Pacific Deterrence: An Update from Admiral John Aquilino

Brad:

Admiral Aquilino, thank you so much for taking the time to come back to FDD and our Center on Military and Political power. It’s really good to see you again.

Admiral Aquilino:

Nice to see you too. Thank you very much for having me.

Brad:

It’s our pleasure. Much has happened since our event together on June 24th, 2022. I’m eager to get an update from you and hear your insights. Mark, thanks so much for joining the conversation as well.

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

Thanks for having me, Brad.

Brad:

As framing comments — as I’ve said for many years, China, I believe and it happens to be consistent with the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, represents the leading grand strategic threat to the United States. I say that because of the People’s Republic of China’s hostile ideology, economic power, growing military might and increasingly aggressive actions. I also believe that what America and its partners and allies do or do not do in the next few years may determine whether deterrence holds or fails in the Taiwan Strait. This is not some parlor game or nebulous academic question of questionable importance. The success or failure of deterrence there will have major consequences for Americans and people and nations around the world. That’s one of the reasons why I’m so honored to have you here, Admiral, and eager to jump into this conversation. With that, let’s get started.

I often like to start conversations like this just for people who may be listening who don’t do this sort of thing full time with the “Who cares?” or “Why does this matter?” question. So, I’ll ask it this way. We’re going to talk about the challenges from the People’s Republic of China and what’s being done to bolster deterrence. But, before we do that, here’s my question. How would you respond to what I just said and what is your view on why should Americans care about what happens in your area of responsibility, specifically the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea?

Admiral Aquilino:

Yeah. Thanks, Brad. The Pacific region’s incredibly important for the global world, the global economy, as two thirds of the world’s commerce flows through the Taiwan– either the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, and to the rest of the globe. Two thirds of the population live in the Indo-Pacific area. It is critical to the prosperity for all of the world, and what’s important in the Pacific affects what happens everywhere. Now, that said, it’s important to everybody for a lot of reasons and why we continue to articulate that the People’s Republic of China is the most significant challenge as a part of the national defense strategy, that remains true today.

Why, you ask? And, why should everyone be interested? Is because for that global trade to flow, it’s foundationally based on the international rules-based order, the free flow of commerce, open and fair markets, freedom of navigation. Those things are critically important for all nations to achieve and receive what they need to be prosperous, to feed their people, to grow economically. If the rules are changed through the interpretation and the Chinese characteristics as described by the PRC, from everything I’ve seen, that will have significant negative effects on the flow of trade, commerce, and it will negatively affect everyone.

That’s number one, why it’s important. Number two, why it’s important is those common values that we share with our like-minded partners and allies and friends, the ability to have freedom, open and free trade, transparency in trade activities, all of those things are inherently opposite of what happens in the PRC. So, we all have a stake in the game. It’s important to everyone. It’s completely worth everyone understanding the negative impact that’ll occur under rules influenced and directed by an authoritarian state, any authoritarian state.

Brad:

That’s great. Mark, how would you answer the who cares or why does this matter question?

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

Look, I think first of all, Admiral Aquilino hit it spot on, which is the economic productivity of the United States is driven primarily in terms of international trade by trade from the Pacific. More than 50% comes in through our Pacific ports. As he mentioned, it flows from the Strait of Malacca, South China Sea through the Strait of Taiwan, depending where it’s going, to us. We are an enriched, successful country with the opportunity to trade and to profit and to grow our GDP and our quality of life because of Pacific trade.

Were we to lose the access to that or were the rules to change where we’re no longer the economic partner of choice for all of northeast Asia and most of southeast Asia and the rising India, that would really have negative impacts on our quality of life, our children and grandchildren’s quality of life. We obviously have to be engaged here. And, more than that, we have to create the conditions where, as Admiral Aquilino said, the western, the rules-based system, the international trade system that exists now continues to exist going forward.

Admiral Aquilino:

Yeah. Brad, I’m going to [add]– one additional point on that. To Admiral Montgomery’s point, it’s not necessarily a western international system. It’s an international system that all the nations agreed to. It resulted in the prosperity of all nations. There’s only one nation that doesn’t like it. And, it’s just concerning to me that it’s the one nation that benefited from it the most, which is China. The growth that nation has achieved was foundationally underwritten by the security that the United States and like-minded partners provided in the Pacific and around the rest of the globe.

