Musa Qala

August 13, 2021 | Bill Roggio, Andrew Tobin

After lengthy siege, Lashkar Gah is taken by the Taliban

Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province, fell to the Taliban after a lengthy seige. With Helmand and Kandahar provinces in the hands of the Taliban, the rest of the south will go under Taliban control...

August 2, 2021 | Bill Roggio |

Taliban, Afghan forces battle for control of Helmand’s capital

After days of heavy fighting with Afghan security forces, the Taliban has entered Laskhar Gah, the capital of Helmand province. The city is in danger of falling to the Taliban. The Taliban is now battling...

May 27, 2021 | Bill Roggio |

Afghan military targets Al Qaeda’s network in Helmand

The Afghan military has launched multiple attacks against Al Qaeda’s network in the southern province of Helmand over the past week. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, Al Qaeda’s regional branch that...

July 7, 2020 | Bill Roggio |

Taliban again denies Al Qaeda is in Afghanistan

In an effort to keep up the facade of a ‘peace’ deal with the U.S. government, the Taliban has yet again denied that Al Qaeda has a presence in Afghanistan. This time, the group refuted a Department...

March 3, 2020 | Thomas Joscelyn, Bill Roggio

Analysis: Taliban leader declares victory after U.S. agrees to withdrawal deal

Shortly after the Trump administration signed its accord with the Taliban on Feb. 29, Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada declared “victory” on behalf “of the entire Muslim and Mujahid nation.”...

September 24, 2019 | Thomas Joscelyn |

Afghan officials identify AQIS members killed in controversial Musa Qala raid

Afghan officials have publicly identified several of the Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) members who were killed during an operation in Helmand province earlier this week. The raid quickly...

September 23, 2019 | Thomas Joscelyn |

Joint raid targeted al Qaeda members in Taliban stronghold, U.S. and Afghan officials say

Taliban sites posted this photo from the aftermath of a joint U.S.-Afghan raid in Musa Qala. Late yesterday, U.S. and Afghan forces targeted al Qaeda members in Musa Qala, a Taliban-controlled district...

February 22, 2016 | Bill Roggio The Long War Journal

Afghan military abandon district in Helmand

The Afghan military withdrew its remaining combat forces from the district of Musa Qala in Helmand province today after battling the Taliban there for nearly a year. The district is now firmly un...

January 26, 2012 | Bill Roggio The Long War Journal

ISAF Captures Senior Taliban Commander in Helmand

In a raid earlier this month, International Security Assistance Force personnel captured a senior Taliban military commander who directed operations against NATO and Afghan forces in northern Hel...

June 14, 2011 | National Review Online |

A Year@War

Successes and setbacks.

July 15, 2010 |

US Marines battle the Taliban for control of Musa Qala

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arines with 4th Platoon, Charlie Company, 1/2 Marines patrol the village of Karamanda in northern Musa Qala. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal.

Part 2 in a three part series on Musa Qala. For Part 1, see The checkered history of Musa Qala.

ISAF transferred official responsibility for Musa Qala from British forces to the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Marine Regiment in March 2010. The British had relatively stabilized the district center by the time the Marines arrived, though occasional small arms and bomb attacks persisted. The Taliban continued infiltrating back into significant areas surrounding the district center, intimidating civilians suspected of working with the government, and they outright held villages and compounds in the northern portion of the district, and southwest in neighboring Now Zad.

'It was very kinetic when we first got here,' explains Manning. 'The Taliban had dug defensive trenches, had four discernible lines of troops, and occupied individual compounds and villages.'

Marines waged a 36-hour battle to take Karamanda, a suburb a few miles north of the district center, and engaged in a weeklong fight in the Salaam Bazaar to the southwest of Musa Qala, in the contiguous district of Now Zad. After this initial gasp of regular defense, the Taliban switched to hit and run tactics utilizing snipers and small arms fire for about a month. Finally, the insurgents largely abandoned conventional tactics in favor of their current habit of laying hidden bombs, which regularly explode among American convoys and foot patrols in the rural areas north and south of the district center, as well as roadways transiting the AO.

Security has somewhat improved in the middle of Musa Qala, loosely described as the 'downtown' that includes the local bazaar and the densest concentration of mud-daubed residences and businesses. The British had largely secured the populous area by the time the Marines arrived, and the increased tempo of joint US-Afghan patrols since has built on this progress. Occasional shootings and Improvised-Explosive Devices (IEDs) are the main threat around the bazaar, though insurgents have not staged a significant attack since April.

'Two bombs went off in the bazaar [in March and April], each injuring five to eight people,' explains Marker. 'The first one hit ANA (Afghan National Army) or ANP (Afghan National Police), and a couple of those came in KIA (Killed in Action). The last one, all eight injured civilians were treated [by the Americans] and left the FOB breathing and alive, got them to Camp Leatherneck, and all returned to their homes within a month. But we haven' t had an incident in a while.'

Several days after Marker's assessment, the long period of calm in Musa Qala's District Center was broken. On July 5th, insurgents deployed two IEDs in the bazaar. One, strapped to a donkey, failed to detonate before it was discovered and destroyed. A second bomb, filled with ball bearings and 12.7 mm rounds, was strapped to the side of a motorcycle and remotely detonated near the market. The explosion killed five Afghan civilians, including two children, and injured another.

The rural areas on the edges of the district remain highly kinetic, however. Frequent IED strikes target US convoys and foot patrols, and are augmented by occasional small arms engagements. The Marines' abandonment of Humvees for the exclusive use of Mine Resistant Ambush Vehicles (MRAPs) and their off-road variant, MRAP-ATVs, has proven a dramatic success. Insurgent bombs are capable of destroying or disabling the vehicles, but rarely kill or grievously injure American occupants, beyond inflicting mild to serious concussions. Dismounted patrols however, are suffering killed and wounded from the use of pressure sensitive and Remote-Controlled IEDs.

Efforts are ongoing to secure the roadways and trouble spots, though Taliban infiltration ' primarily from the north and east ' continues. On the northern edge of the district, Patrol Bases Griffin and Panda Ridge keep significant Taliban forces bottled up in a narrow northern section of the valley, while American surveillance assets throughout the AO have started to make the well-paid job of planting bombs a risky proposition.

'We are beginning to stop a lot of the IEDs,' said Manning. 'We' ve killed quite a few of the IED emplacers.'

