Guinea: At the Edge of the Precipice

By Dr. Walid Phares

When Captain Moussa Dadis Camara seized power the day before Christmas Eve last year following the death of longtime ruler General Lansana Conté, I was willing to take my cue from the citizens of the long-suffering West African country in giving him the benefit of the doubt. After all, I had lived in Conakry for nearly two years and had long been concerned about the myriad centrifugal forces, long repressed, which might be unleashed once the old dictator-who tenaciously held on to power for nearly a quarter of a century after grabbing power himself in the aftermath of the demise of independent Guinea's founding tyrant, Ahmed Sékou Touré-was no longer around. In fact, a series of positive first steps gave many of us reason to be optimistic perhaps that Camara would prove to be a Guinean version of Mali's current president, Amadou Toumani Touré, who led a bloodless 1991 coup which overthrew the dictatorship in his country and then, incredibly enough, relinquished power to a civilian president after organizing a national conference to draft a democratic constitution and a free election (after retiring from the military and serving as a UN special envoy, Touré was elected president of Mali with 64 percent of the vote in 2002 and reelected to a final five-year term in 2007 with 71 percent of the vote). Events this week, however, have not only dashed hopes of any benign outcome from Camara, but raised the specter of national and even regional upheaval.

To review, it has been three years since I first devoted a column in this series to Guinea, an Oregon-sized country that holds more than half of the world's reserves of bauxite (bauxite ore is the source of alumina, the primary ingredient for aluminum smelting). At that time I observed that:

Guinea is … both the most ignored country and, potentially, the most critical one in the West African subregion as it faces the end of the long tenure at the helm of President Lansana Conté … While the situation should be relatively contained as long as President Conté lives, all bets are off for the power vacuum that is expected to follow his eventual demise. Analysts are divided on whether having the largest standing military in its neighborhood will exacerbate or mitigate the coming chaos. Guinea is, after all, a prime target for one or another insurgency group because of long-simmering ethnic tensions … [especially as some of those groups] cut off from sources of power since independence, have in recent years become increasingly radicalized by Islamist clerics imported from the Middle East courtesy of the same Muslim “charities” that have sown the seeds of conflict across the globe. Part of the problem is that General Conté's personal political strategy has consisted primarily of a Machiavellian balance between ethnic favoritism and cynical manipulation of competing forces within his privileged inner circle. In all likelihood, this delicate balance will come undone when he dies or becomes permanently incapacitated and the country will face … concentric waves of conflict … Given cross-border ethnic solidarity … once the post-Conté conflicts begin, they could quickly spiral into a national and regional conflagration, threatening progress in other countries in the subregion, including Liberia and Sierra Leone, and exacerbating ongoing conflicts in others like Côte d'Ivoire.

I warned that while “there are no easy solutions to problems which run as deep as those of Guinea” and “grappling with this little-known, but very complex, situation cannot be done on the cheap,” the United States and its international partners would “find that the costs of having to deal with another massive humanitarian crisis will require far greater resources than a modest amount of preventive engagement today-not just in terms of human costs, but also in terms of shocks to the global economy of even greater increases in spot prices for a commodity vital to modern industry like alumina.” As I likewise reported in this column space, I had to wait less than two months before a strike to protest the country's stagnant political conditions and even worse economic straits turned into a large-scale, nationwide protest which shook the Conté regime's rickety foundations and drove the spot price for alumina on the London Metals Exchange to an all-time record high at nearly $3,000 per metric ton. Despite popular calls for his ouster and the ravages of the half dozen or so maladies from which he suffered, the wily old despot managed to not only stay alive, but to cling on to power, leaving the country to stagnate pretty much as it had for the preceding two decades until he finally expired on the evening of December 22, 2008.

Thus when Moussa Dadis Camara seized power the following day, pushing aside a civilian crony of Conté's whose succession was of contestable legality in any event, there were not a few who were willing to accept the takeover as the least-worst outcome, especially since the coup leader promised to organize free and fair elections within the year, in which he would not participate. Even the International Crisis Group, in a report published earlier this year, acknowledged the catastrophe that was the late general's legacy:

Conté left a legacy of abusive security forces, a collapsed economy and lack of trust among a divided civil society and quarrelsome political parties. Despite their troubled relationship with the military, many Guineans have welcomed the junta as the least worst option. Political parties and civil society groups have argued that the constitution was so manipulated under Conté that it could not provide a way out of the crisis he left behind.