Brad:

That’s a great point that it’s not just Western. I mean, that’s why Japan is so supportive of a free, open, inclusive Indo-Pacific as is India and many others in the region. When I think of threats to a free, open, inclusive Indo-Pacific, obviously I think first of the People’s Liberation Army and some of the things they’re doing. Many here in DC pretend to be experts and opine on what the People’s Liberation Army is up to. But, you are the American combatant commander who best understands the threat from the PLA. I’d love to, if you’re willing, to get an updated assessment from you on the PLA, specifically what kind of modernization and expansion effort are you seeing from the PLA? What capabilities are they developing that you find most concerning?

Admiral Aquilino:

Yeah. Thanks again, Brad. More broadly first, the PRC is certainly identified in the National Defense Strategy as the most significant challenge for the United States and for the other nations in the region. That’s based on this particular point, which is they’re the only nation that has the capability, capacity, the economy and the intent to change the rules-based order in ways that benefit themselves at the expense of all other nations. Despite a significant economic hit, if you’ve watched the real estate market in the PRC and the other actions that are going on, not one change to the capability delivery in the military sphere have I seen. Despite an economy significantly impacted, ships, submarines, aircraft, missiles continue to roll off their industrial baselines at —

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

What I’d say is, look, this is a country that 25 years ago sat back and looked at our asymmetric advantage. This is after the second Taiwan Strait crisis, third Taiwan Strait crisis, sat back and said, “Why was the United States able to bring so much power and influence Chinese actions?” The PLA had no response. They looked at us, decided what our potential vulnerabilities were, areas where they could develop asymmetric advantages, and they have spent 25 years going at that. When you ask me what worries me about the modernizations, I would probably say “What doesn’t?” We’ve been lucky in one or two areas where they probably didn’t focus on anti-submarine warfare enough or development of their own undersea warfare capabilities. I think we see them doing that aggressively now.

I think they were very slow to develop their strategic rocket, the nuclear part of their strategic rocket forces. Now, that’s altered over the last five years. But, they’ve been very good. One thing I want to say is people have looked at this recent case where the generals were fired because there might’ve been water and missiles or lids, weapons, silo lids didn’t open. Let’s be clear. They were throwing money like a drunken sailor at that problem for the last five years. It’s possible problems happen.

We don’t see their J20s falling out of the sky. We don’t see their Luzhou DDG [PLAN Type 051B Louzhou-class destroyer] sinking at the pier. They have a very competent, a well-built naval force.. They have aircraft that are built competently. I’m not saying they’re exactly the equal to the United States. But, what I’m saying is don’t misconstrue these two facts. They can have some failures for which Xi has held those generals apparently very accountable, and they can still be highly successful. We have to be careful about this and understand that their modernization has been effective and has created asymmetric challenges for the United States.

Brad:

You mentioned missiles. The Pentagon’s October report to Congress on military and security developments involving the PRC had the following quote in it, “China has the world’s leading hypersonic arsenal and has dramatically advanced its development of both conventional and nuclear armed hypersonic missile technologies during the past 20 years.” Very much affirming what you both just said. Admiral, what is your assessment of China’s hypersonic arsenal and what kind of challenges does that present?

Admiral Aquilino:

Well, it’s certainly in production of hypersonic capabilities. And, they are producing them, they are deployed, they have fired them for research development and demonstration, and it’s a capability that we certainly have to understand. We have to be able to defend our force. My primary responsibility while number one is to defend the homeland, while I’m doing it, the top priority is to assure I can execute force protection. So, it’s critically important. It’s a challenge and, just like all challenges, we’ll continue to work to overcome it.

Brad:

or not, that as the PLA becomes more powerful, we’ve seen it behaving more aggressively in the seas, the skies around Taiwan and the South China Sea and elsewhere — on the border with India. What is your assessment of the PLA’s behavior in recent years?

Admiral Aquilino:

Yeah, I think they’re all tied hand-in-hand. The extensive development of their capability and capacity of all of their weapons system, their narrative has certainly become stronger and more direct, and their actions have certainly matched that, as well. The actions we see at Second Thomas Shoal and the dangerous and threatening actions that they’ve taken against our Philippine partners is extremely concerning to me. Those three things all line up they articulate a path that’s going in the wrong direction.

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

No, I agree completely. I’d say that that DOD report you mentioned discussed the 180 unsafe operations over about two years. It’s a little dated, that information. It’s a few months old now.

But, what I would say about it is we’ve been fortunate, I would say. It’s been good airmanship principally by the United States that’s prevented a serious incident like the EP3 incident at Hainan Island in 2001. We have very few of the tools we had in 2001 to deescalate a crisis. It’s especially risky and unconscionable that the Chinese are pushing these aggressive, particularly, air engagements. Because, the likelihood eventually of a crisis of dead airmen and a crisis developing out of it are very high and unnecessary.