And conventional battles are not unheard of in the southern portion of Musa Qala, toward the troublesome Sangin district. Almost three weeks ago, portions of Weapons and Kilo Companies of the Third Battalion,Seventh Marine Regiment, began to take sporadic gunfire and roadside bombs as they pushed eastward into Musa Qala from Now Zad district. Last week, the resistance became intense enough to slow their advance near an area called Ladaar Bazaar. In addition to small arms fire, "hundreds of IEDs were built into the walls, because they knew we were coming," according to RCT-2 Commander Colonel Paul Kennedy.

The Marines flanked around the bazaar, and the Taliban finally made a concerted stand at a village called Regay. As the contact intensified, the 1/2 Marines threw additional forces into the fight: two rifle platoons, two heavy machine gun sections, and an HQ element attacked from the north and east. Helicopter gunships and fixed wing aircraft also battered insurgent positions, dropping several guided munitions.

"As [the Marines] were moving up, they'd see truckloads of [insurgents] getting off to load the treelines up," said Kennedy. "There was a high value target in there, and they decided to defend. We dropped three 2,000-pound bombs on a treeline that had heavy machine gun fire and RPGs coming out of it."

After nearly 10 days of fighting, many of the insurgents exfiltrated to the east, and the Marines with 3/7 pulled back west to rest and refit. Several Marines were seriously injured in the engagement, but the losses to the Taliban are thought to have been much heavier.

"By the end of it, [the Marines] accounted for about 100-120 guys [Taliban killed], to include a couple of lower level commanders," said Kennedy. "In an area where we usually kill one or two at a time, that's big news."

'Hold' and combined effects

With central portions of Musa Qala cleared and enjoying sufficient forces to increase their operational tempo, the Marines have quickly moved into the 'hold' and 'build' phases of counterinsurgency. Besides taking over the famously contested compound in the center of the population center and dubbing it 'Forward Operating Base Musa Qala,' the 1/2 Marines have established 10 patrol bases and observation posts manned by a combination of US Marines, Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers, and Afghan National Police (ANP) officers throughout the district center. The neighboring Now Zad District has an additional six patrol bases, combat outposts, and observation posts.

About 1,350 Marines ' including three rifle companies, one weapons company, and one headquarters company ' and roughly 500 Afghan soldiers and 200 Afghan cops patrol the two districts every day. The Marines and Afghan security forces typically patrol in concert, to enhance the Afghan training, legitimize both forces, assuage local sentiment about searches by foreigners, and drastically improve the Marines' effectiveness.

'They see things we can' t see,' explains H&S Company Commander First Lieutenant Joshua Hartley, who regularly leads patrols through Musa Qala. 'Just the way that you growing up in a neighborhood know your neighborhood, they know what right looks like, and they know when something isn' t right.'

In addition, the Marine Civil Affairs Group (CAG) teams, in concert with Provincial Reconstruction Teams, USAID, and private organizations like Spirit of America, are attempting to quickly infuse aid into the area. Projects fall into two categories: small projects under $5,000, and larger projects above that amount.

The small projects require minimal approval or paperwork, allowing junior CAG and regular infantry officers great discretion, speed, and flexibility to assist local civilians.

'They are able to be done quickly and they can make an impact at the local village level,' explains Major Jason Aragon, the team leader of the Civil Affairs Group responsible for Musa Qala. 'The Marines at the outlying patrol bases have the ability to vet and pay for small-scale projects without a lot of delay due to approval process from a higher level.'

A number of quick, easier projects have been initiated to try to demonstrate progress and legitimize the American presence. Digging wells, installing electrical transformers, refurbishing mosques and schools, and clearing canals are examples of projects underway for less than $5,000.

Larger projects inevitably take time, hampered by a frustrating bureaucratic and political nexus of US Military procedure, Afghan government cooperation, and local approval.

'When I got here (in March), the ANA Brigade Commander and I flew in (to Musa Qala) and had a shura with about 200 of their elders,' said Colonel Paul Kennedy, commander of Regimental Combat Team 2, whose area of operations includes Musa Qala. 'We asked them: give us five projects you want.'

The elders prioritized the following: electricity in the bazaar, a bridge across the wadi, refurbishment of the Grand Mosque destroyed in previous Taliban combat with UK troops, cellphone service, and the paving of several major roads in the area.

Of these, temporary bridges have now been placed across the wadi, electricity was restored in the bazaar via the quick addition of a generator, roadwork has begun, and the rest of the projects remain in administrative channels, with the mosque refurbishment assigned to the engineers of the British Military Stabilization Support Team (MSST).

'And if they fail to do it in the next few weeks, then I' m going to rebuild it,' said Kennedy.

But some of the improvements have encountered problems when responsibility for the finished product is handed over to the local government. After a generator was installed in the bazaar, DABS, the local Afghan electric company, installed meters and levied fees on the merchants using the energy. After collecting the taxes for a time, several employees skipped town with 80,000 Afghanis (currency), equal to about $1,600 US dollars. This money was slated to maintain and buy fuel for the generator, and Americans are now holding the Afghan government responsible for the issue.

'At the end of the day, the government and municipality took control of the power, and it is up to them,' said Aragon.

ISAF officials walk a fine line while providing aid: failure to show discernible progress will lead to less cooperation from locals in improving security, such as tips on the location of hidden bombs. But backstopping the government when it fails to maintain these improvements can create unnatural and unsustainable dependencies.

'Nothing is easy here,' adds Aragon.

Despite a range of ongoing American projects ' small and large ' since the Marines' arrival in March , the efforts haven' t yet universally percolated into the local consciousness. Civilian Human Terrain Team observers responsible for gauging local opinion note that many of Musa Qala' s civilians affect a jaded attitude about international assistance, and do not expect ISAF forces to deliver on their promises. Examples of this sentiment were expressed to this reporter during a recent patrol in the local bazaar.

'They haven' t started in these areas in the time they are here,' said a merchant who declined to be named. 'We don' t know about the future, but in the past, we haven' t seen anything from them.'

'No [reconstruction progress],' added another passerby. 'They just build a bridge from sand.' [A reference to the temporary bridges Marines have placed across the wadi]

In addition to combating local perception of inaction on reconstruction, the Marines are also facing challenges from the local rumor mill about the nature of their military operations.

