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July 14, 2010 Al Shabaab’s Grim Milestone In Uganda Bad as the twin blasts that rocked the Ugandan capital of Kampala on Sunday were—and with a death toll of at least 74, they represent a considerable tragedy—the overall carnage could... July 13, 2010 The checkered history of Musa Qala US Marines are briefed before going on a patrol in Musa Qala in Helmand province, Afghanistan. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal. A walk through the main bazaar in Musa Qala offers a study in contrasts. The shabby construction of the mud-walled stalls and the pitted dirt of the sidewalks juxtapose displays with an opulent supply and careful presentation of goods: neatly placed bowls of ancient spices, symmetric racks of colorful textiles, rows of Western drinks, and even some electronics. Business is alive and well in Musa Qala. The dizzying array of goods for sale whispers about the larger economy, the regional and international distribution and trading networks that allow a vibrant merchant class to thrive in the midst of the common deprivation and squalor of many residents. The interaction between American Marines and local vendors and passersby offers contrasts of another sort. The Americans are dispersed and alert, with heads on a swivel, scrutinizing every person and vehicle as a potential missile. The Afghan citizens are nonchalant, gliding with lackadaisical grace when absolutely forced to move from shade into the blistering heat. The Americans offer occasional thickly accented, enthusiastic greetings in Pashto. Some of the locals respond in kind, others turn up their noses and ignore them. The Westerners are engaged. With the exception of bursts of Dickensian enthusiasm from begging, pickpocketing children, the Afghans seem apathetic. It' s not hard to fathom why: it' s 115 degrees, after all. And many are jaded by decades of war, Taliban rule, and unfulfilled promises by foreigners. The bazaar lies in the heart of the Musa Qala District Center, a bustling hub of business and government that contains the greatest density of people and buildings within the larger district. In addition to the bazaar, the District Center boasts the Musa Qala District School, a brand new Afghan National Army headquarters built by ISAF, ongoing construction of a District Government building, and the ruins of the Grand Mosque, destroyed during fighting between the Taliban and the British. The permanent market, along with a larger weekly bazaar that springs up during the summer months in the middle of the valley' s dry riverbed, make Musa Qala a regional trading stop. As one moves north or south from the District Center, the other half of the economy becomes apparent: along the wadi lies a vibrant sea of green amidst the desolate mountains and ridges that flank the east and west of the valley. The rectangular north-south district is filled with small farming villages and compounds growing a range of crops for subsistence and distribution. One plant looms large: Papaver somniferum, or opium poppy. Corn, nuts, wheat, and other legal farming products are dwarfed by the local economy' s inextricable tie to poppy cultivation, and the illegal opium that is its byproduct. After observing a range of interactions between Americans and Afghans at the bazaar and a local school, from casually friendly to dismissive, one teen boy shared his opinion of the Marines. 'I like them,' he said through an interpreter' s translation. 'The Marines talk to us. I like them better than the British.' 'Why?' 'The British shouted at us.' The British experience An Afghan child' s distillation of the contentious story of ISAF involvement in Musa Qala is echoed in more complex terms by civilian and military officials, but only under pressure, and usually without attribution. Most Americans deftly sidestep discussion of the British mission from 2006 to 2010, either claiming ignorance or emphasizing that they' d 'like to focus on the present.' In April 2006, a 'Helmand Task Force' of 3,300 troops, mostly British Airborne, was deployed to the province to combat a resurgent Taliban waging a campaign of offensives and assassinations to destabilize the government. Task Force Helmand' s mission was to conduct a broad spectrum of counterinsurgency operations, from finding and killing insurgents to reconstruction projects aimed at gathering local support. But the strength of the Taliban counteroffensive quickly turned the campaign into a series of highly kinetic battles and defensive sieges, an overall trend exemplified by the remarkable recent history of Musa Qala. On June 16, 2006, a small British force was inserted into a compound in the heart of the Musa Qala District Center, a former hotel and Taliban jail. The unit was assigned to protect local government authorities and augment a small force of local police officers. Within weeks, the Taliban tested the defenders by massing and then assaulting the site. Though they were repelled, this battle was only the beginning of months of attacks against undermanned British and Danish troops tasked with defending the compound. In September 2006, the British and the Taliban acknowledged an impasse by accepting a truce brokered by elders of Musa Qala: each side agreed to withdraw from the district center. The agreement, combined with reported British efforts to bribe Taliban commanders in Helmand, was met with harsh criticism from some coalition critics, who believed these actions projected weakness and empowered the Taliban. Within three months, claiming that a US airstrike violated the agreement, approximately 200 Taliban retook the district center and quickly moved to establish radical Islamist rule over the area. The withdrawal of British forces, coupled with the Taliban' s eventual ability to reclaim the area, cemented Musa Qala as a proud symbol of insurgent resistance, analogous on a smaller scale to the cultural resonance Fallujah once held in Iraq. 