Syria Sets its Traps for the Obama Administration

This article originally appeared in a symposium run by the Middle East Review for International Affairs on the challenges facing President-elect Obama.

In approaching Syria, the new administration will have to navigate carefully amidst myths, fantasies, and traps laid not just by the Syrians, but also by credulous experts here in the United States. The best way to do so is to assess soberly the Syrian regime's nature, interests, priorities, and instruments as well as the history of diplomatic engagement with it.

Syria wants the United States to adopt its own grossly inflated self-image as a major regional power without which “nothing can be done” in the Middle East. Despite a concept of its role far outweighing its capabilities, Syria is, in fact, a weak Third World country with few resources. As such, in order to project an influence well above its weight, the Syrian regime has chronically relied on violence, terrorist proxies, acting as a spoiler, and Iran, with whom it has had an enduring 30-year old strategic alliance.

The problem is that Syria's priorities are basically at odds with those of the United States. These main goals include preserving a strong relationship with Iran–which many in the West think they can break–controlling Lebanon, projecting influence into Iraq, locking Israel in a proxy war of attrition, dominating the Palestinian question, and undermining Jordan. Since Iran shares and furthers these goals, the common denominator to which is undermining American interests and allies in the Middle East, the alliance between Damascus and Tehran is strong and durable.

Regarding Lebanon, Syria is the main factor subverting that country's independence and stability. This strategy includes ongoing armament of Hizballah and other Lebanese and Palestinian militias; facilitating the crossing of radical terrorists and their equipment, including the Fatah al-Islam terror group; refusal to fully demarcate and monitor the common borders; and constant subversive interference in Lebanese domestic affairs in an attempt to restore full Syrian hegemony.

At the same time, Syria is trying to dismantle the two main challenges to its domination of Lebanon: the Chapter VII International Tribunal into the assassinations of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri plus others and UN Security Council resolutions–including 1559, 1680, and 1701–designed to end chronic Syrian subversion of Lebanese independence and sovereignty and to limit Hizballah's freedom of action there.

Syria has also been Syria has also been a particularly malign and destabilizing force in Iraq, sponsoring terrorists who target and kill Americans and Iraqis there. In 2003, Syria's foreign minister declared that it was his country's interest that the “invaders be defeated” in Iraq. The Syrian regime has been pursuing an effective war by proxy in Iraq, supporting, harboring, and facilitating movement for the insurgency, including al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI).

The Syrians' five-year-long proxy war in Iraq has included a revolving door policy for the likes of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and his network; open sponsorship of recruiters and liaisons with AQI, such as Abu al-Qa'qa'.

Recently, Major General John Kelly described it thusly: “Al-Qa'ida operatives and others operate, live pretty openly on the Syrian side.” For instance, despite several appeals by the Iraqi government and the United States to the Syrians, a senior al-Qa'ida figure, Abu Ghadiyya, was afforded safe haven in Syria, where he was a major logistical supplier of AQI, transferring money and fighters across the border until a U.S. cross-border raid in October 2008 either killed or abducted him.

Aside from Iraq, Syria has also been an active sponsor of terrorism against Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel. For example, the Jordanians had alerted Syria when the terrorist Muhammad al-Darsi arrived from Libya at the Damascus Airport only to catch him crossing through Syria into Jordan. In Lebanon, such Syrian clients as Abu Khalid al-Amla, who oversaw the transfer across the border into Lebanon of Shakr al-Absi's Fatah al-Islam, came from that neighboring country. The Syrians were also caught harboring one of the most wanted terrorist masterminds in the world, Imad Mughniya, when his car exploded killing him. Syria's longstanding support for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah remains in full swing.

A new feature in Syria's aggressive role was the clandestine nuclear site destroyed in a September 2007, presumably an Israeli air strike. According to the official IAEA report, sampling from the site showed significant amounts of uranium. It is looking increasingly as though Syria was concealing a plutonium reactor of North Korean design, meant for building bombs.