'I know the Marines, when they go on some other operations in other places, they shoot innocent people,' said one elderly man resting in front of a shop in the bazaar.

American civilian officials who are otherwise critical of the pace of US military reconstruction efforts reject this assertion, along with the common charge that Marines conduct roughly executed raids in the middle of the night, believing that these opinions are mostly the result of Taliban information operations. Both military and civilian officials note that the Marines have practiced restrained rules of engagement and typically put Afghan Security Forces in the lead when conducting searches, in order to avoid civilian casualties and respect cultural sensibilities.

Certain areas are showing progress, especially with the small projects, however.

'Right now, we' ve turned on the power in two villages, I have a small mosque project going, we' re getting ready to build a wall around a religious shrine and we' re also getting ready to do some wells in and around the mosque,' said Staff Sergeant Scott McIntire of Charlie Company, 1-2 Marines. Charlie Company' s projects have apparently improved local opinion in the villages of Wosak, Ratatala and Hogalbaba, located to the west of the district center.

An energetic man, McIntire enthusiastically engaged several villagers at an elders' shura on Monday, explaining to them the difficulty of getting an expensive mosque refurbishment project started.

'That' s why I came here today, I want to show everyone that I care and I do want to finish these things,' McIntire said to three village elders, in between a consistent stream of friendly stories and jokes. 'We want this mosque done more than you know. The time it' s taking is out of my control, but I will do everything I can to make this happen. At the very least, when my time to leave comes, I want to make sure we' ve started on this. I' m trying, I' m trying, but like I' m saying, the paperwork is going to be the biggest hurdle. When politicians and money are involved, it slows down.'

McIntire' s demeanor was well received by smiling elders. An interpreter proactively volunteered an enthusiastic assessment of the staff sergeant' s rapport with the civilians in his area: 'He is such a very nice man, and they (the Afghan civilians) love him up there.'

The Afghan security forces and 'Project Mujahedeen'

Though individual units vary in quality, the Afghan National Army typically receives decent to good reviews from US commanders throughout northern Helmand, whereas the Afghan National Police are generally regarded as a much younger, more corrupt, and less effective organization. And aside from corruption and ineffectiveness, Provincial authorities stated last year that 70% of all ANP personnel in Helmand tested positive for drug use. Musa Qala seems to be an exception to this ranking, however.

The ANA soldiers receive mixed reviews from the Marines who work with them on a daily basis, but they are considered an effective force overall. Common issues cited by advisors to the ANA are poor communication and administrative skills, and a significant rate of desertion resulting from pay issues and a harsh lifestyle. The soldiers are paid on time with direct deposit into their bank accounts, but cannot access their money in remote outposts without any banks, like Musa Qala. This makes it difficult for soldiers to get the money to their families, and some disappear to return home and access their accounts. In addition, some find the draconian lifestyle and mandatory 12 months away from home without leave distasteful, and never return from their first vacation.

'[They would retain more people] if they just had the basic necessities that any army would want,' explains Major Marius Harrison, who leads an embedded Partnering Team (PT) that works with the Afghan Army to improve their capabilities. 'That' s soldiers being allowed to go on leave more than once a year, soldiers being allowed to send money home to their families when their families need it, soldiers being allowed to advance and improve over time.'

The result: though ANA force levels are considered full in Musa Qala, they are actually stagnated at about 80-85% due to the fact that replacement soldiers cannot be requested until AWOL personnel have been gone a full 60 days. On the positive side, the ANA are considered tactically proficient overall and are well-led in both the district and at the regimental level.

But in Musa Qala, it is the police who receive a larger share of credit from Americans for the recent, relative stabilization of the local area. This assessment is based on several factors: many of the cops are relatively experienced, according to US officials; they command more respect than the ANA by virtue of being local citizens; and they are well led by District Police Chief Abdul Wali, commonly known as 'Koka.'

A former mujahedeen who fought against the Soviets and the Taliban, Koka is an imposing man with a stern countenance covered in an impossibly thick black beard. He holds a reputation among the populace and the American advisors as an effective police commander, and is considered perhaps the most widely respected authority figure in the district.

'Koka is a local guy, he knows everyone,' asserts Manning. 'All the police are local, and very professional, more professional than the Army. People like them because they are local boys and treat the people well.'

American advisors suspect that the Koka and the police he commands do have inevitable personal angles ' possibly expressed in the locally common form of taxing businesses ' but the advisors have been thus far unable to discern any major corruption, believing any incidence is not of a magnitude that compromises the police force' s reputation or effectiveness.

'I haven' t seen any large scale corruption here at all,' asserts Gunnery Sergeant Norman Wesolowski, an advisor with the Marine Police Mentoring Team (PMT). 'Officers here get paid on time, and we supervise the payout in cash. Each officer comes in here individually to get it, and they get their thumb print to verify that it is them who is receiving pay. It is counted two times by one officer, another time by another officer, and into the hands of the officer who is getting paid. And as far as shaking people down, we haven' t seen anything like that.'

In addition, police officers claim that Koka beats and imprisons them if he finds that they have mistreated the population, while making sure they are paid on time and treated with appropriate medical care when injured. This has created a relatively well-behaved, extremely loyal police force.

The police in Musa Qala regularly conduct both joint-US and independent operations, including security patrols, searches, and raids.

'When it comes to something that needs to be completed in a day or two, they' re not so good, it' s Insh' allah,' explains Wesolowski, referencing the regional term that can signify procrastination, and literally translates to 'It is as Allah wills.'

'But when an IED or [emergency situation] comes up, they have their own procedures, and they are out the door quickly,' he adds.

The ANP in the area have also started a brand-new covert operation dubbed 'Project Mujahedeen' to counter local Taliban influence. A consistent drag on counterinsurgency progress in Helmand has been the Taliban' s effective intimidation of the citizenry after ISAF and Afghan security patrols are out of sight. In a recent example, a local contractor who ran a shop on an American base was kidnapped, tortured, and killed by the Taliban two weeks ago.

To combat the inevitable threats, Koka and the Marines have launched Project Mujahedeen: police officers don plain clothes and insert into the population centers to look out for lurking Taliban. When the Taliban enforcers inevitably show themselves and begin threatening civilians, the undercover cops intercede. Though only two weeks old, the program has gained quick popularity with local citizens, and ANP officers have already killed two Taliban and arrested several more. The program may be the most effective tactic in the ISAF arsenal, as Taliban infiltrators now fear exposing themselves in the overt intimidation campaigns that have been a historical source of their power.

Next: Part 3, Prospects for stability in Musa Qala: challenges and possible solutions.

July 13, 2010 |

The checkered history of Musa Qala

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US Marines are briefed before going on a patrol in Musa Qala in Helmand province, Afghanistan. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal.

A walk through the main bazaar in Musa Qala offers a study in contrasts. The shabby construction of the mud-walled stalls and the pitted dirt of the sidewalks juxtapose displays with an opulent supply and careful presentation of goods: neatly placed bowls of ancient spices, symmetric racks of colorful textiles, rows of Western drinks, and even some electronics.

Business is alive and well in Musa Qala. The dizzying array of goods for sale whispers about the larger economy, the regional and international distribution and trading networks that allow a vibrant merchant class to thrive in the midst of the common deprivation and squalor of many residents.

The interaction between American Marines and local vendors and passersby offers contrasts of another sort. The Americans are dispersed and alert, with heads on a swivel, scrutinizing every person and vehicle as a potential missile. The Afghan citizens are nonchalant, gliding with lackadaisical grace when absolutely forced to move from shade into the blistering heat. The Americans offer occasional thickly accented, enthusiastic greetings in Pashto. Some of the locals respond in kind, others turn up their noses and ignore them. The Westerners are engaged. With the exception of bursts of Dickensian enthusiasm from begging, pickpocketing children, the Afghans seem apathetic. It' s not hard to fathom why: it' s 115 degrees, after all. And many are jaded by decades of war, Taliban rule, and unfulfilled promises by foreigners.

The bazaar lies in the heart of the Musa Qala District Center, a bustling hub of business and government that contains the greatest density of people and buildings within the larger district. In addition to the bazaar, the District Center boasts the Musa Qala District School, a brand new Afghan National Army headquarters built by ISAF, ongoing construction of a District Government building, and the ruins of the Grand Mosque, destroyed during fighting between the Taliban and the British. The permanent market, along with a larger weekly bazaar that springs up during the summer months in the middle of the valley' s dry riverbed, make Musa Qala a regional trading stop.

As one moves north or south from the District Center, the other half of the economy becomes apparent: along the wadi lies a vibrant sea of green amidst the desolate mountains and ridges that flank the east and west of the valley. The rectangular north-south district is filled with small farming villages and compounds growing a range of crops for subsistence and distribution. One plant looms large: Papaver somniferum, or opium poppy. Corn, nuts, wheat, and other legal farming products are dwarfed by the local economy' s inextricable tie to poppy cultivation, and the illegal opium that is its byproduct.

After observing a range of interactions between Americans and Afghans at the bazaar and a local school, from casually friendly to dismissive, one teen boy shared his opinion of the Marines.

'I like them,' he said through an interpreter' s translation. 'The Marines talk to us. I like them better than the British.'

'Why?'

'The British shouted at us.'

The British experience

An Afghan child' s distillation of the contentious story of ISAF involvement in Musa Qala is echoed in more complex terms by civilian and military officials, but only under pressure, and usually without attribution. Most Americans deftly sidestep discussion of the British mission from 2006 to 2010, either claiming ignorance or emphasizing that they' d 'like to focus on the present.'

In April 2006, a 'Helmand Task Force' of 3,300 troops, mostly British Airborne, was deployed to the province to combat a resurgent Taliban waging a campaign of offensives and assassinations to destabilize the government. Task Force Helmand' s mission was to conduct a broad spectrum of counterinsurgency operations, from finding and killing insurgents to reconstruction projects aimed at gathering local support. But the strength of the Taliban counteroffensive quickly turned the campaign into a series of highly kinetic battles and defensive sieges, an overall trend exemplified by the remarkable recent history of Musa Qala.

On June 16, 2006, a small British force was inserted into a compound in the heart of the Musa Qala District Center, a former hotel and Taliban jail. The unit was assigned to protect local government authorities and augment a small force of local police officers. Within weeks, the Taliban tested the defenders by massing and then assaulting the site. Though they were repelled, this battle was only the beginning of months of attacks against undermanned British and Danish troops tasked with defending the compound.

In September 2006, the British and the Taliban acknowledged an impasse by accepting a truce brokered by elders of Musa Qala: each side agreed to withdraw from the district center. The agreement, combined with reported British efforts to bribe Taliban commanders in Helmand, was met with harsh criticism from some coalition critics, who believed these actions projected weakness and empowered the Taliban. Within three months, claiming that a US airstrike violated the agreement, approximately 200 Taliban retook the district center and quickly moved to establish radical Islamist rule over the area. The withdrawal of British forces, coupled with the Taliban' s eventual ability to reclaim the area, cemented Musa Qala as a proud symbol of insurgent resistance, analogous on a smaller scale to the cultural resonance Fallujah once held in Iraq.

'Because they took and held Musa Qala for so long, it' s symbolic,' said Lieutenant Colonel Mike Manning, commander of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, now responsible for the district. 'And the Taliban continues to try to infiltrate the district center today.'

The battle for Musa Qala and early attempts at counterinsurgency

On Dec. 5, 2007, a combination of British, American, and Afghan troops launched an offensive to retake Musa Qala, dubbed 'Operation Mar Karadad (Snakepit).' An Afghan Army brigade, a battalion of US soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division, elements from the British 40 Commando Royal Marines Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the Yorkshire Regiment, the Scots Guards, and Danish forces retook the district center and surrounding area in less than a week. The majority of the Taliban fled in the face of overwhelming firepower arrayed against them. It' s commonly asserted that the defection of Mullah Mullah Abdul Salaam Alizai, a 'reconciled Taliban commander,' also contributed to the victory.

British forces resumed responsibility for the district center and attempted to stabilize the area, meeting with mixed success. They created a 'security bubble' of relative calm within the populous middle of the district center. But counterinsurgency efforts were plagued by continued Taliban harassment, limited British manpower and patrolling tempo, and failure to garner widespread local cooperation. Some American officials attribute the latter to a combination of having corrupt Afghan government partners, the inability of the British to rapidly deliver reconstruction and aid, and poor tactics.