'Because they took and held Musa Qala for so long, it' s symbolic,' said Lieutenant Colonel Mike Manning, commander of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, now responsible for the district. 'And the Taliban continues to try to infiltrate the district center today.' The battle for Musa Qala and early attempts at counterinsurgency On Dec. 5, 2007, a combination of British, American, and Afghan troops launched an offensive to retake Musa Qala, dubbed 'Operation Mar Karadad (Snakepit).' An Afghan Army brigade, a battalion of US soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division, elements from the British 40 Commando Royal Marines Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the Yorkshire Regiment, the Scots Guards, and Danish forces retook the district center and surrounding area in less than a week. The majority of the Taliban fled in the face of overwhelming firepower arrayed against them. It' s commonly asserted that the defection of Mullah Mullah Abdul Salaam Alizai, a 'reconciled Taliban commander,' also contributed to the victory. British forces resumed responsibility for the district center and attempted to stabilize the area, meeting with mixed success. They created a 'security bubble' of relative calm within the populous middle of the district center. But counterinsurgency efforts were plagued by continued Taliban harassment, limited British manpower and patrolling tempo, and failure to garner widespread local cooperation. Some American officials attribute the latter to a combination of having corrupt Afghan government partners, the inability of the British to rapidly deliver reconstruction and aid, and poor tactics. The failure of both the Afghan government and the British military to deliver basic services and reconstruction is also cited by US civilian and military officials as a factor. After his defection to the government of Afghanistan (often referred to as GIRoA, an acronym for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan), Mullah Salaam was appointed district governor. The former Taliban commander maintained a terrible relationship with British commanders, and soon established a reputation for corruption and ineffectiveness deemed obscene even by local standards. An internal ISAF document very euphemistically describes the shady warlord as an 'ineffective governor [who] is more readily concerned with his own personal affairs than advancing the interests of the district.' The local unpopularity of Salaam' s corruption was complemented by British inability to quickly inject discernible aid and development into Musa Qala. 'When we arrived in March, I found a sign the Brits had put up that sort of encapsulates [the problem],' ' said Manning. 'It said, 'Promise Everything, Deliver Nothing.' The British promised to build a bridge across the wadi (river) three-plus years ago. I came to find out that no contract was ever submitted for the project.' Counterinsurgency doctrine stresses 'combined effects,' stipulating that aid and reconstruction must be rapidly injected into a recently cleared area to legitimize counterinsurgent and government forces in the eyes of the people. Marines are now making their own attempts to hasten reconstruction. 'I' ve told my men, if we are in the AO [area of operations] 90 days and haven' t delivered anything, we are dead in the water,' said Manning. Some US military personnel offer theories about the slow pace of British reconstruction efforts. 'When we got here, they didn' t have a Civil Affairs Team, which allows you to do the small stuff quickly,' offered HM3 Erik Marker, a medical corpsman and project manager with Team One, Detachment 10.1, 11th Marines Civil Affairs Detachment, responsible for civil affairs in Musa Qala. 'They had engineers, so their focus was the big stuff. They knew their job well, but they weren' t civil affairs.' Others cite a slower operational pace and less projection of forces into a smaller area. Many Americans temper or reject criticism of their predecessors by noting that the British are 'good soldiers' and had fewer resources ' they employed about half the manpower currently enjoyed by the US Marines, which limited the ability to hold areas that had been cleared. And one civilian anthropologist who declined to be named for this story believes there may have been a problem in the locals' cultural memory of historical British involvement in Afghanistan. 'Afghans remember British history in Afghanistan negatively,' remarked the official, who works to assess local opinion. 