Rather than show any willingness to change such policies, Syria has taken the offensive by demanding unilateral concessions from the United States. These include insistence that the United States appoint a new ambassador to Syria, restore normal diplomatic ties (originally cut to protest Syrian sponsorship of terrorism and subversion in Lebanon), end “anti-Syrian rhetoric,” lift sanctions, repeal the Syria Accountability Act, renew intelligence cooperation, endorse Israel-Syria talks, to terminate effectively the International Tribunal, and show gratitude for alleged Syrian cooperation in blocking the flow of terrorists into Iraq. Following close behind is insistence that the United States accept Syrian hegemony over Lebanon on the pretext of its “combating” radical Islamist groups there, when the only such groups have been dispatched from Syria and fought by the Lebanese Army.

After these concessions are granted, Syria hints in English that it might reconsider its alliance with Iran. On top of it all, Syrian leaders and their mouthpieces make it clear that the alliance with Iran is non-negotiable and any request to sever it constitutes a “non-starter.” Regarding Iraq, Damascus, currently laying another trap, has expressed itself as willing to accept intelligence cooperation in order to facilitate an “honorable U.S. exit,” but on the condition that the United States reassigns an ambassador to Damascus, under the pretext of “starting with a clean slate.” Also hidden in there is what the Syrians euphemistically called a “package deal” in 2006-2007, when the United States did approach Syria over Iraq's security. “Package deal” was simply code for giving Syria a free hand in Lebanon.

The problem is that the Syrian slate is not clean. As noted above, Bashar al-Asad has piled up an astonishing record of brazen and overt belligerence towards the United States and its allies and violation of international law. Wiping that slate clean through unconditional engagement would send all the wrong signals to both enemies and allies in the region.

During the 1990s, the United States gave a great deal in exchange for the belief that Damascus would make peace with Israel. After spinning out the advantages for almost a decade, Syria rejected a peace agreement in 2000. Then, as now, as a Financial Times editorial put it, “For the Assad regime,” reopening peace talks with Israel “looks like a get-out-of-jail-free card. Syria has not changed its regional behavior.”

That is exactly how the regime itself is portraying it: as a “win-win” strategy. If the talks were to succeed, Syria would get back the Golan Heights on its own terms. If they fail, Syria would have broken out of isolation, destroyed Western leverage against itself, and regained hegemony in Lebanon while giving little or nothing in exchange.

This is why the key point for U.S. policy is to demand equal benefits for anything it gives Syria, and given simultaneously not as vague promises of future actions. Merely to give up tangible positions in order to build “good will” with Syria would be disastrous. Already, the French and British have tried such methods and failed completely to win any beneficial change.

To make matters worse, allowing a resurgence of Syria's international position would undermine several U.S. allies–Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia–who are threatened by Damascus and favored the tougher U.S. policy of recent years.

The long-established pattern of Syrian policy has been to resist stubbornly any concessions, even at a high material cost to itself; then pocket any concessions by the other side followed by insistence on more of the same. Clever maneuvers and stalling tactics are used to undermine and splinter any effort at multilateral pressure on Damascus.

Those promoting engagement with Syria become trapped in this process. To continue they must give more; otherwise the process is ended, with the Western politicians and diplomats appearing to have “failed.” By such judo tactics, Syria reverses the leverage against its stronger enemies, making them dependent on its favors.

The most attractive bait is the alleged prize of splitting Syria from Iran. Yet given the crucial strategic depth Tehran provides for Damascus, allowing it to intimidate opponents and play out its over-inflated role conception, it makes no sense from Syria's perspective to change its strategy. Strengthening this position is the belief that its side is winning, a view only reinforced by the very Western policy of engagement, which is presented by the Syrians as capitulation.

The Syrians currently believe that there has been a fundamental shift in the region's balance of power in favor of the Iran-Syria axis, what they call the “front of rejectionism and resistance” to U.S. interests in the region. The way they see it, Iran is on the threshold of becoming a nuclear state, with a subsequent nuclear umbrella for Syria and the non-state actors it cosponsors with Tehran. As such, to think that Syria will abandon this network for the sake of the Golan Heights is to misunderstand fundamentally the Syrian regime's interest and worldview.

Thus, Syria poses a dangerous problem for the Obama administration. By trying to strengthen regional stability and weaken radical forces, an ill-conceived policy could end by doing the precise opposite result.