Deterring Iran’s Dash to the Bomb

Washington, D.C., August 29, 2024 – The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) published today a strategic plan with two dozen specific and actionable recommendations that the U.S. government should rapidly implement to deter and hinder Iran from producing a nuclear weapon. FDD is a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

“While America is distracted by electoral politics, and U.S. deterrence efforts are fixated on discouraging Iran from crossing the 90 percent enrichment redline, Iran is undertaking other nuclear weapons program advances that will make it far harder to stop Iran from building a nuclear weapon,” said FDD Senior Fellow and co-author Orde Kittrie.

“Deterring Iran’s Dash to the Bomb,” authored by Kittrie, Bradley Bowman, and Behnam Ben Taleblu, catalogs specific nuclear weapons program advances that Iran could, unless deterred, undertake in the coming weeks. It suggests that the United States quickly develop and implement specific deterrent steps, and responses to employ, for each potential Iranian nuclear advance.

“Unless the Biden-Harris administration takes robust steps now to deter and hinder those advances, Iran could complete a crude nuclear bomb before the next U.S. president is inaugurated,” Kittrie said.

The report notes disturbing developments in Iran’s nuclear weapons capability, including: 

• The U.S. intelligence community can no longer attest that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.” This is suggested by the unclassified version of a late July 2024 report on Iran’s nuclear program by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) that omitted a finding found in previous reports.
• Iran “could use these three or four months before our election to sprint to a nuclear weapon” said Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) on July 28, stating that the classified version of the ODNI report on Iran’s nuclear program made him “very worried” and “we have to put them on notice that cannot happen.” Graham added, in a July 31 press conference, that “after having viewed the DNI report, I believe it is a certainty that if we do not change course, Iran will in the coming weeks or months possess a nuclear weapon.”
• Iran’s breakout time — the amount of time needed to produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear weapon — “is now probably one or two weeks,” said U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on July 19. This is reportedly the shortest period of time that U.S. officials have ever publicly referenced for Iran producing that quantity of weapons-grade uranium (i.e., uranium enriched to 90 percent uranium-235).
• While U.S. and allied attention is focused on deterring Iran from crossing the 90 percent redline, Iran is evidently in the process of significantly advancing other elements of its enrichment program. For example, by adding enrichment capacity at its deeply buried Fordow facility, Tehran is attempting to make it more difficult for the West to stop a breakout.
• Iran could achieve sufficient advances in enrichment capacity and nuclear weaponization activities, before November 5 and almost certainly by January 20. 2025, so that the cumulative effect would make it difficult to stop an Iranian nuclear weapon by solely patrolling the 90 percent redline. In addition, the cumulative effect of these other advances could make it impossible to stop Iran from getting so close to a weapon that the regime will enjoy nearly all the benefits of having such a capability.

“If we hope to deter Tehran, the administration must be clearer on which Iranian actions are unacceptable and also take steps to persuade the regime that the United States has both the military capability and political will to impose decisive costs,” said Bowman, senior director of FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power. “Unfortunately, Tehran appears to have concluded that the United States is more muscle than punch, thus encouraging the regime to push boundaries and take risks. The next few months represent a unique moment of risk. The stakes are nothing less than ensuring that the world’s worst state sponsor of terrorism does not obtain the world’s most dangerous weapon.”

The report lays out specific military and non-military recommendations that the U.S. government should quickly implement to deter and hinder Iran from making any further progress toward a nuclear weapon.

Recommended military steps include:

• Declassifying intelligence assessments related to Iran’s nuclear weapons program to build domestic and international consensus for necessary deterrent strategies.
• Deploying U.S. military forces affiliated with strategic targeting mission sets to the region, at least on a temporary basis, to signal the administration’s political will to stop an Iranian nuclear breakout, if necessary.
• Committing U.S. forces to regularly take part in military exercises that demonstrate targeting capabilities against hardened and deeply buried targets, as well as expand the number of ground, air, and naval exercises with the military forces of Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Iraq.
• Building on the success of the January 2023 Juniper Oak bilateral exercise with Israel by working with Israel to conduct a Juniper Oak 2024 exercise.
• Responding rapidly and forcefully to attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria to better protect them and increase concerns in Tehran that the United States might be willing to use military force.
• Deepening and expanding U.S.-Israel intelligence sharing.
• Leasing Israel a number of the Pentagon’s own KC-46 refueling planes.
• Expediting steps related to the delivery of Israel’s order of new F-15IA fighter jets and the modernization of its existing F-15I fighters.
• Lifting the White House hold on the shipment of 2,000-pound bombs (MK-84) to Israel that would provide Jerusalem with vital capabilities and signal that U.S. support is unwavering.
• Ensuring there are no delays in delivering hundreds of BLU-109 Penetrator Bombs, which could help Israel destroy hardened targets.
• Ensuring Israeli requests for air-launched munitions, guidance kits, and fuses that require congressional notification are sent to the Hill without delay.

Recommended non-military steps include:

• Reiterating and strengthening the declared U.S. commitment to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon — the president, vice president, former President Trump, and leading members of Congress should all do so.
• Reiterating and strengthening the U.S. commitment to support Israeli action to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb– the president, vice president, former President Trump, and leading members of Congress should all do so.
• Massively increasing the use of U.S. economic sanctions to deter and hinder Iranian nuclear advances.
• Working with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to trigger the snapback of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran.
• Strengthening the use of cyber capabilities to deter and disrupt Iranian nuclear advances.
• Enhancing U.S. cyber engagement and collaboration with Israel.
• Implementing offensive information warfare against the Islamic Republic of Iran that systematically exposes the Iranian people to the corruption, hypocrisy, lies, and oppression of regime leaders.
• Encouraging and assisting the IAEA to continue pressing concerns that Iran’s nuclear program is not peaceful.

“The Islamic Republic did not invest billions of dollars and decades of time into a nuclear program because it is a science fair project,” said Taleblu. “This is a quest for the ultimate weapon, but one that is advanced opportunistically and with minimal exposure to risk. To that end, as the presidential election nears and Washington looks inward, Tehran may hope to advance its atomic agenda by presenting the world with a fait accompli. Fortunately, Tehran’s hedging can be shaped and deterred by Washington, should it decide to credibly and clearly signal resolve and bolster its deterrence.”

To arrange an interview with the report’s authors, please contact FDD media relations at [email protected].

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