Turkey’s Erdogan must take concrete action on Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood

Prior to the devastating earthquakes that struck Turkey in early February, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was attempting to pull off several foreign policy magic tricks ahead of the country’s May 14 elections. This involved resetting ties with Israel and a number of Arab countries, notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Until recently, Ankara had difficult ties with leaders of the Arab world. The need to mend fences became an imperative, owing to Erdogan’s increasingly desperate need to stabilize the national currency (the lira) by procuring funding from abroad.

To that end, Erdogan quickly changed tune.

The UAE, whom he’d accused of backing Turkey’s failed 2016 coup, quickly became the focus of his newfound affections. This resulted in $10 billion worth of investment. Positive overtures were also made to Saudi Arabia, which Erdogan had previously sought to weaken by drawing attention to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi on Turkish soil. Erdogan handed over all case materials and evidence pertaining to the investigation to Saudi authorities, thus ending his moral crusade. Erdogan also paid a personal visit to President Sisi of Egypt, whom he had personally called a dictator. That followed Sisi’s power grab from the Muslim Brotherhood — a movement Erdogan has long championed. With Israel, Erdogan reversed course to reestablish diplomatic ties. This was likely to entice the pro-Israel lobby in Washington, which Turkey hopes will help Ankara acquire new F-16 fighter jets.

Yet, despite Erdogan’s positive overtures, none of the powers in question likely perceives this as anything more than short-term opportunism.

For one thing, Ankara has done virtually nothing to address issues that are of concern to Arab powers: namely, Erdogan’s patronage of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Token gestures such as closing down an MB-affiliated television station in Turkey have been overshadowed by Erdogan’s hosting of the group in Ankara. The same is true of Hamas. Ankara refuses to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization and continues to allow the organization to exist in Turkey. Ismail Haniyeh, a top Hamas leader residing in Turkey, and his son have both been given Turkish passports. It is likely that Erdogan wants to keep the MB and Hamas in his back pocket, mainly as a means of having leverage over Israel and the Arab powers as they continue to develop bilateral ties.

In post-earthquake Turkey, however, Erdogan may not be able to stall on these two issues. Many countries, including Israel, dispatched rescue teams and aid to Turkey. Continuing to withhold decisive action against the MB and Hamas inside of Turkey will be a hard pill for Israel to swallow. Moreover, Turkey will need more foreign capital if it is to successfully overcome the economic challenge born out of the earthquakes, which by some estimates could cost the country close to $45 billion. If he wants to open regional doors for direct investment into Turkey, Erdogan will have to back positive sentiment with action.

Erdogan still has a little time to address these issues, owing to the possibility of a leadership change in Turkey following the May 14 elections. Still, the president is facing his greatest political uphill challenge. The earthquakes have angered citizens throughout Turkey. There is an emerging perception that Erdogan’s time may be over, as he has no credible answers as to how he’s going to heal the country’s physical, economic, and political wounds. The visual of collapsed buildings and devastated cities may be a metaphorical representation of his own rule.

If this is the case, Turkey’s new government will have a unique opportunity to mend ties in a substantive manner to regional powers’ satisfaction. Rather than make demands of Ankara, Israel and the Arab world should wait until the elections pass to see who’s in charge.