The failure of both the Afghan government and the British military to deliver basic services and reconstruction is also cited by US civilian and military officials as a factor. After his defection to the government of Afghanistan (often referred to as GIRoA, an acronym for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan), Mullah Salaam was appointed district governor. The former Taliban commander maintained a terrible relationship with British commanders, and soon established a reputation for corruption and ineffectiveness deemed obscene even by local standards. An internal ISAF document very euphemistically describes the shady warlord as an 'ineffective governor [who] is more readily concerned with his own personal affairs than advancing the interests of the district.'

The local unpopularity of Salaam' s corruption was complemented by British inability to quickly inject discernible aid and development into Musa Qala.

'When we arrived in March, I found a sign the Brits had put up that sort of encapsulates [the problem],' ' said Manning. 'It said, 'Promise Everything, Deliver Nothing.' The British promised to build a bridge across the wadi (river) three-plus years ago. I came to find out that no contract was ever submitted for the project.'

Counterinsurgency doctrine stresses 'combined effects,' stipulating that aid and reconstruction must be rapidly injected into a recently cleared area to legitimize counterinsurgent and government forces in the eyes of the people. Marines are now making their own attempts to hasten reconstruction.

'I' ve told my men, if we are in the AO [area of operations] 90 days and haven' t delivered anything, we are dead in the water,' said Manning.

Some US military personnel offer theories about the slow pace of British reconstruction efforts.

'When we got here, they didn' t have a Civil Affairs Team, which allows you to do the small stuff quickly,' offered HM3 Erik Marker, a medical corpsman and project manager with Team One, Detachment 10.1, 11th Marines Civil Affairs Detachment, responsible for civil affairs in Musa Qala. 'They had engineers, so their focus was the big stuff. They knew their job well, but they weren' t civil affairs.'

Others cite a slower operational pace and less projection of forces into a smaller area. Many Americans temper or reject criticism of their predecessors by noting that the British are 'good soldiers' and had fewer resources ' they employed about half the manpower currently enjoyed by the US Marines, which limited the ability to hold areas that had been cleared. And one civilian anthropologist who declined to be named for this story believes there may have been a problem in the locals' cultural memory of historical British involvement in Afghanistan.

'Afghans remember British history in Afghanistan negatively,' remarked the official, who works to assess local opinion. 'There is a word that is used to label all foreigners: 'Agriaz.' It simply means, 'the English,' but [the connotation] is xenophobic.'

During the handover of the area to US forces, the British Chief of Staff glumly admitted to Manning, 'We' ve forgotten how to do counterinsurgency.'

July 12, 2010 | The Long War Journal

Karzai Pushes for Removal of Ex-Taliban Officials from UN Blacklist

The Washington Post reports that Afghan president Hamid Karzai "plans to seek the r...

July 11, 2010 |

“Foreign Taliban” control the insurgency in Musa Qala: Deputy district governor

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A US Marines, an interpreter, and an Afghan soldier talk to a village elder in the town of Karamanda in Musa Qala in Helmand province, Afghanistan. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal

Bill Ardolino interviews the deputy district governor of the Musa Qala district in northern Helmand province. The deputy district governor discusses the state of government, the economy and security.

A key pillar of successful counterinsurgency doctrine is the existence or development of a legitimate civilian government, run by officials who are recognized by a majority of the people. While the Musa Qala District in northern Helmand province has many of the key ingredients for COIN ' actively applied doctrine, burgeoning reconstruction efforts, and effective local security forces ' the validity of local government remains an open question, and its reputation is plagued by a recent history of corruption and ineffectiveness.

When ISAF forces retook much of the area from Taliban forces during Operation Snakepit in December 2007, they appointed a defected local Taliban field commander, Mullah Abdul Salaam Alizai, as the district governor of Musa Qala. By all accounts, Mullah Salaam' s time in office was a disaster. He had terrible relationships with his British and then American partners, and he maintained a corrupt private militia that clashed with the police. Numerous officials list sloth and self-interest as his guiding characteristics; Mullah Salaam was extremely energetic about taxing local businesses, but little else. His failure to deliver progress on the most basic services and reconstruction projects made him widely unpopular in the district, reinforcing an intense local skepticism of government that lingers today.

About three months after the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine regiment took responsibility for Musa Qala in March, Mullah Salaam was out. Health reasons are cited as the official reason for his departure, but the subtext is that Americans refused to work with him, and sought his replacement in a bid to rehabilitate civilian governance. Niamatullah, a former teacher and a government employee since 1985, was appointed as the new district governor about a month later. Americans have high hopes for the new district governor: he is experienced, and like nearly all of Musa Qala, Niamatullah is a Pashtun, but hails from a different province in Helmand. This may give him enough cultural authority to be effective, but also keep him clear of the twisting local political and tribal ties that can distort fair governance.

While the incoming district governor has been training in Kabul and Lashkar Gah, and attempting to pass the exam that certifies all district governors for the past month (he just passed the exam on his second try Monday), the responsibility of government has fallen to Deputy District Governor Mohammad Akbar Khan.

Appointed as the deputy district governor in May, 2009, Khan is a former shopkeeper, farmer and police officer who has lived in Musa Qala for most of his life, with the exception of 7 years in Lashkar Gah. Dissatisfied with the ineffectiveness of Mullah Salaam' s government, he proactively formed a district shura council, a group of local leaders who advocate for the interests of their villages within the district, in May. Mullah Salaam left a week after the council' s formation, and Khan' s ability to get government moving has naturally increased with his ascent to acting governor prior to Niamatullah' s arrival.

Americans hope Khan will work well with the new governor; they regard the deputy district governor as a good civil servant and a competent individual, but critique his willingness to make tough decisions that can inflame local politics and tribal ties. As an outsider, Niamatullah will have less of these constraints, while Khan may be able to serve as a local link to sometimes insular political circles.

Khan' s demeanor is calm and intelligent, and he sports the unmistakable polish of politicians the world over ' his answers to questions were carefully measured, and steered clear of controversy.

The interview with Deputy District Mohammad Akbar Khan follows.

The Long War Journal: What is your experience in politics and background, and why did you decide to serve in the government?

Mohammad Akbar Khan: I graduated from school (12th grade) in 1969. I' m from Musa Qala - I lived here in the time of the Mujahadeen and the Taliban, moved to Lashkar Gah (the provincial capital) for a time, and came back. I decided to work with the government because I wanted to serve my country. I was told 'If you want to work with the government you must pass an exam and we will assign you as the deputy of a district, and you may select some districts.' So I passed the exam and had many different choices, but I decided to serve in Musa Qala because it is my home and I want to serve my community.

LWJ: How has security been since ISAF forces retook Musa Qala from the Taliban?

Khan: Day by day, security is improving. A lot of places are now in the hands of the government. For example, Sher Ghazi, Salaam Bazaar (in neighboring Now Zad District), Karamanda, many areas were controlled by the Taliban and are now controlled by the government, so it' s improving.

LWJ: What do you think of the Afghan security forces, what kind of job are they doing?

Khan: Both the ANA and the ANP are working well, but Musa Qala is a very big place, so we need more of them. For example, Sher Ghazi is under control of the government, but unfortunately the Taliban still intimidates the people there, and say 'Don' t work with the government or else.' So ANA and ANP are working well, but we need more of them to stop the intimidation.

LWJ: Who are the people who are staging attacks against security forces and intimidating the people? Are they criminals, are they Taliban?

Khan: The men who control the hand of the insurgents are foreign Taliban. They are trained in foreign countries and sent here, so I do not think they are from this area.

LWJ: When I spoke to the District Police Chief [Haji Abdul Wali], he seemed to disagree, saying that the majority of the fighters were local people '

Khan: Well, he is also correct because the economy here in Musa Qala is not doing well and we have high unemployment, so some people are compelled to work as insurgents for pay. So if the government makes jobs for those people, day by day, fewer will work for the Taliban. The people who plant bombs are locals who are unemployed. But the people who train and pay them? They are foreigners.

LWJ: What do the people think of the Taliban overall? It' s hard to get an honest opinion from someone because many people are afraid, but what is the general opinion of the Taliban?

Khan: Most people don' t like the Taliban, but they are scared of them. Because if a person works [on a construction project], like to pave roads, the Taliban will kill him, so people are scared. But they don' t like the Taliban.

LWJ: What can be done to stop this intimidation?

Khan: We can stop the intimidation when we have better security. But at the same time, we can stop it by calling shuras (councils) that ask the members of the Taliban 'Why do you want to fight with us? It is your country too, let' s live peacefully.' So we need an elder shura from every village to talk with the Taliban and ask them why they fight with their brothers, and ask them what they want. Tell us why you are fighting, tell us what you want [and if we can], we will complete it.

LWJ: Do you get enough support from the National government, as far as funds, projects, personnel and other support?

Khan: Many of the officials in Lashkar Gah are working well with the Marines to get government resources for reconstruction. We need to build more hospitals and clinics, and we need more schools because we have few of them. But the most important thing is health care.

LWJ: Do you have a good relationship with the national government in Kabul?

Khan: When we undertake projects and file reports, we deal with the provincial government in Lashkar Gah, and that is who we work with. We' re pleased with their support.

LWJ: What do you think of the Marines and the British?

Khan: When the British and now Marines working here, security in Musa Qala is better than [neighboring] Now Zad, better than Marjah, Kajaki, and Sangin. Many people don' t understand the difference between the Marines and the British, they think they are both American. The Marines have done a little better, because they have taken control of more of the villages that were held by the Taliban.

Before the Marines and the British, there was no security. When the British came, they established a lot of the posts and checkpoints. Unfortunately the Marines don' t have as many checkpoints, but now the security is also good because now the reconstruction is underway. And before the Marines came, Salaam Bazaar and Karamanda were under the control of the Taliban, and now they are under the control of the government.

LWJ: What is the long term solution for Musa Qala' s security beyond the American [ISAF] presence here?

Khan: When Marines leave this place, the security will deteriorate, because we don' t have weapons and equipment like artillery and helicopters. We don' t have resources like the Taliban has ' they don' t have helicopters, but they have artillery. So, when we have appropriate equipment [for our security forces], it won' t be a problem. But until then, we need the Marines' capabilities. Now we don' t have anything, but we will be complete when other countries supply us.

LWJ: How long do you think that will take?

Khan: It' s not in our hands, because we don' t have anything. It is in the hands of other countries, so whenever they [supply] us.

LWJ: So has the pace of reconstruction increased since the Marines got here [in March]?

Khan: The reconstruction hasn' t really gotten underway yet, but people are hopeful about the Marines. People say, 'Now that the Marines have come, they will build some things.'

LWJ: It' s my understanding that the government has appointed a new District Governor, but he isn' t here. Where is he and when is he coming?

Khan: Before, Mullah Salaam was governor of Musa Qala, but now the provincial governor has assigned Niamatullah as the new district governor. He is currently in Lashkar Gah and will go to Kabul to complete his training.

LWJ: Why was Mullah Salaam replaced?

Khan: I heard he was sick, but he also had some other problems, and I don' t have perfect information on what they were.

LWJ: What about the role of the tribes? Do tribes in Afghanistan often fight with each other, or do they get along? Are tribal politics difficult here?

Khan: There are some problems with politics in Musa Qala. When someone joins a Shura (council), they will go home at night and the Taliban will arrest and maybe kill him. But a lot of people are happier now with the government, so we have less problems with political rivalries.

LWJ: But what about when, [for example], two people are on a shura, and one person is from one tribe and another member is from another tribe ' do they tend to fight? Do they have conflicts because they are from different tribes?

Khan: Some of them. It is another reason why people sometimes fight with each other, but we don' t really have a big problem with it in Musa Qala.

LWJ: What do you think is the biggest challenge right now for Musa Qala to succeed?

Khan: If the [national] government makes Musa Qala its own province, I think it will help Musa Qala succeed.

LWJ: But what is the biggest challenge you need to conquer, the biggest thing that needs to be overcome, to improve Musa Qala ?

Khan: The biggest problem here is simply security. First of all security, because it is so important. And with that, we can develop a strong government here. Here in Musa Qala, we really don' t have any civilian offices, like they do in the [provincial capitals]. So here we need more civilian offices and more components of government here in Musa Qala itself.

[Note: Marine Civil Affairs and local contractors have broken ground on a District Governor' s compound]

LWJ: What is the government' s policy on the opium trade, and what do you think the government should do to move the economy away from opium?

Khan: First of all, when we have security we can deal with poppy and other drugs. And once the government provides other opportunities for people ' with factories and such ' we can move away from growing drugs. The people need work, the people need money, so if the government gives them alternate crops and more opportunities, they will move away from poppy.