'There is a word that is used to label all foreigners: 'Agriaz.' It simply means, 'the English,' but [the connotation] is xenophobic.' During the handover of the area to US forces, the British Chief of Staff glumly admitted to Manning, 'We' ve forgotten how to do counterinsurgency.' July 13, 2010 Jim Lobe, ‘Neoconservatives,’ and War on Iran Jim Lobe has probably devoted most of his time for the past decade “exposing” what he takes to be the enormous and malevolent influence of “neoconservatives” on American f... July 13, 2010 Toilet Paper and Revolution Years ago, the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, in true revolutionary fashion, took to exporting bright-red toilet paper to places like Tunisia. It didn't catch on, since the color ran, promp... July 13, 2010 Iranian-backed Shia terror group remains a threat in Iraq: General Odierno Logo for the Hezbollah Brigades from a propaganda video released on the Internet. An Iranian-backed Shia terror group continues to remain a threat to US forces in Iraq, the top... July 13, 2010 Why is German Public Television Courting Ahmadinejad’s Media? Last week, executives from two public German television channels hosted Ezzatollah Zarghami, the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). Zarghami allegedly has ties to the... July 13, 2010 British Surrender to Former Gitmo Detainees Last week, British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that his government has agreed to investigate torture allegations made by former Guantanamo detainees. The inquiry is expected to last on... July 13, 2010 The Islamic Revolution Is Still Alive The recent tension in South Lebanon, choreographed by Hezbollah against UNIFIL under the guise of spontaneous protests by villagers, has been used by the party to reassert its equation of “... July 13, 2010 Disconnecting the Dots On Tuesday, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a stinging rebuke to a district court that granted a Guantanamo detainee’s habeas petition last year. The detainee in question is... July 12, 2010 Shabaab claims credit for dual suicide attacks in Uganda Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage. Shabaab, al Qaeda's affiliate in Somalia, has claimed credit for the dual suicide attack in the capital of Uganda that took the lives of 74 people who were watching the World Cup championship match. Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage, Shabaab's top spokesman, said his group carried out the deadly attack and was merely "performing our Islamic duty." "We will carry out attacks against our enemy wherever they are," Rage said, according to the Associated Press. "No one will deter us from performing our Islamic duty." Ugandan officials immediately suspected Shabaab as being the culprit in the twin deadly blasts that targeted a rugby club and a restaurant in Kampala. Police said that the head of a Somali suicide bomber was found in the aftermath of one of the attacks. A police spokesman indicated that both attacks were carried out by suicide bombers. The attacks are the first carried out by Shabaab outside the borders of Somalia since the group was formed in 2006. Shabaab and its predecessor, the Islamic Courts, have carried out 21 suicide attacks inside Somalia since the summer of 2006. Shabaab had telegraphed the attack in Uganda in statements made by top leaders over the past week. On July 5, Sheikh Muktar Abdelrahman Abu Zubeyr, Shabaab's spiritual leader, released an audiotape that was broadcast on Somali radio stations in which he vowed to attack in Uganda and Burundi for sending troops to Mogadishu to back the beleaguered transitional government. "You should know that the massacres against the children, women and the elderly of Mogadishu will be revenged against you," Zubeyr said, addressing the people of the two countries. "Keep in mind that the aggressions being committed by your leaders and soldiers is awaiting you." Zubeyr urged Somalis to wage an "all-out Jihad campaign against the enemy and everyone should take part both young and old." Other Shabaab leaders have also called for attacks against Uganda and Burundi. On July 8, Sheikh Muktar Abu Mansour Robow, a top military leader, urged allied terror groups to attack the diplomatic missions of Uganda and Burundi. "We urge our brothers from Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan and from anywhere around the world to attack the diplomatic missions of Uganda and Burundi," Robow said at a public rally in Mogadishu. Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, al Qaeda's leader in East Africa and a senior Shabaab leader, may be involved in the attack. Fazul has experience with carrying out attacks outside Somalia and is known to move with ease through the region. He is the last remaining East African-based al Qaeda operative to have been involved in the deadly 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Shabaab merged with al Qaeda in November 2008 after requesting to join the international terror group in September 2008. Top al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and Abu Yayha al Libi have praised Shabaab in propaganda tapes and encouraged the group to carry out attacks against the Somali government, neighboring countries, and the West. In late 2009, Osama bin Laden appointed Fazul Mohammed to serve as al Qaeda's operations chief in East Africa; the announcement was made at a ceremony in Mogadishu that was attended by Ahmad Godane Zubayr, Shabaab's spiritual leader. Shabaab and the sometimes allied, sometimes rival Islamist group Hizbul Islam have been relentless in attacking African Union peacekeepers and Somali government forces stationed in the capital of Mogadishu. The government and AMISOM control only a few enclaves in the city. Outside of Mogadishu, the central government wields little control. Shabaab and Hizbul Islam currently