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I think, Peter, you have to admit, when you hear these audiotapes, you hear what we believe to be the voice of Mohammed Atta or Zia Jurat (ph), some of the hijackers, you have to conclude that — I mean, it just brings back horrible memories for all of us.

PETER BEINART, EDITOR, THE NEW REPUBLIC: No, it really does. And also a sense of rage. I mean, that people would do this to us. And I think the only — one has to try to move beyond, just as we did after September 11, the incredible grief and pain to a strategy for how to stop these people so it never happens again.

BLITZER: Is there a strategy in place right now to do this, to stop these people from doing it again?

CLIFF MAY, PRESIDENT, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES: There’s the beginning of one. Understand that we didn’t have a strategy for terrorism for a very long time. What we had was the belief that if we had an Army, an intelligence service that could take on the Soviet Union, the small countries obviously would not be a problem. If we could deal with China, we wouldn’t have to worry about Afghanistan.

That was the wrong strategy. It was the strategy in place for more than a generation.

I don’t know that we have the best policies in place right now. But we need to evolve the best policies, and that means we need to look forward rather than continue to look back and say, OK, exactly who is to blame for this one?

BLITZER: Well, before we look forward, let’s look back a little bit. Cliff makes a very important point, and I want to get your sense. Is it true that in the ’80s and the ’90s, the period of the Reagan administration, the first Bush administration, and the eight years of the Clinton administration, they were asleep, they really had no strategy in fighting terrorism?

BEINART: Yes. Relative to what they should have been doing to where we are now, they were asleep. There’s no question about it.

You know, none of us, I think we should say, very, very few people out there in the ’80s or ’90s, were saying this should be the top American foreign policy priority. But in retrospect, it should have been a much higher priority than it was. And we are paying for the price for that inaction.

MAY: Can I point out just — for example, in the 1990s, we now know that 20,000 terrorists were trained in lethal skills in Afghan training camps. Now, we did nothing to close those camps, to infiltrate them or track those who graduated. But it goes back further. Keep in mind that in the late 1970s, President Carter dismissed 25 percent of our intelligence agents, including most of those trained in the most lethal things.

(CROSSTALK)

BEINART: You know, let me just make…

MAY: And assassinations were ruled out.

BEINART: I just want to make a point here. What’s interesting is the partisan tinge this takes.

MAY: No, no…

BEINART: You notice the ’90s and the ’70s. In all of the discussions…

MAY: Let me agree with you.

BEINART: … of Ronald Reagan’s legacy, how many…

MAY: I’m sorry…

BEINART: … stories did you read about his abysmal record on terrorism…

MAY: Let me say…

BEINART: … his weakness in the face of terrorism, which was just as bad as President Clinton’s, probably worse?

MAY: My…

BEINART: Very little from the right side of the aisle.

MAY: Let me just be clear, because I’ve written about this, and I have written about this I think in a fair way. This goes back to ’79. I mentioned particularly the hijack — the hijacking of our embassy and some of Carter’s policies.

In 1982, our embassy was attacked by Hezbollah in Beirut under Ronald Reagan. Ronald Reagan made exactly the wrong decision. He pulled out of Beirut, which sent yet another signal to the terrorists that, if you hit us, we will flee. This — I will say — let me say…

BEINART: And how much discussion has there been about that?

MAY: Let me say it. I’m going to say it once and say it as clearly as I can. Republicans and Democrats, for more than a generation, in the White House and in Congress, have not understood the threat of terrorism. They have instead had a bipartisan policy, and that policy was focused on Russia and China. And what were called the lesser included, they didn’t worry about.

BLITZER: I think that’s a good, important clarification, because you did refer to the Clinton administration, the Carter administration…

MAY: I — no.

BLITZER: But you neglected the 12 years of Republican administration involving Reagan and the first Bush.

MAY: And — and the first Bush. It was also a mistake. And it wasn’t only Bush’s fault, but it was partly his fault in 1991.

We said the fact that Saddam Hussein had tried to destroy a fellow — neighboring country, had engaged in genocide, had created weapons of mass destruction, we’re not going to evict him from his palaces, it’s not a serious enough crime. Terrible mistake. I wish Bush had said, I don’t care who advises me. This is the decision…

(CROSSTALK)

BLITZER: And you will agree with Peter, and I’m sure you will, that the failure of Ronald Reagan to respond to the killing of 241 Marines at the U.S. barracks outside of Beirut in 1983, the failure to go after Hezbollah or Iranian-sponsored terrorists, that was a huge mistake with hindsight.

MAY: It was a huge mistake. And we never followed up properly, even with the investigation of what happened in Beirut. The only one punished for what happened in Beirut was Keith Hall (ph), a CIA agent.