Admiral Aquilino:

Yeah. Before you go on, I do worry about the dangerous intercepts and activities, whether they be airborne or whether they be in the maritime environment.

As Admiral Montgomery articulated, I’m also concerned about a potential accident based on unsafe behavior, whether it’s dictated, whether it’s planned, or whether it’s still poor airmanship or seamanship. I watch this very closely. I’m encouraged that we’ve started some mil-to-mil dialogue again. That said, I continue to have a request in to talk to my counterparts. For me, those are the Eastern and Southern theater commanders of the PRC, and they have yet to accept my invitation. I’m hoping that they do that very soon, because it is the operational commander’s responsibility to ensure we don’t have one of these accidents.

Brad:

Before we move out of this headache section into the aspirin section, one last question that I was hoping to ask you was on China and Russia. I’m interested in how you would characterize China’s relationship with Russia and what combined Chinese-Russian military exercises you’ve seen. Because, for my part, I think a lot of Americans don’t realize how a lot of our adversaries are increasingly working together, and I’d love to hear your thoughts on that.

Admiral Aquilino:

Yeah. It’s concerning to me that the two most critical challenges that we identify in our national security strategy are coming together to operate and, to use their terms, to develop a no-limits relationship. Two authoritarian states with the same desire to upset the entire theater in ways that benefit themselves and at the expense of all other nations, that’s pretty concerning. We see them demonstrating it. President Xi identified this relationship is a relationship not seen in a hundred years.

Brad:

It’s a great point, and that’s a point that our founder and president and the usual host of this podcast, Cliff May, often makes — that we really are seeing some form of an axis developing where you have China and Iran of course, which developed their 25 year deal a couple years back. And, a leaked version of that agreement talked about technology transfers and weapon sales and military exercises. We know our intel community said several years back in its public worldwide threat assessment to Congress that China and Russia are more aligned than they’ve been since the 1950s. Of course, we see an incredibly close and growing relationship between Iran and Russia that’s manifesting itself both in Ukraine and also in the Middle East. So, that’s such a great point. Mark, anything you want to add on that?

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

Well, I do agree. I love how you characterize that with all four. I mean they really are like the axis of disruptors of the current system and we should worry about it. I mean, I think the next step we have to watch out for is do they begin to start sharing information and intelligence. I mean, one of our great values, we say our allies and partners are our greatest strengths. One of the things we do really well with our allies and partners, if you think about Five Eyes or releasable-to-NATO classified information is the sharing of information. Individually, each of those countries collects quite heavily against us. So, collectively, I think that would be a challenge for us if they began to share it. It would show a level of trust between them that we may not have seen historically. So, I do worry.

Admiral Aquilino:

I agree. The sharing of technology is also right on top of that as just as concerning as we look at missile technology potentially transferring from Russia to the DPRK and allowing them to advance their systems. Again, amongst all of those nations, high-end technology shared is not going to be for the benefit of the people. It’s going to be to deliver increased weapons capability.

Brad:

For me, really what we’re seeing our adversaries doing in terms of this this axis with multiple manifestations really underscores that they understand the value of partners. We as Americans have to understand the value of partners too. And, that arguably we need them more than ever right now. One thing… You don’t have to comment on this unless you want to. One thing that I’ve been thinking about is the growing, clearly strategic coordination among our adversaries and, at the unclassified level, a lot of our plans assume that we may be taking on one adversary at a time. But, if we see increasing strategic coordination, then some of those assumptions may not be accurate, and that has implications for defense spending and capacity and that sort of thing.

All right. With that, let’s move on to the aspirin section now that we’ve explored the headache. Thankfully, you’ve clearly not sat around and simply rung your hands about these problems. You’ve tried to get at them and not just admire the problem. I’d love to give you a chance to talk about some of the positive initiatives that you’ve been undertaking that you’re proud of, that you think have yielded some promise. You assumed command in April– May 2021, if I’m not mistaken. What are some of the initiatives during your command that you’re proud of where you’ve seen some progress in bolstering deterrence?

Admiral Aquilino:

Well, thanks for that. Number one, I’m really proud of my team and all the work that they’ve done. Without them, we would’ve failed in this mission. But, I have the best staff on the planet. They understand the theater, they understand the challenges, they understand the cultures, and they’re incredible. I’ll start with, as Admiral Montgomery finished, which is that critical aspect of our allies and partners. We’re always stronger when we’re together.