control almost all of the southern and many of the central provinces. Sources: ' Al-Shabab claims Uganda blasts, Strait Times ' Somali group takes credit for deadly Uganda bombings, CTV ' Suicide bomber targets Somali state minister for defense, The Long War Journal ' Somalia's Islamist leader threatens Ugandans, Burundians with revenge, Xinhau ' Al-Shabaab Urges Attacks on Diplomats, Daily Nation ' Senior al Qaeda leader killed in Somalia, The Long War Journal July 12, 2010 Revolution, Iranian and Otherwise Tell the truth: you don’t really know what a revolution looks like, do you? Chances are that if anybody asked you, you’d conjure up some picture including the storming of the B... July 12, 2010 Int’l Community More Willing to Pressure Iran WASHINGTON – America's international partners are now more willing to resort to sanctions and otherwise pressure Iran than in the past, a top US Treasury official has told The Jerusalem Post.... July 12, 2010 Counting al Qaeda When CIA director Leon Panetta declared on a Sunday talk show in late June that “we’re looking at maybe 50 to 100” al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan, “maybe less,” so... July 12, 2010 The Homegrown Terror Threat Homegrown terrorism has been much discussed on cable news channels and the op-ed pages of major newspapers in recent months. The attention is unsurprising. After all, 2009 saw more homegrown terr... July 12, 2010 Germany Agrees to Accept Two Gitmo Detainees Germany agreed to accept two Guantanamo detainees last week. In justifying the decision, German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere explained: "The United States has asked us to take three peopl... July 12, 2010 The Jihad Against Uganda The terror group Shabab al Jihad of Somalia is all business when it threatens its victims with attacks. For weeks and months, the mouthpieces of the jihadist organization battling the Somali gove... July 12, 2010 Karzai Pushes for Removal of Ex-Taliban Officials from UN Blacklist The Washington Post reports that Afghan president Hamid Karzai "plans to seek the r... July 11, 2010 US military begins to link Afghan Taliban to Pakistani terror groups Within the past several days, the US military has begun to publicly identify the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other foreign fighters based in Pakistan as being a direct threat to Coalition and Afghan forc... July 11, 2010 “Foreign Taliban” control the insurgency in Musa Qala: Deputy district governor A US Marines, an interpreter, and an Afghan soldier talk to a village elder in the town of Karamanda in Musa Qala in Helmand province, Afghanistan. Photo by Bill Ardolino for The Long War Journal Bill Ardolino interviews the deputy district governor of the Musa Qala district in northern Helmand province. The deputy district governor discusses the state of government, the economy and security. A key pillar of successful counterinsurgency doctrine is the existence or development of a legitimate civilian government, run by officials who are recognized by a majority of the people. While the Musa Qala District in northern Helmand province has many of the key ingredients for COIN ' actively applied doctrine, burgeoning reconstruction efforts, and effective local security forces ' the validity of local government remains an open question, and its reputation is plagued by a recent history of corruption and ineffectiveness. When ISAF forces retook much of the area from Taliban forces during Operation Snakepit in December 2007, they appointed a defected local Taliban field commander, Mullah Abdul Salaam Alizai, as the district governor of Musa Qala. By all accounts, Mullah Salaam' s time in office was a disaster. He had terrible relationships with his British and then American partners, and he maintained a corrupt private militia that clashed with the police. Numerous officials list sloth and self-interest as his guiding characteristics; Mullah Salaam was extremely energetic about taxing local businesses, but little else. His failure to deliver progress on the most basic services and reconstruction projects made him widely unpopular in the district, reinforcing an intense local skepticism of government that lingers today. About three months after the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine regiment took responsibility for Musa Qala in March, Mullah Salaam was out. Health reasons are cited as the official reason for his departure, but the subtext is that Americans refused to work with him, and sought his replacement in a bid to rehabilitate civilian governance. Niamatullah, a former teacher and a government employee since 1985, was appointed as the new district governor about a month later. Americans have high hopes for the new district governor: he is experienced, and like nearly all of Musa Qala, Niamatullah is a Pashtun, but hails from a different province in Helmand. This may give him enough cultural authority to be effective, but also keep him clear of the twisting local political and tribal ties that can distort fair governance. While the incoming district governor has been training in Kabul and Lashkar Gah, and attempting to pass the exam that certifies all district governors for the past month (he just passed the exam on his second try Monday), the responsibility of government has fallen to Deputy District Governor Mohammad Akbar Khan. Appointed as the deputy district governor in May, 2009, Khan is a former shopkeeper, farmer