Israel-Hamas war: The dangers of an IDF strategy shift in Gaza

Reports this weekend swarmed with headlines that Israel is continuing to consider a strategy shift in Gaza, with the focus on the transition to “low intensity” warfare.

Israel has already churned through several phases: the initial response to the Hamas attack, the air campaign in October, and the ground operation in November; then, a pause in fighting, the December campaign in southern Gaza, and attempts to consolidate control in northern Gaza.

Yet despite the different phases, and Israel’s ability to dominate operational tempo in Gaza, many questions remain about what a low-intensity conflict would look like. This discussion has gone on for weeks, with reports as recently as mid-December suggesting US pressure on moving toward that kind of transition.

The problem with these discussions is that they hinge on a lot of questions, starting with the focus from abroad on the issue of civilian casualties and damage in Gaza. Israel’s campaign primarily sought to move civilians south, out of the line of fire in the north.

Western media, however, saw the campaign as heavy in the use of bombs that were not as precise as they could have been, and they put a spotlight on the damages. At the same time, there were comparisons made to the US’s campaign against ISIS.

In essence, then, the discussion about the Gaza operation gets bogged down in time frames. A transition away from major combat operations sounds a lot like what the US did in Iraq after initially invading it in 2003. When American forces raced to Baghdad, they left civilians behind in the cities it conquered. Israel didn’t do that in Gaza; the operation here is more of a slog to uproot terrorist infrastructure.

Comparisons between Gaza and Mosul

There have also been comparisons to the war against ISIS in Mosul, Iraq, a city with a similar population to Gaza. The effort to take Mosul from ISIS took nine months, which is why the language has been that of “months” and “years.”

More concerning would be comparisons to the campaign in Afghanistan against the Taliban. This is an important distinction. The US fought al-Qaeda and ISIS to eliminate its top leadership. Osama bin Laden was found in Pakistan, and ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was found near the Turkish border in Syria; both met their ends facing US Special Forces.

Hamas leaders have not met their end this way, but it seems they will, with their tendency to live in Doha and travel between Beirut and Turkey, similar to the Taliban. After the initial defeat in 2002, the Taliban were brought back to power 20 years later when the American forces pulled out. Hamas, by contrast, has been in power in Gaza for almost two decades. There are a lot of countries with a vested interest in keeping them in power.

There is the challenge as well that is closer to home in terms of strategy in Gaza. The campaign in Gaza is under the leadership of many men who have extensive experience in the enclave. What that means is that while they might pull a rabbit out of a hat and come up with some new innovative strategy, it’s more likely that the same old approach of Defensive Shield, Cast Lead, Protective Edge, Guardian of the Walls, Shield and Arrow, Summer Rains, and a dozen other operations – some long forgotten now – will come back to haunt us.

This is why when many people hear the words “Shejaia,” or “Jabalya,” or “Beit Hanun,” it brings back memories of campaigns long ago, challenges met, adversaries bested, but with no real victory. Low intensity appears to be a form of mission shrinkage in Gaza, from claims that there wouldn’t be Hamas in Gaza after this war to a climb-down in goal setting.

Hamas is also transitioning to its form of low-intensity conflict, with smaller cells of fighters, as it tries to preserve a dozen of its battalions for the next round. Considering Hamas’s past success at preservation, this is a problematic future development.

Seth Frantzman is the author of Drone Wars: Pioneers, Killing Machine, Artificial Intelligence and the Battle for the Future (Bombardier 2021) and an adjunct fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies.