Assessing U.S. Sanctions on Russia: Next Steps

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Introduction

Chairman Crapo, Ranking Member Brown, and distinguished members of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, I am honored to appear before you today to discuss assessing U.S. sanctions on Russia and next steps.

I would like to focus my testimony on the effectiveness of the current U.S. sanctions programs targeting Russia, as well as what the United States can do to responsibly ramp up economic pressure on Russia to convince Moscow to cease destabilizing activities in Eastern Ukraine, reduce malicious cyber activities targeting the United States and its allies, and limit their military operations in Syria. 

To date, U.S. sanctions on Russia have a mixed record of success.  Many macroeconomic indicators and recent studies suggest the various forms of sanctions—in particular the sectoral sanctions imposed on key Russian economic sectors—have had an impact on overall Russian economic health.  Likewise, Russian Government officials continually push for sanctions relief, either in public statements[1] or by trying to undermine EU sanctions,[2] suggesting that Russia is feeling the pinch. 

Nevertheless, the United States has not achieved many of the core objectives it sought when deploying these tools; while the United States has imposed one of the most sophisticated sanctions regime ever constructed—including list-based sanctions targeting Russian individuals supporting separatist activities in eastern Ukraine, as well as individuals engaged in human rights abuses, a comprehensive embargo on Crimea, sectoral sanctions focused on key sectors of the Russian economy, sanctions targeting Russian malicious cyber activity, and secondary sanctions authority—Russia continues to engage in threatening activity in a range of areas.  In Eastern Ukraine, Russian-backed forces continue to violate the ceasefire, routinely attacking Ukrainian villages and military personnel.  Likewise, Moscow continues to target Russian opposition leaders, often with lethal means.  Last year and again more recently, Russian opposition leader Vladimir Kara-Murza was poisoned after speaking out about Russian human rights abuses and corruption, with many believing the Russian Government was behind the attempt on his life.[3]  This poisoning followed the shooting death of Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in February 2015, a killing widely perceived as a response to Nemtsov’s outspoken protests against the government.[4]  In Syria, Russia continues to support President Bashar al-Assad with direct military intervention,[5] including during the Syrian Government’s brutal assault on Aleppo.[6]  And finally, in the cyber realm, according to the intelligence community, Russia has continued its efforts to influence and undermine U.S. allies across Europe, in recent months focusing these efforts on upcoming elections in Western Europe.[7]

This Committee should make no mistake; Russian activity in these areas poses a serious threat to U.S. interests and the United States should be prepared to use all elements of its national power—including its economic power—to blunt Moscow’s ability to undermine U.S. interests at home and abroad.