and police officer who has lived in Musa Qala for most of his life, with the exception of 7 years in Lashkar Gah. Dissatisfied with the ineffectiveness of Mullah Salaam' s government, he proactively formed a district shura council, a group of local leaders who advocate for the interests of their villages within the district, in May. Mullah Salaam left a week after the council' s formation, and Khan' s ability to get government moving has naturally increased with his ascent to acting governor prior to Niamatullah' s arrival. Americans hope Khan will work well with the new governor; they regard the deputy district governor as a good civil servant and a competent individual, but critique his willingness to make tough decisions that can inflame local politics and tribal ties. As an outsider, Niamatullah will have less of these constraints, while Khan may be able to serve as a local link to sometimes insular political circles. Khan' s demeanor is calm and intelligent, and he sports the unmistakable polish of politicians the world over ' his answers to questions were carefully measured, and steered clear of controversy. The interview with Deputy District Mohammad Akbar Khan follows. The Long War Journal: What is your experience in politics and background, and why did you decide to serve in the government? Mohammad Akbar Khan: I graduated from school (12th grade) in 1969. I' m from Musa Qala - I lived here in the time of the Mujahadeen and the Taliban, moved to Lashkar Gah (the provincial capital) for a time, and came back. I decided to work with the government because I wanted to serve my country. I was told 'If you want to work with the government you must pass an exam and we will assign you as the deputy of a district, and you may select some districts.' So I passed the exam and had many different choices, but I decided to serve in Musa Qala because it is my home and I want to serve my community. LWJ: How has security been since ISAF forces retook Musa Qala from the Taliban? Khan: Day by day, security is improving. A lot of places are now in the hands of the government. For example, Sher Ghazi, Salaam Bazaar (in neighboring Now Zad District), Karamanda, many areas were controlled by the Taliban and are now controlled by the government, so it' s improving. LWJ: What do you think of the Afghan security forces, what kind of job are they doing? Khan: Both the ANA and the ANP are working well, but Musa Qala is a very big place, so we need more of them. For example, Sher Ghazi is under control of the government, but unfortunately the Taliban still intimidates the people there, and say 'Don' t work with the government or else.' So ANA and ANP are working well, but we need more of them to stop the intimidation. LWJ: Who are the people who are staging attacks against security forces and intimidating the people? Are they criminals, are they Taliban? Khan: The men who control the hand of the insurgents are foreign Taliban. They are trained in foreign countries and sent here, so I do not think they are from this area. LWJ: When I spoke to the District Police Chief [Haji Abdul Wali], he seemed to disagree, saying that the majority of the fighters were local people ' Khan: Well, he is also correct because the economy here in Musa Qala is not doing well and we have high unemployment, so some people are compelled to work as insurgents for pay. So if the government makes jobs for those people, day by day, fewer will work for the Taliban. The people who plant bombs are locals who are unemployed. But the people who train and pay them? They are foreigners. LWJ: What do the people think of the Taliban overall? It' s hard to get an honest opinion from someone because many people are afraid, but what is the general opinion of the Taliban? Khan: Most people don' t like the Taliban, but they are scared of them. Because if a person works [on a construction project], like to pave roads, the Taliban will kill him, so people are scared. But they don' t like the Taliban. LWJ: What can be done to stop this intimidation? Khan: We can stop the intimidation when we have better security. But at the same time, we can stop it by calling shuras (councils) that ask the members of the Taliban 'Why do you want to fight with us? It is your country too, let' s live peacefully.' So we need an elder shura from every village to talk with the Taliban and ask them why they fight with their brothers, and ask them what they want. Tell us why you are fighting, tell us what you want [and if we can], we will complete it. LWJ: Do you get enough support from the National government, as far as funds, projects, personnel and other support? Khan: Many of the officials in Lashkar Gah are working well with the Marines to get government resources for reconstruction. We need to build more hospitals and clinics, and we need more schools because we have few of them. But the most important thing is health care. LWJ: Do you have a good relationship with the national government in Kabul? Khan: When we undertake projects and file reports, we deal with the provincial government in Lashkar Gah, and that is who we work with. We' re pleased with their support. LWJ: What do you think of the Marines and the British? Khan: When the British and now Marines working here, security in Musa Qala is better than [neighboring] Now Zad, better than Marjah, Kajaki, and Sangin. Many people don' t understand the difference between the Marines and the British, they think they are