We have really moved the ball down the field as it applies to, number one, solidifying the significance of our five treaty allies in the region. Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Those mutual defense treaties are foundational and treaty allies are a step above all things because we have committed to defend those nations if they are attacked. That said, there is a ton of work and a great movement forward on all of our partners in the region as well. The approach of more multilateral operations has really grown drastically throughout the region and everything we’re doing. I credit that to my partner chiefs of defense who have articulated the importance of being able to do multilateral work together. We will continue to do that in all of our exercises.

When you think about RIMPAC of 26, 28 nations, the largest maritime exercise in the world comes together in the Pacific. When you think about what our Australian partners have done in Talisman Saber, that used to be a bilateral US-Australia event. There were multiple nations that participated based on Australia’s invite. In the Philippines and Balikatan, that is now a multilateral exercise. I credit my partner General Bronner from the Philippines to continue to move that. In Indonesia, Garuda Shield is multilateral. Cobra Gold in Thailand, a multilateral event of broad number of nations coming together. This ability to come together quickly, be interoperable at a moment’s notice, that’s been the objective. We’ll continue to do that. But, the allies and partners, the strength of that can’t be overstated. I’d actually argue that the cooperation between those other nations are a response to those broad set of actions that we’ve taken in.

Second, we continue to upgrade and develop our posture for a couple of reasons. Number one, to help our partners build out their infrastructure. Then number two, to be able to operate together any place anytime to meet our mutual defense security requirements as well as be able to support. If you think about humanitarian assistance and disaster response, all the chiefs of defense have committed to go anywhere anyone needs help to support them. To do that, the infrastructure build-out is required. We’ll continue to do that in all of the nations that we operate with in the theater.

Third, our campaigning and our operations together also has really been impressive. The synchronization of the joint force, undersea, on the sea, above the sea, in space and cyberspace, in ways that I would challenge anyone else to try to do, incredibly important. Then you take that and combine it with the allies and partners, that’s a force to be reckoned with. Then, lastly, the capabilities that we continue to develop and deliver. I thank the Deputy and the Secretary for a strategic based budget. But, I continue to highlight a sense of urgency and the fact that we need to go faster to deliver those capabilities. As released in 2024, the INDOPACOM ask for capability, had a $3.5 billion shortfall. And, I’m critically in need of those capabilities to deliver the deterrence required. I thank the department always. I thank the Congress for helping. But, boy, that shortfall… it would be nice if we could get that delivered.

Brad:

Mark, if China’s the number one threat and INDOPACOM is the most important area of responsibility, what the heck would justify a $3.5 billion shortfall?

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

Well, it’s hard. Look, in fairness, both Admiral Aquilino and I have been involved in the development of the PAC Fleet and PACOM, INDOPACOM, unfunded lists or what are called integrated priority lists and such for almost 10 years together. I would say it is not a lack of focus at the Department of Defense. They understand that China’s just number one priority. It’s very hard to move services off of what they considernumber one.I think if Admiral Aquilino made up a war plan and said, “Here’s the war plan I have. Hey, chief of naval operations, can you produce this Navy?” He would tell Admiral Aquilino, or she would now, “Great news, Lung [Admiral Aquilino’s callsign], the Program of Record meets every need you have.” And, if Admiral Aquilino were to turn the plan upside down and say, “No, no, no, no, I’m sorry. It was this way. I have a whole new idea.” She would say, “Great news, Lung, the Program of Record meets everything you need.”

I think the services generally build what they think they need and it’s very hard to get them off a Program of Records. As we see the adversary maneuver, it’s hard for us to alter. Look, the one exception to this is something called the European Deterrence Initiative. The reason that got funded was that it didn’t actually hit any service budgets. It was funded out of what was called OCO, Overseas Contingency Operations. It was done separately. Then when OCO ended, they actually had a bishop’s fund that services compete or are managed by the Deputy Secretary Fund that services competed for. That kind of discretion has never been given to the PACOM list over the last decade. The differences over the last three to four years, we’ve actually worked things off that list. If you were to take the list that probably Vice Admiral or Rear Admiral Montgomery and Aquilino worked in 2016 and looked in 2020, we’d have said not much happened, or 2021. Over two administrations.