You know what he was punished for? Being too tough in his interrogations. And we’re getting into an interesting discussion of them now.

What did he do? As far as we know, he pushed a suspect off his chair to show he meant business. And we didn’t pursue it. He was fired, nobody else was punished for what happened in Beirut in 1982.

BLITZER: One of the most shocking things we learned today — and I was shocked, and I’ve been watching this story for many, many years, for decades, going back to long before I was a Pentagon correspondent — the U.S. military, the U.S. Air Force had never trained for the possibility that an airliner, a civilian airliner, could be hijacked and used as a bomb by suicide hijackers. That’s — that’s shocking to me. I don’t know about you, Peter.

BEINART: Well, in retrospect, obviously hindsight is 20/20. But we do know that there was a plot in Malaysia to blow up — to blow up airplanes.

BLITZER: Well, that’s what I mean. There were so many signals in the ’80s and ’90s that this was — this was a potential weapon out there, to hijack a plane and use it as a missile.

BEINART: That’s right. Look, sadly, the history of this country, and I think the history of democracies in general, is that they tend not to get on — on the war footing they need to get to until after something terrible happens.

It would be wonderful if it wasn’t that case, if it wasn’t the case. But it usually is. Luckily, in our history, we’ve been able to respond to these things by getting it right the second and third time, is what we have to do now.

MAY: Despite what we knew about 1995, remember back what it was like going through an airport in the late 1990s. And I don’t say that to (UNINTELLIGIBLE). After 2002, people said, “Did you pack your own luggage? Did anybody assist you?”

That was considered to be airline security. It was ridiculous. And you’re right, we have to get on a substantial war footing. But part of my argument now would be, are we sure we’re doing it now? Do we understand the magnitude of the threat that’s out there, what they seek to do against us? And are we doing enough?

Democrats and Republicans alike, are we doing enough to fight this war? And it’s a global war against terrorism.

BLITZER: All right. Let’s move on and talk about an issue that’s out there right now, the connection or lack thereof between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and al Qaeda. The president was asked once again to respond on this issue earlier today in his cabinet meeting at the White House. Listen to what he said.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

BUSH: Well, the reason I keep insisting that there was a relationship between Iraq and Saddam and al Qaeda, because there was a relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. This administration never said that the 9/11 attacks were orchestrated between Saddam and al Qaeda. We did say there were numerous contacts between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. For example, Iraqi intelligence officers met with bin Laden, the head of al Qaeda, in the Sudan.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

BLITZER: Is this a serious dispute between the White House and the 9/11 Commission, or are we missing something?

BEINART: I think we’re missing something. First of all, the president is wrong. His own vice president has implied strongly that Saddam did have a role in 9/11, and that’s why he made this unfound delegation, said Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker, had met with — with an Iraqi agent in Prague, something which has now been discredited.

I would say this, the 9/11 Commission, which seems to me the most credible source we have, has said there was no — there was no real relationship between the two.

BLITZER: No collaborative effort against the United States.

BEINART: No — they say there were meetings, they say that Iraq was basically not interested in helping al Qaeda. But I would say this, if the bar is war here, you need more — even if we were to concede that there were ties, there were links, you would have to say, are these ties and links greater than the links that Pakistan has, that the Sudan has, that Saudi Arabia has? Even if we were willing to concede that there were links and ties, they would be of such minimal nature compared to so many other countries that this — it seems to me bizarre that the focus of the war on terrorism was on Iraq.

MAY: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) my friend, Peter, I think is contradicting himself. If we’re on a war footing, it’s not the same as saying, well, until we have absolute proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Saddam Hussein…

BEINART: But we have to make choices.

MAY: … was involved — was involved — was involved in a crime against the United States, then we can’t do anything. Look, in 1998 — again, just making this bipartisan — the Justice Department under President Clinton said very clearly in an indictment that al Qaeda had — made an agreement with Iraq that they would — specifically including weapons to government and working cooperatively between Iraq and — and the government — and al Qaeda.

BEINART: But that…

BLITZER: But that seems to be rejected now by the 9/11 Commission.

MAY: If they’re rejected if they don’t…

(CROSSTALK)

BEINART: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) the 9/11 Commission?

MAY: You know, I wish this 9/11 Commission would take something like that, an indictment made by the Justice Department, and discuss in there whether they think they’re indictment was wrong or right, instead of just leaving it out. There’s a lot of work in this commission that they haven’t done.