both American. The Marines have done a little better, because they have taken control of more of the villages that were held by the Taliban. Before the Marines and the British, there was no security. When the British came, they established a lot of the posts and checkpoints. Unfortunately the Marines don' t have as many checkpoints, but now the security is also good because now the reconstruction is underway. And before the Marines came, Salaam Bazaar and Karamanda were under the control of the Taliban, and now they are under the control of the government. LWJ: What is the long term solution for Musa Qala' s security beyond the American [ISAF] presence here? Khan: When Marines leave this place, the security will deteriorate, because we don' t have weapons and equipment like artillery and helicopters. We don' t have resources like the Taliban has ' they don' t have helicopters, but they have artillery. So, when we have appropriate equipment [for our security forces], it won' t be a problem. But until then, we need the Marines' capabilities. Now we don' t have anything, but we will be complete when other countries supply us. LWJ: How long do you think that will take? Khan: It' s not in our hands, because we don' t have anything. It is in the hands of other countries, so whenever they [supply] us. LWJ: So has the pace of reconstruction increased since the Marines got here [in March]? Khan: The reconstruction hasn' t really gotten underway yet, but people are hopeful about the Marines. People say, 'Now that the Marines have come, they will build some things.' LWJ: It' s my understanding that the government has appointed a new District Governor, but he isn' t here. Where is he and when is he coming? Khan: Before, Mullah Salaam was governor of Musa Qala, but now the provincial governor has assigned Niamatullah as the new district governor. He is currently in Lashkar Gah and will go to Kabul to complete his training. LWJ: Why was Mullah Salaam replaced? Khan: I heard he was sick, but he also had some other problems, and I don' t have perfect information on what they were. LWJ: What about the role of the tribes? Do tribes in Afghanistan often fight with each other, or do they get along? Are tribal politics difficult here? Khan: There are some problems with politics in Musa Qala. When someone joins a Shura (council), they will go home at night and the Taliban will arrest and maybe kill him. But a lot of people are happier now with the government, so we have less problems with political rivalries. LWJ: But what about when, [for example], two people are on a shura, and one person is from one tribe and another member is from another tribe ' do they tend to fight? Do they have conflicts because they are from different tribes? Khan: Some of them. It is another reason why people sometimes fight with each other, but we don' t really have a big problem with it in Musa Qala. LWJ: What do you think is the biggest challenge right now for Musa Qala to succeed? Khan: If the [national] government makes Musa Qala its own province, I think it will help Musa Qala succeed. LWJ: But what is the biggest challenge you need to conquer, the biggest thing that needs to be overcome, to improve Musa Qala ? Khan: The biggest problem here is simply security. First of all security, because it is so important. And with that, we can develop a strong government here. Here in Musa Qala, we really don' t have any civilian offices, like they do in the [provincial capitals]. So here we need more civilian offices and more components of government here in Musa Qala itself. [Note: Marine Civil Affairs and local contractors have broken ground on a District Governor' s compound] LWJ: What is the government' s policy on the opium trade, and what do you think the government should do to move the economy away from opium? Khan: First of all, when we have security we can deal with poppy and other drugs. And once the government provides other opportunities for people ' with factories and such ' we can move away from growing drugs. The people need work, the people need money, so if the government gives them alternate crops and more opportunities, they will move away from poppy. LWJ: What do you think about the future? Are you hopeful? Negative? What do you think will happen? Khan: I think Musa Qala' s future will be bright when the government supports the people with security, schools and factories. Things are now starting to go well, so I think the future is bright. 80 percent of the people are happy with government, simply because the Taliban beats people. The government hasn' t helped Musa Qala yet. But now the people are waiting ' they hope and expect that we will fulfill our promises. July 10, 2010 Pakistani military, Taliban clash in South Waziristan Pakistani troops and Taliban fighters battled in the tribal agency of South Waziristan after the Taliban attack security outposts in the region. The Taliban killed six Pakistani troops who were manning outposts in the Mehsud tribal areas and wounded 35 more in what was described as intense fighting that lasted several hours. The Pakistani military claimed to have killed 38 Taliban fighters in retaliatory air and artillery strikes throughout the region. The Taliban have been relatively inactive in South Waziristan since the military launched an offensive to clear them from the Mehsud's tribal regions in October 2009. The military claimed to have killed more than 600 Taliban fighters during the months-long