LWJ: What do you think about the future? Are you hopeful? Negative? What do you think will happen?

Khan: I think Musa Qala' s future will be bright when the government supports the people with security, schools and factories. Things are now starting to go well, so I think the future is bright. 80 percent of the people are happy with government, simply because the Taliban beats people. The government hasn' t helped Musa Qala yet. But now the people are waiting ' they hope and expect that we will fulfill our promises.

July 8, 2010 |

More Taliban ‘need to die’ before fighting ends: Musa Qala police chief

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Musa Qala District Police Chief Haji Abdul Wali, who is also known as "Koka." Photo by Bill Ardolino/LWJ

Bill Ardolino interviews an Afghan National Police chief in the Musa Qala district in northern Helmand province. The general discusses the state of the police, the security situation, the make-up of the Taliban, and his thoughts on ISAF and American withdrawal.

The District of Musa Qala in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, is an area in transition. The overwhelming majority of its 30,000 plus (estimated) residents want peace ' farmers simply want to farm, businessmen want to buy, sell, and trade ' but popular sentiment hasn' t settled on the most likely path to achieve it. Some long for a return to the stability offered by Taliban, despite the baggage that came with their draconian rule. Others support the Afghan security forces, and by extension their Western allies, while retaining healthy skepticism of the civilian government. And most aren' t sure where to place their bet, and will studiously maintain neutrality until a long term victor begins to emerge.

Of all the factors influencing ISAF counterinsurgency effort in Musa Qala, one of the bright spots is the presence of respected, relatively effective local security forces that present a viable alternative to the Taliban. Both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) in the district are well-reviewed by US advisors, presenting a legitimate face to the government and working well with Marine security patrols. While the police are generally regarded as tactically inferior and more corrupt than the Army across wider Helmand province, and in certain areas are viewed by citizens as a worse option than the Taliban, in Musa Qala their status is different. Here, the police are local Pashtuns, generally do their jobs, and they exhibit low levels of corruption and rarely mistreat citizens, according to American advisors. This combination of factors grants the ANP singular legitimacy as a security force in the district. Above all, their relative competence stems from the will of one man, District Police Chief Haji Abdul Wali, who is more commonly known as 'Koka.'

A former mujahid, Koka joined the Harakat-e-Inquilab-e-Islami (HII, or Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) in 1981 after his father and two brothers were killed by Russians. A major element of the Afghan resistance early on in the Soviet-Afghan conflict, HII was particularly influential in northern Helmand under the leadership of Mullah Nasim Akhundzada (Alizai). Koka himself fought the Soviet forces and remained otherwise active with the party until 1990. He later joined Jeemiiat Islami (Society of Islam) in 1996, and waged war against the Taliban with the support of Iranian intelligence. His war record against the Talibs involved a string of battles and several defeats, brief evacuation to Iran by the Iranian Secret Service, and then flight to Pakistan. He eventually returned to live in Musa Qala, and even briefly switched sides to join the Taliban in their fight against his former allies in Jeemiiat. This odd mutability was a consequence of local custom - he' d struck a deal to take the place of his brother, who had been conscripted into Taliban service. At the time, Taliban conscription campaigns were particularly acute in northern Helmand, including both Musa Qala and Kajaki districts, and even Maiwand district in neighboring Kandahar.

After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Koka rejoined the Jeemiiat, and served as Musa Qala' s police commander in 2001 -2002. His tenure ended when he was arrested by NATO forces for lying about the whereabouts of the district governor, who was wanted for questioning about suspected ties to a known terrorist. Koka was released after being incarcerated for 14 months at Bagram. He returned to find his home village again at war, weathering constant attacks by the Taliban, and he soon rejoined government service to fight his old enemies and brief allies. Following the conclusion of Operation Snakebite, the joint ISAF-Afghan operation to drive out Taliban forces occupying Musa Qala, Koka was reappointed as the Musa Qala district police chief in December 2007.

Koka now commands about 200 police officers manning 10 posts within the district, with an additional two posts and one checkpoint under request for construction. The police chief has unusual legal authority, arbitrating local business disputes and deciding the fate of nearly all prisoners in his jurisdiction, with the exception of those who have committed crimes against Marines. The police host approximately one prisoner per week in three small but clean jail cells.

'Generally if it' s minor offenses, he' ll have a shura and release the prisoner into the custody of elders, once they vouch that they' ll keep an eye on him,' explains Gunnery Sergeant Norman Wesolowski, an advisor with the Marine Police Mentoring Team (PMT). 'But if it' s a significant criminal case, [the prisoner] will be taken to Lashkar Gah (the capital of Helmand Province) for further prosecution.'

Koka' s men receive timely pay and equipment from the provincial government in Lashkar Gah, and are not engaged in any large scale corruption or shakedowns as far as the Marines can tell. The chief employs both carrot and stick to keep his men honest. The ANP are compensated and taken care of, and their commander ensures that they receive appropriate medical care when they are injured. But police officers are quick to tell interviewers that Koka will personally and publicly beat and imprison his men if they mistreat civilians. When one American official asked the police chief what keeps his men in line, he answered, 'Me.'

US officials welcome Koka' s leadership and laud his sincere efforts to secure Musa Qala. But they are also cognizant of how his significant power is growing along with his reputation and the ranks of his police force. If and when Musa Qala transitions to a district with effective civilian government, officials wonder how the police chief' s influence will work within that framework. But for now, in the midst of a shooting war and shaky stabilization efforts, Koka is most of the law in Musa Qala.

The interview with District Police Chief Haji Abdul 'Koka' Wali follows.

The Long War Journal: How has security been trending in Musa Qala for the past year, and since the Marines have taken over in March?

District Police Chief Haji Abdul Wali, also known as Koka: Security is better, the best it' s been in some time.

LWJ: It' s my understanding that you have about 200 police officers. Is that force sufficient to secure the area?

Koka: Well, security is good, but if we had 200 more, security would be better in Musa Qala.

[Note: The ANP in Musa Qala are approved for up to 300 officers total, and a recruiting campaign is underway.]

LWJ: Do you get enough support from the Afghan government?

Koka: We don' t have any problems getting pay and equipment for the police force from the provincial government in Lashkar Gah. We don' t have any problems.