Here’s — also, these are mistakes that are being made all over the place. Having a collaborative relationship or having close links or links that we don’t understand entirely, that’s different from saying they were involved in 9/11, which we don’t know, different from…

(CROSSTALK)

MAY: By the way, Mohammed Atta, we don’t know yet. The basic…

BEINART: No, no. Come on, Cliff. We know that that has been rejected.

MAY: No.

BEINART: It has been rejected by every serious person who’s looked at it.

MAY: Here’s the basic..

BEINART: Can you — you’re still going out with that?

MAY: I’m saying we don’t know. And I’m saying you don’t know.

BEINART: We do know.

MAY: Here’s the basic evidence. His cell phone was used from Florida at a time when he should have been in Prague. (AUDIO GAP) my office and you make a call from it, does that mean I was here? We don’t know.

Our intelligence community has not — look, our intelligence community still doesn’t know who was responsible for the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. Do you know? Do you know? How come we don’t know?

Does that — I mean, it didn’t take place? Absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence. It’s basic logic.

BEINART: With all due respect — with all due respect, I think you’re not paying attention to my question. My question is, there is much stronger evidence of al Qaeda relationships to many other governments in the world than there is to Iraq. And that, I think, you would not dispute.

So the question that we might — there might possibly have been a tie between Iraq and al Qaeda does not seem to me any — we are in a war footing, we have to make choices about where the greatest threats are. Are you going to say that al Qaeda had a stronger relationship with Iraq than with Pakistan, with Sudan…

MAY: You were somebody…

BEINART: … which harbored it for years?

MAY: Peter, you were somebody who was in favor of the war against Saddam Hussein.

BEINART: Absolutely, and still are. And still are.

MAY: And are you saying — OK. Well, then don’t — but you are implying…

BEINART: But we never believed — we never believed this dishonest rationale…

MAY: No, no, no, no.

BEINART: … that it was somehow connected to the war on terrorism in the sense that al Qaeda had strong Iraqi connections because…

MAY: We knew that…

BEINART: … the evidence for that has been so weak.

MAY: No. We knew that al Qaeda agents and other terrorists were being trained at Salman Pac. We knew that every intelligence agency…

BEINART: That was not in Saddam’s control. Be honest about this.

MAY: Salman Pac? No, no. You’re thinking of Ansar al Islam. Salman Pac was within a half-hour drive of Baghdad, Peter.

BEINART: We — that has been disputed. And the 9/11 Commission itself has found no evidence to this.

MAY: Oh, what does it say about Salman Pac?

BEINART: The 9/11 Commission…

MAY: Finding no evidence doesn’t mean there wasn’t any evidence. We have had…

BEINART: They have (ph) gone much further than that.

MAY: No.

(CROSSTALK)

BEINART: It hasn’t said we didn’t find evidence. It has said, to the best of our knowledge — and they have done an exhaustive study. They have been given more documents than anybody else. We find no evidence of a collaborative relationship.

MAY: Salman Pac…

BEINART: You just dismiss that?

MAY: … what do you — you just dismiss Salman Pac. But we’ve had people who work there say that there were foreign jihadis who were there, they were trained, and Saddam Hussein said to them, your targets when you graduate, Americans.

BEINART: And we have had the 9/11 Commission look into precisely this issue, and they have…

MAY: And what have they said about Salman Pac?

BEINART: … and they have said there is no collaborative relationship.

MAY: A foreign jihadi trained in Iraq by Saddam Hussein.

BEINART: You don’t think they looked into — you don’t think they looked into Salman Pac?

MAY: They didn’t explain it here. You can’t explain it now. I wish they would do that. I wish they would do that.

BLITZER: All right. We’re going to end it right now, because unfortunately we are all out of time. But we will continue this discussion.

What they did say, though, in the report issued yesterday was they found no reason to believe that Mohammed Atta, the ringleader of 9/11, was in Prague and met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official. There was no evidence that they had to back that up.

(CROSSTALK)

BEINART: I would — right.

MAY: And don’t forget, the guy we’re most — who’s on the most wanted listed right now in Iraq is who? Is Zarqawi. Zarqawi is connected to al Qaeda. Zarqawi was there before the liberation of Iraq. He’s there now. And he’s the guy we most need to get.

BLITZER: All right. But the connections with al Qaeda, even with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, are — are indirect at least. He’s not necessarily a top lieutenant to Osama bin Laden.

Stand by, guys. We’ll do this on another occasion. Peter Beinart, thank you very much. Cliff May, as usual, thank you.

MAY: Thank you.

BLITZER: We’re going to switch gears dramatically when we come back. In fact, we’re going to go to the world according to Ben Stein. He claims to know exactly what you must do in order not to ruin your financial life. Ben Stein in our studio. That’s coming up next.