A foreign entity that conducts terrorist violence can be deemed a foreign terrorist organization or a specially designated global terrorist. Though these two designation mechanisms differ slightly in how they define terrorism and punish designated entities, their fundamental conception of terrorism and terrorist groups are the same. Terrorist groups use violence as part of a psychological campaign to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population” or to “compel” action. There are also two criteria for designation that are not obvious from available definitions but important to the U.S. government: terrorist entities must be coherent organizations and must have engaged in recent terrorist acts.
Establishing that an organization maintains command and control over its members is important for proving culpability for their actions. In Wagner’s case, its internal hierarchy is self-evident. Wagner is not a “leaderless” private military company where anyone can claim membership. Wagner also demonstrates a consistent methodology across a variety of countries: the group establishes bases of operation, integrates with government forces, and leverages its shadowy legal status to conduct horrific acts of violence without repercussions.
While its violence is often described as “indiscriminate,” Wagner’s acts are neither random nor the product of rogue units. They are part of an intentional campaign to project power and influence through fear. A consistent pattern of violence across multiple theaters shows that Wagner’s violence has at least tacit support from leadership, but far more likely direct approval.
In the Central African Republic (CAR), for example, Wagner arrived to train government forces and protect Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mining investments in 2018 as part of an agreement between Russia and CAR. While there, the group committed numerous human rights abuses that targeted civilians.
One particularly notorious episode that prompted a United Nations investigation offers a glimpse into Wagner’s strategy. A year ago, on Jan. 16-17, Wagner invaded the mining town of Aïgbando, set homes ablaze, forced hundreds to flee, and killed several dozen civilians. Victims further reported kidnappings and sexual assaults. Nicolas de Rivière, the French ambassador to the UN, deemed these actions to be “part of a method which aims to provoke terror in order to control certain territories and derive profits from them.” Elsewhere in CAR, Wagner attacked miners, summarily executed men, and conducted unprovoked attacks on civilians taking refuge in a local mosque.
Wagner has replicated its pattern of summary execution, destruction of towns, and indiscriminate fire in other countries, including Mali, Ukraine, and Sudan — all just in the past year. The repetition of this practice over time and space indicates that Wagner leadership continues to greenlight these tactics.
Wagner’s pattern of behavior fulfills the definitional, organization, and recency criteria necessary for the Biden administration to designate the group as a terrorist entity. While there may be pragmatic reasons to avoid using a terrorist designation against Wagner, from a legal perspective its designability is unambiguous even if the group doesn’t fit the typical pattern of a terrorist organization. Wagner’s weaponization of fear is terrorism at its most basic level, and thus Wagner meets the legal criteria for designation as a terrorist entity.
Gartenstein-Ross is the founder and CEO of Valens Global and leads a project on domestic extremism for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Urban is an analyst at Valens Global and supports FDD’s project on domestic extremism. Follow Daveed on Twitter @DaveedGR. FDD is a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.