The gap between public declarations and actions is large. Prioritization is required.

*This article was originally published in Hebrew

Israel is now multi-tasking. It has entered a new phase of the war in Gaza, while at the same time striving to destroy the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas, and working to return the hostages.  After three weeks where the IDF operated mainly from the air, and after several days of ground attacks and the rescue of the kidnapped soldier Ori Megidish, one gets the impression that Hamas’ capacity to inflict damage is decreasing, its operatives are hurting, its rocket barrages are less frequent, and the terrorist organization is not succeeding – despite its best efforts – to drag the Lebanese Hezbollah into the war. This could all change at any moment, but such is the picture now. 

Is Israel closer to attaining its goals in the war? The answer appears to be “no.”  The country is certainly not closer to restoring a sense of security to the citizens of Israel. 

The gap between public declarations and facts on the ground is too wide.  From the very start, there was broad support throughout Israel and the world for the goal articulated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: excising Hamas from the Gaza Strip.  It was clear that time was needed to organize forces and make operational plans. Israel also coordinated with the United States more deeply than probably ever before.  All these things took time – the only resource that cannot be replenished.

The notion that time is on Israel’s side is wrong. The American expectation is that Israel complete the operation within a limited window, and with as few civilian casualties as possible in Gaza. It is difficult to estimate how much time will pass before significant international pressure is exerted to end the war. For now, it appears that the pressure will come in weeks, not months.  This means that the political leadership in Israel will soon be unable to continue operating without a coherent plan. There will come a time where the IDF will be forced to re-prioritize the goals it wants to achieve.

Israel’s leaders must now understand that when goals are declared without the ability to meet them, this will further increase the public’s mistrust and the lack of a sense of security. Goals must be articulated clearly.

If there is a genuine intention to destroy Hamas in Gaza, Israel must take operational risks that are obviously not being taken at this stage. This is due either to fear that inserting larger forces in Gaza would lead to getting bogged down, or fear of a two-front war, with Hezbollah threatening joint the fighting from the north.  The thinking that it will be possible to perform more significant ground actions during the next stage of the war does not correspond with reality.

If, on the other hand, the goal is to wear down Hamas’ leadership for months until they all come out of hiding, then Israel must buy time and extend the political window, especially by improving the humanitarian conditions in the southern Gaza Strip, as America is demanding. 

If the intention is to get the hostages back as quickly as possible – Israel must seriously consider a deal that will come at the expense of its war aims in Gaza.

 And no less important: if the intention is to return a sense of security to the residents of the communities adjacent to Gaza, the war must end with a deep and significant buffer zone that keeps all armed threats away from the fence.

Israel also needs completely different security arrangements at the Rafah crossing to prevent extremist elements in Gaza from rearming after the war ends. These arrangements must be coordinated with Egypt and the U.S. 

It must be said soberly: these goals are quite diverse and they even conflict.  Israel desperately needs a coherent strategic plan and clear priorities.

Clear actions to extend the political clock must start immediately, with real improvement of the humanitarian situation in the south of Gaza. Without this, international pressure will mount to stop the war. Israel must publicly state that it prioritizes the return of all its hostages over eliminating the Hamas leadership. This will put a clear choice to Hamas:  as long as it does not release the hostages, Israel will pursue its leadership wherever and whenever they are.

Concurrently, Israel must immediately get to work on creating a new buffer zone, and to make new security arrangements with Egypt and other actors for after the war. 

It is possible to disagree with these priorities, of course. The Prime Minister and the cabinet are the ones that must decide.  But the citizens of Israel expect from their political leadership, and especially from Netanyahu, to set forth clear priorities and then work to achieve them, without placing blame on others.  There are difficult decisions that must be made now.  This is the time, and this is the mission.

Dr. Eyal Hulata is Israel’s former National Security Advisor and head of the National Security Council.  He is currently a senior international fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington.