March 16, 2010 | NOW Lebanon

Iran Took A Hit In Iraq, But Will Obama Profit?

The emerging picture from last week’s parliamentary elections in Iraq points to the return of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to office. Preliminary results also suggest that Iran’s allies have suffered a setback.

If these developments are borne out, they will have repercussions on the behavior of Iraq’s neighbors and will require that Washington engage more actively in Iraq to protect its gains, particularly against Tehran. However, by tying itself tightly to an August deadline for the withdrawal of US combat troops, the Obama administration is reducing its leverage and focus at a crucial moment when it simply cannot afford to do so.

Despite a months-long campaign by Syria (with the cover of other Arab neighbors of Iraq) and Iran (through local proxies) to undermine Maliki, the incumbent prime minister is making a strong showing in preliminary election returns. According to Iraq’s election commission, he appears to be leading, in some places by significant margins, the Iraqi National Alliance (which includes pro-Iranian parties or politicians such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Sadrist movement, and Ahmed Chalabi). This is not only the case in Baghdad, but also in predominantly Shia provinces like Najaf, Basra, Babel, Karbala and Muthanna. Such an outcome makes it more likely that he will head the next government.

If the results are confirmed, it would be the second recent election in the region, after the Lebanese elections in June 2009, in which Iran’s allies suffer a reversal at the polls. However, if Hezbollah’s actions in Lebanon are any indication, Iran will not let democracy get in its way. Indeed, there are already signs of an Iranian counterattack in Iraq.

For starters, the Iraqi National Alliance is lashing out against Maliki and attempting to impose its conditions on the formation of a new government—regardless of the final tally. In language reminiscent of Hezbollah’s in Lebanon, alliance officials are demanding that the next cabinet be one of “real partnership”, and that only someone who believes in “consensus” will have a chance at forming that government.

Maliki and his team appear to have other plans. Confident that they will win a large number of seats, they’re making it clear that they expect to form a “harmonious” government – in other words not a disjointed “national unity” government. Maliki exhibited similar strong-headedness during the campaign, when Iran tried to coerce him back into the fold of the Iraqi National Alliance, which the prime minister refused. However, things could get dicey. There have been unconfirmed reports of a failed attempt on Maliki’s life, requiring his brief hospitalization.

Whether the story is true or not, and a pro-Maliki official denied it, the threats to the prime minister cannot be underestimated. The problem is that by making withdrawal from Iraq the centerpiece of its policy, the Obama administration is not helping to stabilize the situation in Iraq. This is worrying officials with deep knowledge of the Iraqi situation.

Several times already, the top US commander in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, has voiced dissent on future troop levels. Last week, in an interview with Foreign Policy online, Ryan Crocker, the respected former ambassador to Iraq, was quite explicit: “I would have preferred to see us keep maximum flexibility with the Iraqis between now and 2011. [The August deadline] makes me nervous… I would be more comfortable, within the terms of the agreement we negotiated, with keeping a more robust force for a longer period of time.”

Crocker went on to say that Washington needed to remain “intensely engaged politically in Iraq,” even if this was done “quietly.”

The United States should also engage more with its allies among Iraq’s neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have made it plain that they are uneasy with Maliki. Syria has seized on this Saudi suspicion to oppose the Iraqi prime minister, by many accounts facilitating a bombing campaign in recent months to destroy him politically. Now that Maliki may be set to return to power, Washington must persuade the Saudis to get over their skepticism, especially if he faces Iranian pressure.

A strong show of support for Maliki would not just be a message to American allies, but also enemies. Maliki has blamed the Syrians for the string of bombings, as has Odierno. The Syrian gambit to topple Maliki failed. The Obama administration must coordinate with the Iraqi prime minister, if he indeed returns, to issue a strong and united message that further Syrian destabilization of Iraq won’t be tolerated. At the same time, Washington should recalibrate accordingly its recent poorly-conceived, incompetently pursued opening to Syria.

The Iranians and the Syrians were able to abort the democratic process in Lebanon through violence. Iraq, however, is not Lebanon. Maliki has shown the ability and will to take on pro-Iranian militias such as the Mahdi Army. He has also proven that he can defeat Iran’s allies politically. However, Maliki cannot take on Iraq’s neighbors alone. If he returns as prime minister, he will need more robust American help.

The stakes are as significant for the Obama administration. Iraq is strategically important for US interests; its role far transcends the narrow aim to affect a military withdrawal. The country must be integrated into a coherent American strategic vision for the Middle East. Whether the administration is capable of such a readjustment remains to be seen.

Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Issues:

Issues:

Iran

Topics:

Topics:

Arabs Baghdad Barack Obama Hezbollah Iran Iraq Karbala Lebanon Mahdi Army Middle East Saudi Arabia Shia Islam Syria Tehran United States