August 6, 2008 | FDD’s Long War Journal

Pakistan: A Dangerous Neighbor

This article was co-written by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Bill Roggio and originally published at The Daily Standard.

Hangu is the latest district to fall under Taliban control. The government signed peace agreements in the red agencies/ districts; purple districts are under de facto Taliban control; yellow regions are under Taliban influence.

THE PRE-DAWN SILENCE in eastern Afghanistan's Nuristan province was shattered on July 13 by the racket of machine gun fire and rocket-propelled grenades; the attack on the new base was fiercer and the insurgent force larger than American troops could have expected. The first enemy fire struck the mortar pit, then their RPGs blew up a tow truck. Stars and Stripes, the U.S. armed forces' overseas newspaper, reported that after two hours of combat “some of the soldiers' guns seized up because they expelled so many rounds so quickly.”

The attack on the small base near the remote village of Wanat drew enormous media attention. It was not just the fact that nine American soldiers lost their lives. A reported 200 well-armed insurgents managed to mass around the base and came close to overrunning it. Stars and Stripes noted that “so many RPGs were fired at the soldiers that they wondered how the insurgents had so many.” This early morning attack quickly came to symbolize the growing difficulties of the Afghanistan war.

Insurgent activity in Afghanistan has spiked in recent months. According to Army Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Schloesser, the U.S. commander of NATO forces in the region, there were about 40 percent more attacks in eastern Afghanistan over the first five months of 2008 than during the same period a year ago. Schloesser has also described the attacks as “increasingly complex.” A mid-July ABC News/Washington Post poll found that a surprising 45 percent of Americans “do not think the war in Afghanistan is
worth fighting,” despite the attacks of 9/11.

A critical factor behind Afghanistan's deteriorating state is the turn of events in Pakistan, where the Taliban and al Qaeda have found a safe haven in recent years. After the October 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan felled the Taliban, most of al Qaeda's senior leadership relocated to Pakistan's federally administered tribal areas, the remote and mountainous regions that border Afghanistan, and set about finding allies within tribal society.

Pakistan's military mounted a campaign to flush al Qaeda out of the tribal areas after the group was connected to multiple assassination attempts against Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, but the military suffered so many losses that Musharraf eventually concluded he had no choice but to deal with his would-be killers. In March and September 2006 he consummated the two halves of the Waziristan accords, peace agreements that essentially ceded Waziristan to the Taliban and al Qaeda. Musharraf also cut deals with Islamic militants in the regions of Swat, Bajaur, and Mohmand. The treaties, punctuated with frequent skirmishes, symbolized Pakistan's inability to confront its extremists.

The negotiation process only accelerated after a new parliamentary majority rode to power in February on a wave of anti-American sentiment. While negotiations and peace deals with militants have long been part of Pakistan's political landscape, the scale of negotiations under the new majority was unprecedented. Talks opened with virtually every militant outfit in the country, and the government has entered into seven agreements encompassing nine districts.

It was easy to predict the failure of the Waziristan accords, in which the government received only unenforceable promises from extremists, and there is no reason to believe that the new accords will yield a different result. Rather, they are likely to increase the geographic areas that serve as safe havens for Pakistan's extremist groups-with predictable harm to Afghanistan.

The primary advantage that terrorist sanctuaries in northwestern Pakistan provide to the Afghan insurgency is the ability to operate with relative freedom in that country. The U.S. military is constrained in cross-border strikes and hot pursuit because Pakistan views the tribal areas as sovereign territory. Not only is Pakistan a U.S. ally, but there are also serious concerns that too heavy a U.S. hand in the tribal areas will destabilize the government and push more members of Pakistan's military and intelligence communities and civilian population into the extremists' camp.

Thus, the American military is handcuffed in its ability to respond to attacks when the enemy melts back over Pakistan's border. Reluctance to strike in Pakistani territory also prevents the U.S. military from disrupting the enemy's bases and supply lines. The safe havens in northwestern Pakistan give the Taliban and allied groups a virtually untouchable rear area, where they can recruit, arm, train, and infiltrate fighters into Afghanistan.

Pakistan is used both defensively and offensively by insurgents. The July attack in Nuristan was just one of many attacks along the border. Militant groups based in Pakistan have been able to carry out a string of fresh attacks and bombings in the provinces of Zabul, Paktika, Paktia, Nangarhar, and Kunar–all of which sit along the border.

The second advantage that Afghan insurgents derive from Pakistan is the ability to train and gain combat experience. American military and intelligence officials have told us that more than 100 training camps are operating in the North-West Frontier Province and tribal
areas, up from an estimated 29 camps last year in Waziristan. The camps vary in size and specialty, and some are temporary.

At these camps, a host of extremist groups–including local Taliban organizations, hardcore al Qaeda recruits, and Pakistani terror groups focused on Kashmir-are trained in a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures. Training for the Taliban's military arm focuses on the fight against the Pakistani army or NATO forces in Afghanistan. Other camps focus on training suicide bombers or preparing al Qaeda operatives for attacks in the West. One camp exclusively services the Black Guard, Osama bin Laden's elite bodyguard.

In addition to the training camps, insurgents have gained experience fighting against Pakistan's military, Frontier Corps, and police forces. Though not all Taliban fighters who battle Pakistan's security forces travel to Afghanistan to fight NATO, some do. The Pakistani theater has allowed the Taliban to refine its tactics against a professional military, and these tactics have in turn migrated into Afghanistan.

The peace treaties that Pakistan's government has entered into with extremists also allow a greater flow of recruits to join insurgent groups. Some are volunteers, while others are draftees. The author of a remarkable travelogue about Pakistan's Khyber agency recently published in the English-language daily The News was told by a local business owner that the Taliban forces families to provide one male to join their ranks. “Those who refuse,” he was told, “risk having their homes demolished and a heavy fine … imposed.”

Indeed, once peace agreements are signed, the Taliban frequently establishes a parallel political administration. Two of the top priorities are extracting taxes and recruiting fighters. This provides the Taliban with a robust force that allows it to hold local territory and send more fighters to Afghanistan. In fact, the Nuristan assault was conducted by a broad range of extremist groups. Tamim Nuristani, the former governor of Nuristan, said the attackers were “not only Taliban. They were [Pakistan-based] Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hezb-i-Islami, Taliban, and those people who are dissatisfied with the [Karzai] government.”

In an effort to defeat NATO, the Taliban and allied groups are targeting coalition supply lines through Pakistan. More than 70 percent of NATO's supplies pass through the Torkham Gate in the Khyber tribal agency. The Taliban runs much of that province, with Pakistani troops heavily patrolling the road to Afghanistan but little else. Despite this military presence, the Taliban still periodically disrupts supply lines. In March, Taliban fighters blew up 36 parked oil tankers destined for Afghanistan in what appeared to be a chain reaction triggered by an initial bomb blast. In July, an armed Taliban squad in Landikotal smashed the windows and punctured the tires of a NATO supply convoy. The Taliban has distributed leaflets threatening drivers who deliver oil or other supplies to coalition forces.

Insurgents in Afghanistan will continue to use the situation in Pakistan to their advantage. One of the keys to a successful U.S. mission in Afghanistan is a sound Pakistan policy. Otherwise, the war may be lost on both fronts.

Read in FDD’s Long War Journal


Afghanistan Pakistan