trying to convert Syria through dialogue, it sets no timetable for engagement. Instead, as Ford put it, we are to have “patience” and not expect “quick” changes in Syrian behavior. This eliminates benchmarks and allows the Syrians to continue to play both sides without any serious challenge. How does this “present Damascus with a clear choice,” as Kerry stated? All it does is allow the Syrians to impose the agenda and avenues of engagement.

Engaging Syria was always vaunted as an example of “hardnosed realism”. However, realism stipulates that states rationally calculate and pursue their interests. Instead, what we are seeing here is a claim that the United States knows Assad's “real” interests better than he does, therefore that the task of engagement is to enlighten him, then convert him to this view. This isn't realism; it's diplomacy defined as missionary work.

Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.