But, in reality over the last three or four years, things that PACOM or INDOPACOM has asked for are being worked off the list. That doesn’t mean there’s not 3.5 billion more on that list. So, it’s been worked off. My answer, the shorter answer of that, is some things have been done not enough. But, if we stay on this track and continue to work down, whittle down this list, and Congress has been a big part of that, I think we can get there. But, this problem was a long time in the making. The hole we dug ourselves with foot fixation elsewhere, it’s going to take a little while to get out of it.

Brad:

It’s great that we… and I agree with you that we’re making progress. But, if one’s looking at a potential major contingency in the 2027, 2028 timeframe, you both know better than me. These things take time to get authorized and appropriated to get it built and get it deployed. Right? So, it seems to me we have, if you accept those dates and no one knows what the real dates are of course, that we have a window of opportunity here in the next one to three years where we really need to get a lot of key things done. Agree? Disagree?.

Admiral Aquilino:

Well, for me, I have the responsibility to be ready today. And, responsibility comes with this job each and every day, and we will continue to do everything possible to focus on this specific challenge. And, everything we do every single day is designed to prevent this conflict, not provoke it.

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

I hate to think about just being… I agree. You can’t just be ready for 2027, 2028. You have to be ready today, ready three years from now, ready 10 years from now. So, you have to go at all these. That’s hard. You have to go at everything everywhere, all at once, right?. I think, let me pick one area. We might’ve talked about this a little bit in the future. I’ll pick it out now. Munitions. I mean, the truth is, INDOPACOM, PAC Fleet, PACAF, have been asking for more and more munitions for 10 years. They put it in a request. It gets whittled down at the service level because, don’t worry, we can plus that up if we need it. Then it gets whittled down at the joint staff review, then it gets whittled down at the OSD review, then it gets whittled down over at OMB, and it even used to get whittled down in Congress.

You know what woke us up to that? Nothing in Asia. What woke us up to that, as you know, was the Russia-Ukraine conflict. As a result, everything Admiral Aquilino was asking for in 2022 and not getting, in 2023, you saw real movement. What it was, was we saw an authoritarian regime take authoritative action. All of a sudden, we’re starting to see work on these munitions. The question is, can they solve all of the shortfalls that INDOPACOM, the J8 and the J3 there have identified and tackled them. That’s why the 3.5 billion is probably still out there. Is that as you work that bogey off, it’s going to take a little while on these adjustments.

Brad:

I want to transfer, move to Guam. Admiral, last time you visited FDD, we spent some time discussing Guam, the growing missile threat to our citizens there, our bases, our force there, hypersonic defense and the Guam Defense System. How is progress on that effort? Are we on track to have the relevant defenses deployed in time and what are some of the next milestones that you’re looking at?

Admiral Aquilino:

Yeah, thanks. Just to start right, the number one priority is we talk about mission sets as homeland defense. Guam is home to 170,000 US citizens that I’m responsible to protect. It remains my top priority. I thank the department deputy and the secretary for funding now in the last two budgets submitted, over $2 billion. That will get this started. It will certainly cost some more. The integration of the systems that we have is ongoing. I worked specifically with Missile Defense Agency to go ahead and deliver that capability. We’re working towards the demonstration of a capability here in ’24, at least in a rudimentary level. Moving down the right direction. But, we can’t let our processes and/or rice bowls get in the way of this. We have to continue to move it. In my belief, we got to accelerate it.

Brad:

Mark, timelines, rice bowls, what say you?

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

First, I’m going to say right now that the only reason we’re having a test at the end of 2024 is that PACOM has tacked this to the wall solidly for two years. The system itself would love to test this in 2025, 2026, you pick your year. Not the end of 2024. I’m really hoping we can get there as a SPY-like radar with a AEGIS weapons control system controlling a standard missile type missile, intercepting an inbound threat. That kind of demonstration would be critical. I worry that the IOC of a capability followed by the F-

Brad:

Initial operational capability.

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

Initial operational capability followed by final operational capability, we have to watch the years that the department or Congress puts against that. Not let it slip too far to the right. Because, this has a strong deterrent effect I think on China.

Brad:

That’s great. You mentioned posture earlier. I just wanted to drill down on that for a moment if I could. Admiral, from your perspective, what is the value of US military force posture in the region as opposed just to retaining a lot of our combat power in the continental United States?

