November 20, 2026 | Policy Brief

From Arms Sales to Co-Production: Turkey’s Growing Stake in Egypt’s Defense Industry

November 20, 2026 | Policy Brief

From Arms Sales to Co-Production: Turkey’s Growing Stake in Egypt’s Defense Industry

Defense cooperation between Turkey and Egypt is growing. On November 9, Turkish Naval Forces Commander Adm. Ercument Tatlioglu proposed building warships jointly with Egypt under Ankara’s MILGEM program, its national military shipbuilding initiative. The announcement came during the Sea of Friendship 2026 naval exercises off Alexandria, three years after the two countries restored diplomatic relations following a decade of hostility.

The two countries have yet to sign an agreement, but a shipbuilding partnership would give Ankara greater influence over one of Washington’s most important Arab partners and potentially expand Turkish arms production across Africa and the Middle East.

Turkey Moves Into Egypt’s Defense Industry

In February, the Turkish state-owned manufacturer Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKE) signed a reported $350 million agreement with Cairo that will provide Egypt with key materiel. The Tolga counter-drone system accounts for $130 million, while $220 million finances ammunition-production facilities. In September, MKE established a subsidiary in Cairo to support joint manufacturing and exports to African and Gulf markets. Aselsan, Turkey’s leading defense electronics company, has opened a Cairo office.

Tatlioglu cited Turkey’s 2018 MILGEM agreement with Islamabad — which provided Pakistan with four corvettes, local construction, training, spare parts, and technology transfers — as a model for cooperation with Cairo. Egypt has experience building foreign-designed warships, having produced French Gowind corvettes at its Alexandria shipyard.

For Cairo, such agreements develop domestic manufacturing. For Ankara, they provide something more enduring than an arms sale. Egypt would rely on Turkish firms for components, maintenance, and future upgrades, potentially giving Ankara influence over procurement decisions.

Turkey’s Military Expansion in Northeast Africa

Turkey is seeking a more permanent military role in Northeast Africa: It already has a base in Mogadishu and a naval presence off Somalia, and a Turkish naval delegation visited Port Sudan on November 2-5 to examine shipbuilding and repair facilities. In Sudan, Turkey and Egypt both support the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces. In February, Reuters used satellite imagery to identify Turkish-made Akinci drones at an Egyptian airfield near the Sudanese border.

While there is no evidence that new Turkish-Egyptian manufacturing agreements have supplied weapons to Sudan, Egypt’s growing ammunition production could eventually enable such transfers. Closer defense ties could also constrain Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, where it joined Greece in October in protesting Libya’s ratification of its maritime agreement with Turkey as infringing on their rights. The more Egypt depends on Turkish defense technology, the costlier opposing Ankara’s maritime claims could become.

Washington Has Leverage

The United States provides Egypt with $1.375 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for fiscal year 2026 to fund purchases of defense equipment, services, and training. U.S. components offer further leverage: Pakistan’s MILGEM corvettes use U.S.-made GE LM2500 gas turbines, and Washington derailed Turkey’s $1.5 billion T129 helicopter sale to Pakistan by withholding export licenses for its American-made engines.

Washington should use these tools to set clear conditions on Turkish-Egyptian defense cooperation. Export licenses for U.S. components and future FMF should depend on strong end-use monitoring and on Egypt’s prevention of unauthorized arms transfers to Sudan, with funds suspended if diversion is verified. Through bilateral talks and NATO consultations, Washington should also press Ankara for greater transparency on technology transfers and third-country exports involving Egypt.

Egypt’s interest in diversifying its defense partnerships is understandable. Washington’s aim should be to ensure that these partnerships support, rather than complicate, regional stability. Early engagement offers the best opportunity to do so.

Helin Unal is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Martine Panner is an intern. For more analysis from the authors and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.