operation. The Mehsud tribe makes up the backbone of the leadership of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. South Waziristan was the terror group's headquarters prior to October 2009. Major General Nawaz Khan, the military's operations chief in the region, said on July 1 that South Waziristan has been cleared and there are no more Taliban bases in the area. The Taliban have denied they have been ejected from South Waziristan, and claimed they would launch a counteroffensive against the military that was to begin last spring. That counteroffensive never materialized, but there have been strong indications that the Taliban is still present in the region. The Taliban have issued night letters in villages threatening those who support the government and the military, intimidate and assassinate key tribal members who oppose the Taliban, and occasionally launch attacks against the Pakistani military. Today's clashes took place as the military is preparing to move internal refugees from South Waziristan back into their homes. More than 300,000 members of the Mehsud tribe are said to have fled the fighting. As part of the resettlement process of the refugees, the Pakistani government has pressured the Mehsud tribe to denounce the Taliban and promise that no foreign fighters and the so-called Punjabi Taliban would be based in the region. The tribal leaders have resisted pressure to agree to the government's terms. The Mehsud tribal areas in South Waziristan was one of several major hubs for the Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda, and other Central and South Asian terror groups in Pakistan's northwest. Foreign terror groups, including al Qaeda, are still in South Waziristan, but are based in the Wazir tribal areas under the command of Mullah Nazir, who is considered a "good Taliban" leader despite his support for al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Nazir does not support attacks against the Pakistani state but backs terror groups that do, including the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. Recently, the Wazir tribes refused government demands that they eject foreign terrorists from their midst. On June 29, an al Qaeda operative from Egypt known as Hawza al Jawfi, two Punjabi fighters, and five local Taliban fighters were killed in a US airstrike near Wana, an area under Nazir's command. Sources: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-swaziristan-clashes-qs-07 ' Clashes break pause in S. Waziristan; 38 militants killed, Dawn http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-swaziristan-cleared-qs-01 ' South Waziristan cleared of militants, says army, Dawn http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/03-pakistan-starts-resettling-south-waziristan-tribes-ss-13 ' Pakistan starts resettling South Waziristan tribes, Dawn http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/provinces/12-sw+jirga+fails+to+reach+consensus--bi-03 ' SW jirga fails to reach consensus, Dawn July 10, 2010 Uighur Al Qaeda Affiliate Implicated in International Plot Last week, the details of the plot to bomb New York City subways in 2009 expanded dramatically. We learned that the NYC plot was connected to two others, in the UK and Norway, and that all three... July 9, 2010 No, the Problem Is Not Obama’ s Middle Name As part of his public reconciliation with Israel, Obama for the first time in the almost 18 months since he became president just gave an interview to an Israeli TV station (this from the same Am... July 9, 2010 Suicide bomber kills 56 in northwestern Pakistan A Taliban suicide bomber killed 56 people and wounded more than 100 in an attack on a government official's office in northwestern Pakistan. The Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan... July 9, 2010 Obama Taps Two Men Who Know How to Win Rolling Stone magazine may have done in Gen. Stanley McChrystal, but the Rolling Stones may have it had right when they sang, "You can't always get what you want... But if you try sometimes... July 9, 2010 Three Cheers for Politics A guilty plea by one of Osama bin Laden’s most trusted minions demonstrates yet again that political accountability can spur even a Democrat-controlled Congress to correct the Obama adminis... July 8, 2010 More Taliban ‘need to die’ before fighting ends: Musa Qala police chief Musa Qala District Police Chief Haji Abdul Wali, who is also known as "Koka." Photo by Bill Ardolino/LWJ Bill Ardolino interviews an Afghan National Police chief in the Musa Qala district in northern Helmand province. The general discusses the state of the police, the security situation, the make-up of the Taliban, and his thoughts on ISAF and American withdrawal. The District of Musa Qala in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, is an area in transition. The overwhelming majority of its 30,000 plus (estimated) residents want peace ' farmers simply want to farm, businessmen want to buy, sell, and trade ' but popular sentiment hasn' t settled on the most likely path to achieve it. Some long for a return to the stability offered by Taliban, despite the baggage that came with their draconian rule. Others support the Afghan security forces, and by extension their Western allies, while retaining healthy skepticism of the civilian government. And most aren' t sure where to place their bet, and will studiously maintain neutrality until a long term victor begins to emerge. Of all the factors influencing