Admiral Aquilino:

Well, certainly, on the logistics sustainment, peace is critical for us to operate across half the globe. All right? The INDOPACOM area covers half the globe. So, the ability to have places that we can do logistics actions, that’s important. The reason or the ability to get into places to execute our responsibilities under our mutual defense treaties are critical reasons that we need to lay in the posture. The ability to support our partners, friends and allies when they’re impacted by an earthquake, a tsunami, you name the emergency. Remember, we live in the rim of the Pacific and it’s the area most affected by natural disasters. For us to respond and help our partners, that posture is needed. Those are all the reasons. On top of that, for us to work with our allies and partners and be interoperable, it’s important that we operate in the same places with the same equipment.

Brad:

Mark, where and how do you believe we need to strengthen US force posture in the region?

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

Well, first, I’d say over the last three years it’s been great. We’ve gotten submarines in Guam, more submarines in the Guam. We’re getting new flight three DDGs, which basically are serving as cruiser replacements into Yokosuka with those ships. We’re putting our best stuff forward. Those are just two naval examples. I’m a little disappointed in the Air Force. I think the withdrawal of the squadron at Kadena while eventually those older F15 needed to go, I think we probably could have done a better job of having F15EXs ready, or whatever’s going to replace them there, ready to go or F15Cs, whatever’s going to go in there. I wish the Air Force would get back on. They used to have a plan. If you go back seven or eight years ago in their strategic lay down for F35s in Japan, they explicitly said in Misawa they sped up deployment to the UK, understandably, at the time in Europe after the Crimean invasion.

But, I think it’s time to get serious again about F35s somewhere in Japan or Guam over time having a fifth generation fighter permanently stationed there, in addition to the Marine Corps ones and Navy ones I acknowledge will be down in Iwakuni associated with the Air Wings down there. I think the Navy’s done a good job. INDOPACOM, not surprising, has been able to steer that one pretty well. It’d be nice to get the Air Force… And, I do think what the Marines have done with the Marine Littoral Regiment, can’t say enough fantastic things about that. The innovative thinking that General Berger, the previous commandant brought to that was significant. I think that that is a real value added. Final thing I’ll say is INDOPACOM’s work on the ECDA, the agreements we have with the Philippines throughout the Duterte time, INDOPACOM’s working quietly–

Brad:

Those are the defense cooperation agreements.

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

Defense cooperation — working quietly almost against Duterte’s wishes to get ourselves prepared. As soon as President Marcos got in, I think there’s been a very quiet, deliberate effort to really get our logistics, our basing, our prepositioning right in the Philippines in support of the development of the Philippines and their ability to do things.

Brad:

Just for the listener, one of the big ideas here that’s implicit I’ll make explicit now, is that if we put all of our military assets and capabilities in large bases, then there’s a danger of them being targeted by adversary forces. So, we want to have it distributed so that they’re able to survive and operate and not be targeted in one or two surprise attacks or large scale attacks. So, that’s the big idea here. The Air Force has talked about a hub and spoke strategy and things along those lines. Mark, anything to add on distributed force posture?

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

Yeah. I’m a big fan of the Air Force’s Agile Combat Deployment, which gets at that. The only problem I see is there’s a slight say-do mismatch from the Air Force in the sense that they talk and they exercise well getting around, but they really do need to procure a good number of deployable, what are called DABS, deployable airbase sets. In a couple of Sierra land containers, there’s the runway repair kit, the temporary air traffic control, a big bladder for fuel, a few other things, the maintenance ladders that you need to do a little bit of weapon stowage stuff.

We need PACOM to have, I think, 25 to 30 of those in INDOPACOM similar to the 20 plus I believe we have now US European command, bought by that OCO money I mentioned. Getting those deployable airbase sets over would be really helpful to do that. It would be a strong sign to Japan, Guam, the Philippines, others that, “Hey, we mean business when we say we’re going to be moving around aggressively.” That would be helpful I think long-term. Otherwise, a lot of good stuff’s going on.

Brad:

Admiral, in a major conflict in the region there, again, with deference to you, there are questions about the ability to get forces in the region as quickly and effectively as we’d like once the shooting starts. If you’re willing, can you talk about contested logistics and what more needs to be done to ensure we can flow forces effectively into the region from the United States?

Admiral Aquilino:

Yeah, they always say that amateurs talk war fighting and professionals talk logistics. The ability to sustain the force is something that only the United States can do globally today. It’s a critical asymmetric advantage. It’s a key part of our thought. It’s a key part of our planning. The posture initiatives we talk about help sustain and support that. Additionally, the preposition of capabilities forward is a focus for us as well just based on the sheer size and scope of the region should we end up in a fight tonight type scenario?

Brad:

Mark, can you talk about the… I’d just love to hear from you about the cyber threat to our CONUS force generation, given the fact that you  lead our Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation.