LWJ: Can you explain who the people are who are fighting? Who is planting the bombs, attacking Marines and your police officers?

Koka: There are Taliban in Musa Qala. They come in and contract people in the area to put in bombs in the ground and fight with Marines, police, and the Afghan Army. There are people who work with the Taliban in this whole area. [For example], some guy has two sons. One may be a shopkeeper, another might work with the Taliban. Musa Qala is different from other districts that have borders with other provinces, which have [foreign Taliban] coming from other provinces, and from Pakistan. The Taliban here belong to this district, they are mostly local Taliban.

LWJ: Do these locals do it for money, or do they believe in the ideology? Why do they work with the Taliban?

Koka: Well, I don' t know who the top leader is, and if they support [the Taliban] in Pakistan. But the Pakistanis send money, and the people here take it to plant bombs and conduct suicide bombings. It' s for money, because it' s not according to Islam. True Muslim people do not do this.

LWJ: So to clarify: the motivation for joining the Taliban in Musa Qala is money and not religious ideology?

Koka: I do not understand their goal, because there is no permission in the Koran to fight with innocent people. It is also caused by politics, because some local people don' t like foreign people, British, Americans, who are not Muslim, coming to this area. They have incorrect ideas that foreigners are here to take this area, and their behavior is not good, it is not in the Koran and it is not Muslim.

LWJ: What do most of the people around here think of the Taliban?

Koka: Local people have different opinions on the Taliban. Some people like them, and do business with them, and want them to take control of this area again. Some people 'like those whose son or brother works with the police ' like the police instead. And some people have no ties to the Taliban and no ties to the government, and they just want security, and a good place to live and work.

LWJ: And so how do you get to a point where more people support your police than the Taliban?

Koka: The local people like government, they like the police, they like the Afghan Army.

LWJ: But you said there are three kinds of people. Why do a lot of those people like the Taliban?

Koka: Well, some people want them to come back and take control again. Because the Taliban had control for seven years here, and some people want the Taliban back because they make less money now that there is a fight with the Taliban [instability]. And other bad things like drugs are coming back now that there is a fight with the Taliban.

[Note: poppy cultivation increased 663% in Musa Qala District between 2005-2008, according to the UN.]

LWJ: I understand the opium trade has gotten very big in Musa Qala, what is the government' s official position on the opium trade?

Koka: The government has made it illegal.

LWJ: But it' s so much a part of the culture and economy here. How do you change that?

Koka: Drugs and opium are not permitted under Islam. Since this is the case, why do the Taliban engage in the drug trade? Drugs are Taliban activity, not government activity or Islamic activity.

LWJ: But the farmers who have to put food on their table and make money ' they might not want to help the Taliban, but they have to make money. How do you get them to stop growing poppy?

Koka: [Long term], drugs are not good for our economy. We need to find another way to build the economy. The international community needs to come here and help the farmers grow other crops, like wheat and other things.

[ISAF and international development organizations have alternate seed programs that distribute large amounts of seed for crops other than poppy. Unfortunately, the farmers lack a distribution network as well as the ability to process or store some of these crops for sale, and don' t have easy access to the start-up credit available through the opium economy. These challenges make shifting farmers away from poppy more complex than simply distributing seed.]

LWJ: What do you think of the US Marines, and what do you think of their predecessors, the British?

Koka: I like both the British and the Marines, they are both good people. I spent two years with the British. They both have money, equipment and everything, and that is good. The Americans have more influence because they have more troops in Afghanistan. Both are good for me and my country, because they help us. I like the Marines because they are better fighters than the British, who don' t like to fight and attack the Taliban as much. But the British were better at getting me a flight to Lashkar Gah (the Provincial Capital) when I needed one.

LWJ: Any hard feelings about the Americans [ISAF forces] putting you in jail for so long?

[Koka slightly bristled at this question, and later complained to other Americans that 'all the reporter wanted to ask me about was my time in jail.' ]

Koka: A lot of people were arrested back then. By the time I was released, I had no problem with the people who arrested me, I forgave them. They thought I worked with the Taliban, but I did not. The people who arrested me did not have experience with this area.

LWJ: How long do you think the Americans will stay and how long would you like them to stay?

Koka: The Afghan government needs the Americans and people of other nations to stay for a longer time, because Afghanistan will be better when the Taliban is gone. But the Taliban are not our only problem ' when they are gone we will still need the American people. We need to have more electricity, good roads, better farms, and reconstruction teams to stay here and help the Afghan people.

LWJ: How strong is the influence of the tribes?

Koka: When the Taliban controlled things, the tribes fought each other more, but now they work together. They all work with the government. Like my guys (the police), they are from different tribes but they help all people, not just their tribe.

LWJ: What' s the long term solution to securing Musa Qala and securing Helmand Province as a whole?

Koka: We need a lot more troops and outposts. We need to send more troops north and south to secure the borders of Helmand Province to keep the Taliban out. That is really important for us, because the insurgent [ringleaders] are coming from outside.

LWJ: What do you think of the Taliban? Your personal opinion?

Koka: We need the Taliban to go far away from Musa Qala, and far away from Helmand. Because when local people try to help build the government, the Taliban threatens them and kills them. This is not good, and it is not Muslim.

LWJ: How much Taliban intimidation is going on Musa Qala and how can it be stopped?

Koka: There are maybe 600 Taliban north and south of Musa Qala. More of them need to die before the fighting and intimidation stops.

LWJ: Why did you decide to serve your country and fight the Taliban?

Koka: I wanted to help the people and build my country.

LWJ: What needs to happen in order to finally secure and stabilize Afghanistan? And what do you think will happen?

Koka: I think the Coalition forces need to stay longer in Afghanistan to help the people. It' s good for everyone.

LWJ: So what happens if the Coalition forces begin to leave in 2011?

Koka: If they leave in a year the Taliban will be strong and it will be like before ' the Taliban will take control again. If the Americans leave it will not be good. I am happy to have the Americans in my country. Look at Japan, the Marines are still there. It is very important for the Marines to stay here for a long time like that, otherwise the Taliban will become strong.

July 1, 2010 | Bill Roggio The Long War Journal

Coalition, Afghan forces capture Taliban commander in Helmand

A combined Coalition and Afghan force killed 31 Taliban fighters and captured a senior commander during a raid last night in Helmand. The combined force clashed with the Taliban for four...