In fact, the African Union and the subregional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) slowly backed away from their initial condemnation of the coup d'état and sought to support the new leadership in its efforts to bring about long-overdue democratic reforms to Guinea where the last parliamentary elections in took place in 2002, the legislators declared winners at that time having seen their terms expire three years ago, while the last presidential poll was a farcical exercise in late 2003 that purportedly gave General Conté another seven-year mandate with nearly 96 percent of the vote. Thus, I argued on New Year's Eve that:

The United States, the European Union, and other responsible stakeholders in the international community would do well to follow the lead [of Guinea's West African neighbors], responding constructively to the appeal made by Captain Camara … in a meeting with the diplomatic corps and other international representatives in Conakry: “We made a coup d'état without bloodshed. We made it to avoid a civil war because of the dissension that followed the death of the head of state. We ask you then to accompany us in this transition to end in elections as soon as possible.” Guinea may have indeed just avoided a deluge; it is in the interests of the international community to help keep it that way.

Unfortunately, Camara's subsequent erratic behavior has belied the sentiments he expressed, even as the Guinean state's already weakened capacity deteriorated further and caused concern not only within the country, but throughout the subregion. In fact, as the months wore on, an increasingly personal-and paranoid-style of rule emerged. Camara literally bunkered down in Camp Alpha Yaya Diallo, a large military installation not far from the international airport in Conakry, seldom venturing forth. According to both foreign diplomats and those unfortunate Guineans who have been summoned to meet with him, the 45-year-old Camara sleeps until well into the afternoon and prefers to begin his meetings after the sun has set. The nerve-wracking encounters with the self-appointed head of the Conseil national pour la démocratie et le développement (CNDD, “National Council for Democracy and Development”) usually run into the early hours of the morning and often consist of lengthy harangues from le chef, who apparently is guarded by heavily-armed young soldiers who reportedly appear to be under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol.

In recent months, as word of his worrisome personal habits spread alongside discontent with the lack of any substantive movement toward the elections that he had originally promised to hold later this year but currently has scheduled for early 2010, Camara has tried to shore up his plummeting popularity by engaging in a public crackdown on corruption and drug trafficking. Those arrested, including the late President Conté's son Ousmane, were paraded on national television to be interrogated by Guinea's new ruler. In July, there was even a broadcast showing two members of the previously untouchable elite presidential guard, the berets rouges, forced to crawl on the bellies to and then kneeling before Camara to beg pardon for their offenses. On the other hand, these theatrical performances may be just that since none of those humiliated, including Ousmane Conté, has actually been put on trial, much less convicted and punished.

Meanwhile, the CNDD started showing ever decreasing tolerance of any questioning of its motivations and actions. When, in late August, it found that an anonymous text message was being widely disseminated that called on Guineans to resist plans by the junta leader to use the planned elections to transform himself into an “elected” civilian president, the regime pressured the country's cellular telephone service providers into blocking all text messages for several days in an attempt to prevent the spread of the communication. At the beginning of September, it took censorship a step further by banning discussion of politics on live radio broadcasts in Guinea (the country's only television station is already government-controlled). Small demonstrations against the ban were broken up by security forces.

Events, however, have spiraled out of control in recent days. Last week, Camara embarked on a tour of the country-the first time he had left the capital since seizing power last December-that was designed to have the masses “encourage” him to run for president at the head of a ticket for a newly-formed party. After tens of thousands gathered to peacefully protest last Thursday in Labé, Guinea's second-largest city, the ruler decided to enter the town in a military convoy and bussed in supporters to get an audience for his speech Saturday at the local stadium.

This Monday, the fifty-first anniversary of the referendum that lead to Guinea's independence from France, when an estimated 50,000 people gathered for a pro-democracy rally in Conakry's largest arena, a soccer stadium named for the historic date, soldiers opened fire on the crowd. As the multitude tried to flee what turned into a bloodbath-at least 150 people have been reported to have been killed while more than one thousand were wounded-they were assaulted by police wielding knives and clubs. According to reports which have come out of the country, some women were publicly raped by soldiers and others were sexually assaulted with guns and other objects. Other attacks against perceived opponents of the military junta subsequently took place across the capital, with the homes of prominent opposition figures singled out for looting by men in uniform. Camara has denied responsibility for the brutal use of force, telling Christophe Boisbouvier of Radio France Internationale that he “wasn't at the stadium” and “did not know what would happen.” (All the same, the junta chief appeared on national television Tuesday night to blame the opposition for the carnage and to announce a ban on all public gatherings.)