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

Yeah, before cyber, I want to just say I agree completely and I think I talk about war fighting too much. I’d better be careful. But, on that, one thing I want to mention is something a little bit outside INDOPACOM’s span and control. But, what’s really critical to them is our military sea lift and our ability to get there. We are at the razor’s edge. We say we need 60 plus. When we brief publicly, we say we need about 60 of these ships available. There’s literally only 61 that we could draw the 60 from. If you know how ship maintenance works, the idea that 60 would be available is really unlikely. So, we don’t meet the ships. The only thing I found kind of humorous is that a good friend of mine and Lung’s, Admiral Anne Phillips is now head of MARAD at the Department of Transportation.

She said, “Well, that’s not a big problem because we don’t have near the crews we need to man them.” I’m like, “Well, okay. Now, problem two on this list is we got to get our crews right.” These are the merchant mariners. We got to get our shipping right. Because, if we don’t have that, we’re not going to be able to sustain war fighting. Because, the one thing about PACOM that’s really brutal is the tyranny of distance and water. So, we’re really going to need that military sea lift.

You asked me about cyber. The one thing I’d say is there’s been a lot of talk because of the leaks about Volt Typhoon, I mean the Chinese placing of malicious software allegedly in our different infrastructures, electrical power, water, pipelines and ports. We are really concerned. We write a lot at our center about, and you and I do, about military mobility and the ability to protect the critical infrastructure of our rail systems, aviation and ports in the United States from Chinese or Russian, but in this case mostly Chinese assault.

It is going to be a rough decision making process for the secretary of defense and the president when they’re saying, “Well, I think I might want to do this.” And, suddenly, the rail system’s not working or the port system’s not working. Our ability to show deterrence movements or to actually prepare forces for war could be significantly hampered. This is something that’s outside the Department of Defense’s ability to control. They don’t own the eight national rail companies. They don’t own the air traffic control system. They don’t own the 19 strategic sea lift ports.

These all have to be done by the private sector and the rest of the federal government is the lead agencies. Really, this is one of those tough national security issues where the Department of Defense actually needs everybody else’s help and everybody else has not been helpful in a really meaningful way. We really need to attack that in the next couple of years because the Chinese have found this vulnerability and we need to close it so that the military can do its job.

Admiral Aquilino:

On cyber defense, the CYBERCOM commander, General Nakasone, has been a tremendous partner. He understands the value, our strength is in defense, and ensuring that no matter what any adversary does, we can still operate all of our critical infrastructure, all of our military critical infrastructure and generate the force when needed.

Brad:

That’s a point that I think a lot of people are not familiar with military issues don’t always appreciate that our continental United States military bases depend to some degree on the civilian infrastructure around them to generate the forces that the combatant commanders would need in a contingency or a crisis. To me, this reinforces the value of forward posture. It also reinforces the value of pre-positioned stocks. Anything that either of you would want to say on where we’re at on pre-positioned stock and where we need to be going?

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

One thing that Congress has been trying to do and failed to get done was a war reserve supply allies, Taiwan. I mean, one of the things that people look at Ukraine are like, “What a fantastic deal. We’re able to deliver all these weapons.” That’s called the border of Poland, Slovakia and Romania, mostly Poland. We’re not going to have that opportunity in Taiwan. I think there’s some value in munitions. We have munitions like this stowed in Korea and in Israel, and we’ve used them on numerous occasions to help have the ally help have access to some weaponry. I think the same things do for Taiwan, and the beauty is we authorized a hundred million dollars of Taiwan specific munitions in the FY23 NDAA, but really didn’t have a good home for it.

If we could now authorize the WRSA [War Reserve Stock Allies], expand it to include Taiwan, it’s a very simple one word change in the law. I think that would go a long way to starting to get this issue of munitions on island. Munitions are great. They’re a great deterrent because your ally knows they’re there and has to account for them. I like the Taiwans because they have a lot of caves, so they’re going to be able to dig this stuff in. Not perfectly, but I think there’s some opportunity there. I’m hoping to see Congress pass that in the next National Defense Authorization Act.

Admiral Aquilino:

While in command, the coordination and the work that my predecessor did, Admiral Davidson, taking a look at a set of options for command and control. At the end of his tour, he identified what he thought was best of breed, and I implemented it on day one. We’ve been operating out of a supported-supporting relationship. The PAC Fleet commander has been synchronizing the ops of all the components together to deliver integrated effects anywhere we chose to do them with the understanding that that setup could transition to an operational JTF in time of crisis and conflict.

