From Russia with, Well … Not Much

Following Syrian President Bashar Assad's recent visit to Russia, and on the heels of the Russian military assault in Georgia, there was a flurry of commentary by regime-sanctioned “analysts” in Syria explaining that this was a turning point in the balance of power in the Middle East. The argument, also echoed in some Western media, was that Syria would use Russian patronage to weaken the standing of the United States in the region while enhancing Syria's position as it played Moscow and Washington off against each other.

This assessment was made on the basis of Assad's hasty endorsement of the Russian invasion of Georgia and his encouraging Moscow to confront the West, NATO and Israel. Assad was the only leader in the world to make such statements, outdoing even the Iranians. Assad also confidently announced he would be seeking to acquire new Russian weapons systems – which Russia had earlier refrained from selling to Syria. This included advanced anti-aircraft missile systems, especially the SA-300 and the portable Igla ground-to-air missiles. Assad also wanted the Pantsyr-S1 and Buk-M2 anti-aircraft systems, as well as anti-tank systems, which Syria was caught transferring to Hizbullah during the 2006 Lebanon war, leading Israel to complain to the Russians. Nor did Assad stop there. He pre-emptively declared his readiness to host Russian advanced ground-to-ground missile stations for the 280-kilometer range Iskander-E, as a counterweight to the US missile shield in Poland.

That was the plan at least. But all evidence now points to the fact that in contrast to Assad's rash statements, the Russians showed tepid interest in what he proposed. The Russian response was evident in Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's carefully worded comments after Assad met with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in Sochi. Lavrov said that Russia would “consider” Syria's proposals for new arms purchases. However, this consideration would only be for weapons of a “defensive character” that would “in no way upset the regional balance of power.”

Robert Freedman, an expert on Russian Middle East policy, wrote that Lavrov could still be overruled, assuming he was being truthful to begin with. However, for now his comments imply that the SA-300 and the Iskander-E systems are off the table. The statements of Russia's acting ambassador to Israel, Anatoly Yurkov, supported this conclusion. Yurkov told the Israeli press: “Why in the world would we need to deploy our missiles [in Syria]? Against whom? We have no enemies in the region.”

Perhaps the most compelling indicator that Assad had fired blanks was Syria's clumsy subsequent denial that it had requested the Iskander system at all.

Aside from the missile stations, the Syrians also implied they would offer Russian warships a permanent base in the Mediterranean by upgrading the Tartus port. Other media reports ran wild with speculation about Russian nuclear submarines and warships now being a permanent feature off the Syrian coast. However, there too the payoff for Assad was apparently slight. Igor Belyaev, the Russian charge d'affaires in Damascus, told reporters: “Our navy presence in the Mediterranean will increase. Russian vessels will be visiting Syria and other friendly ports more frequently.”

That meant precious little. “Visiting” Syria is precisely what the Russians have been doing in Tartus all along. In other words their ships will not be permanently stationed there, which implies that Russia won't necessarily be hurrying to upgrade the port, contrary to speculation. At best, Belyaev seemed to say that the Russians would show up there more often – but such activity won't be exclusive to Tartus, hence visits to “other friendly ports.”

The lack of exclusivity for Syria was another interesting aspect of this episode, doing away with much talk of Syria reviving its privileged client status with the Russians. Far less media attention was given to another visitor to Russia at around the same time that Assad arrived there: Jordan's King Abdullah. The king's visit was focused mainly on military and technical cooperation. Jordan has developed a number of joint military ventures with the Russians in recent years.

A few days later Premier Vladimir Putin – who had met with King Abdullah but not with Assad – also received Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan. The Saudis began discussing arms deals with the Russians last year, when Putin made his historic visit to the kingdom when he was still president. Meanwhile, Saudi-Syrian relations have sunk to their lowest levels in recent history. Whatever the purpose of Bandar's visit, the Russians were clearly not giving Syria any special privileges, and seemingly they were not interested in placing all their eggs in Bashar Assad's basket.

Moreover, in contrast to the Syrians, the Saudis can actually pay for their military merchandise. Reportedly, the Russians have demanded advance cash payments for any Syrian purchases, especially since Russia was forced to forgo some $10 billion owed to it by Syria from the Soviet era. The Syrians still owe the Russians another $3 billion.

The Russians might well proceed with a previously negotiated deal on the short-range Pantsyr-S1, and there already have been reports that an initial shipment was delivered in June. This would be a noteworthy development; however it would not alter the balance of forces in the region and would still be a far cry from the ambitious wish-list Assad had splashed all over the Russian media. Much more interesting will be to watch whether the Russians proceed with the sale to Syria of the shoulder-fired Igla, given how the weapons might well end up in the hands of Hizbullah. 

In the end, the primary result of Assad's attitude toward Russia was that it highlighted the Syrian president's impulsiveness. What he didn't seem to realize was that there is a new world out there and that even Russia perhaps does not relish going back to the reflexes of the Cold War. But it also tells us something about Bashar Assad that he evidently does.