Condemnation of the outrage has been both swift and universal. In Washington, the State Department declared that “the United States condemns the Guinean military's brazen and inappropriate use of force against civilians,” while, in Paris, the French Foreign Ministry likewise stated it “strongly condemned the violent repression.” In New York, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced that he “deplore[d] the use of force” and was “shocked by the loss of life, the high number of people injured and the destruction of property,” while, in Brussels, the European Union's high representative for common foreign and security policy, Javier Solana, put out a statement saying he “strongly condemn[ed] the use of force to disperse the demonstrations.” On Tuesday, a statement of the African Union Commission expressed its “grave concern over the situation in Guinea, in particular the repression by the security and armed forces of a peaceful rally.” The declaration went on to “strongly condemn the indiscriminate firing on unarmed civilians, which left dozens dead and many others injured, while serious other violations of human rights were committed.” Significantly, the Commission document “reiterates the principles of the AU regarding the fight against impunity, and underlines the personal responsibility and accountability of the perpetrators of the killings and other violations of human rights, and of those who ordered them.”

The AU Commission statement rightly takes no comfort in the pathetic disclaimer of responsibility that Moussa Dadis Camara tried to make in his interview with Radio France Internationale: “Faced with unpredictable and uncontrollable events, not even the head of state can exercise discipline.” What the captain, whose most responsible position prior to taking over his country was to command a fuel depot, apparently fails to appreciate is that about the only thing worse than an abusive army is an abusive army that no one controls, one whose command and control structure he himself describes as “disorganized.” In fact, given the dynamics set in motion by the CNDD, itself largely made up of mid-ranking officers, none of whom held a significant command, cashiering nearly two dozen senior generals, including several who had led some of the more capable units in the Guinean military, there is a serious risk of the situation degenerating at this point into a series of purges, coups, and counter-coups.

Sadly there are no readily apparent civilian figures around which a political alternative to military misrule could be easily constructed. Most of the country's civilian politicians were either corrupted by the former Conté regime or have such little following that the wily old general did not even bother trying to co-opt them. For example, Sidya Touré, who is often touted as the head of an “opposition” party, albeit a small one, is a relatively late convert to the gospel of democracy and good governance, having only seen the light after he was dismissed as prime minister by Lansana Conté in 1999, after having previously served the general. Alpha Condé, another political figure, cuts a more credible image as a dissident, having been a critic of both the Sékou Touré and Conté regimes. However, for this very reason, he has lived more of his life outside of Guinea than within the country, mainly in Paris where he has been wont to earn his daily baguette on the Left Bank giving fashionable university lectures on the subject of “American neocolonialism” (the subtitle of one of his books). Nor are there any particularly impressive figures in civil society. Although Guinea is a predominantly Muslim nation, the Roman Catholic Church enjoyed considerable influence due to the importance of its educational and charitable works. Unfortunately, that legacy has dissipated over the years. In contrast to the urbane Archbishop Raymond-Marie Tchidimbo, who heroically resisted Sékou Touré's Marxist dictatorship and paid the price with nearly nine year's imprisonment in atrocious conditions at the infamous Camp Boiro concentration camp, the current incumbent of the see of Conakry, Vincent Coulibaly, is a virtual nonentity who, like his predecessor, Robert Sarah, happily accepted emoluments from the Conté clan, presumably in exchange for not pronouncing on matters relating to the earthly city.

Thus, beyond the immediate horror of what happened earlier this week and what could happen in the current climate in Conakry are the wider consequences. The roots of the crisis are found in a deeper malaise that has afflicted Guinea since the time of Sékou Touré. In this context, an incident in the capital can easily metastasize into a nationwide conflict. And, as I illustrated in the two books I have written on conflicts in West Africa, the nature of the Guinea and its neighbors in the subregion and their closely linked historical, social, and economic fabrics are such that, as the civil wars of the 1990s and the early part of this decade in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire underscore, violence in any one country can quickly spark a regional conflagration destroying the considerable progress made in all the others. While it would indeed be the worst-case scenario, the United States and the international community need to bear this destructive potential in mind as it faces the prospect of a Guinea that seems to be sliding up to the very edge of a terrible abyss.

– J. Peter Pham is Senior Fellow and Director of the Africa Project at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in New York City. He also hold academic appointments as Associate Professor of Justice Studies, Political Science, and African Studies at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia, and non-resident Senior Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C. He currently serves as Vice President of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA).

Dr. Pham has authored, edited, or translated over a dozen books and is the author of over three hundred essays and reviews on a wide variety of subjects in scholarly and opinion journals on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to the study of terrorism and political violence, his research interests lie at the intersection of international relations, international law, political theory, and ethics, with particular concentrations on the implications for United States foreign policy and African states as well as religion and global politics.

Dr. Pham has testified before the U.S. Congress on numerous occasions and conducted briefings or consulted for the U.S. and foreign governments as well as private firms. He has appeared in various media outlets, including CBS, PBS, CBC, SABC, VOA, CNN, the Fox News Channel, MSNBC, National Public Radio, the BBC, Radio France Internationale, the Associated Press, Reuters, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Washington Times, USA Today, National Journal, Newsweek, The Weekly Standard, New Statesman, and Maclean's, among others.