Now, that was day one of my command. Within eight months of that, we identified the need to be able to identify and synchronize the force through the lens of a joint task force commander, and we centered it around Guam. What we identified was, in the short term, I needed a JTF commander to synchronize all the capabilities that we intended to put on Guam. When you think of Guam defense system, Guam offensive systems, and then logistic sustainment from Guam seaport and airport, in the short term, a joint task force commander was the best path to do that. Now, in the medium term, that would transition to a full-blown operational joint task force headquarters that could execute and integrate my operations when needed in the form of a standing JTF. That said, I’ve continued to evolve my thinking and, as I look at the threat, as I look at the actions, as I look at what might be coming our way, we’re evaluating what the next picture might look like and we’re working on that right now.

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

I agree with all that. I mean, this is an evolving issue. The ability of the Chinese to reach farther and farther across the AOR. I mean, it’s over the last, if you went back seven years ago, where their span of control was, was much shorter than it is now. It is getting farther and farther out there. So, we have to think… One of the things that makes me most excited is the… Circling back to Lung’s initial comments, what the Japanese have done with their permanent joint force headquarters.

They’ve committed to do it. They’ve got something going. They’re finally building someone to be Admiral Aquilino’s counterpart, a COCOM commander who can work with him. I think in wartime, if we have a standing joint force task force out there, whether it’s INDOPACOM commander or somebody commanding it to work with very directly. But, they still have someone for us to exercise with, to work with. The Japanese have bought a military that… There is no military that’s more integratable with ours at such a high end with so much capacity. I mean, the Australians is integratable, but with a much less capacity than the Japanese. Having that, having the Australian JOC, their joint operation command, having INDOPACOM, having this task force, I think there’s real opportunity there. Hopefully, as the thinking evolves, there’s going to be some opportunity to really bring those together in a meaningful war fighting way.

Admiral Aquilino:

We’re going to do exercise Keen Edge coming up here at the end of January. That previously was a bilateral high-end event with our Japanese partners. My counterpart, again, is a incredible leader and a visionary. He has identified, and we did this together, that he’s invited the Australians. We’re going to execute Keen Edge in a trilateral fashion in exactly the command and control that Admiral Montgomery articulated.

Brad:

In our remaining moments, I just would love to get to two last questions if I could. Admiral, it’s a question I often like to ask senior military officers like yourself. What military capabilities do you most need that are not yet fielded? Mark, anything to add?

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

I love that list. My son wants to go to a destroyer out of Yokosuka later this year, and so I like the blind part a lot.

Brad:

Yeah, I bet.Admiral, as you look at your remaining months in command and as listeners on Capitol Hill start thinking about the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2025, where do you think their top priorities and your top priority should be in your remaining time in command?

Admiral Aquilino:

Well, my priorities haven’t changed. Again, the consistency of what we have articulated, both in the strategy and the implementation of that strategy and the approach and the capabilities we’ve asked for have not changed one bit in my three years. I believe that consistency actually has helped. I think the department understands that we’ve been very thoughtful about what we need. And, the other side of it is even more concerning. If I gave a different top three list every year, no one would believe I would have any idea what was going on. The consistency is because we have a clear-eyed view of the problem. And, I think we have a well-articulated and thoughtful aspirin, to your point, for delivering that deterrence. You won’t see too much different out of INDOPACOM.

Brad:

Makes sense. Mark, where do you think authorizers and appropriators should focus for the upcoming defense authorization and appropriations?

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

Well, first, they need to read the INDOPACOM annual report.

Brad:

Good start. Yeah, that makes sense.

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

Second, execute it.

Brad:

Right. Right. There it is. Well, Admiral, I just want to really thank you sincerely for your time. I can only imagine what your inbox looks like, and I want to thank you and your family sincerely for your decades of service and continued service to our country. From my perspective, your success is all of our success. I wish you the very best in the future.

Admiral Aquilino:

Yeah, thanks for having me again. Again, I appreciate everybody continuing to support both INDOPACOM the Department of Defense. Again, our key task here is to prevent conflict, not to provoke it. Thank you for all you do.

Brad:

To my great friend, an incredible colleague, Mark. Thanks so much for joining as well.

Admiral Mark Montgomery:

Thanks for having me. I’d tell Lung don’t burn out. But, I’ve known him for 20 years and I know that’s not possible.

Brad:

There you go. Well, thank you. To our listeners, thanks so much for joining the conversation here on Foreign Podicy.