ISAF counterinsurgency effort in Musa Qala, one of the bright spots is the presence of respected, relatively effective local security forces that present a viable alternative to the Taliban. Both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) in the district are well-reviewed by US advisors, presenting a legitimate face to the government and working well with Marine security patrols. While the police are generally regarded as tactically inferior and more corrupt than the Army across wider Helmand province, and in certain areas are viewed by citizens as a worse option than the Taliban, in Musa Qala their status is different. Here, the police are local Pashtuns, generally do their jobs, and they exhibit low levels of corruption and rarely mistreat citizens, according to American advisors. This combination of factors grants the ANP singular legitimacy as a security force in the district. Above all, their relative competence stems from the will of one man, District Police Chief Haji Abdul Wali, who is more commonly known as 'Koka.' A former mujahid, Koka joined the Harakat-e-Inquilab-e-Islami (HII, or Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) in 1981 after his father and two brothers were killed by Russians. A major element of the Afghan resistance early on in the Soviet-Afghan conflict, HII was particularly influential in northern Helmand under the leadership of Mullah Nasim Akhundzada (Alizai). Koka himself fought the Soviet forces and remained otherwise active with the party until 1990. He later joined Jeemiiat Islami (Society of Islam) in 1996, and waged war against the Taliban with the support of Iranian intelligence. His war record against the Talibs involved a string of battles and several defeats, brief evacuation to Iran by the Iranian Secret Service, and then flight to Pakistan. He eventually returned to live in Musa Qala, and even briefly switched sides to join the Taliban in their fight against his former allies in Jeemiiat. This odd mutability was a consequence of local custom - he' d struck a deal to take the place of his brother, who had been conscripted into Taliban service. At the time, Taliban conscription campaigns were particularly acute in northern Helmand, including both Musa Qala and Kajaki districts, and even Maiwand district in neighboring Kandahar. After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Koka rejoined the Jeemiiat, and served as Musa Qala' s police commander in 2001 -2002. His tenure ended when he was arrested by NATO forces for lying about the whereabouts of the district governor, who was wanted for questioning about suspected ties to a known terrorist. Koka was released after being incarcerated for 14 months at Bagram. He returned to find his home village again at war, weathering constant attacks by the Taliban, and he soon rejoined government service to fight his old enemies and brief allies. Following the conclusion of Operation Snakebite, the joint ISAF-Afghan operation to drive out Taliban forces occupying Musa Qala, Koka was reappointed as the Musa Qala district police chief in December 2007. Koka now commands about 200 police officers manning 10 posts within the district, with an additional two posts and one checkpoint under request for construction. The police chief has unusual legal authority, arbitrating local business disputes and deciding the fate of nearly all prisoners in his jurisdiction, with the exception of those who have committed crimes against Marines. The police host approximately one prisoner per week in three small but clean jail cells. 'Generally if it' s minor offenses, he' ll have a shura and release the prisoner into the custody of elders, once they vouch that they' ll keep an eye on him,' explains Gunnery Sergeant Norman Wesolowski, an advisor with the Marine Police Mentoring Team (PMT). 'But if it' s a significant criminal case, [the prisoner] will be taken to Lashkar Gah (the capital of Helmand Province) for further prosecution.' Koka' s men receive timely pay and equipment from the provincial government in Lashkar Gah, and are not engaged in any large scale corruption or shakedowns as far as the Marines can tell. The chief employs both carrot and stick to keep his men honest. The ANP are compensated and taken care of, and their commander ensures that they receive appropriate medical care when they are injured. But police officers are quick to tell interviewers that Koka will personally and publicly beat and imprison his men if they mistreat civilians. When one American official asked the police chief what keeps his men in line, he answered, 'Me.' US officials welcome Koka' s leadership and laud his sincere efforts to secure Musa Qala. But they are also cognizant of how his significant power is growing along with his reputation and the ranks of his police force. If and when Musa Qala transitions to a district with effective civilian government, officials wonder how the police chief' s influence will work within that framework. But for now, in the midst of a shooting war and shaky stabilization efforts, Koka is most of the law in Musa Qala. The interview with District Police Chief Haji Abdul 'Koka' Wali follows. The Long War Journal: How has security been trending in Musa Qala for the past year, and since the Marines have taken over in March? District Police Chief Haji Abdul Wali, also known as Koka: Security is better, the best it' s been in some time. LWJ: It' s my understanding that you have about 200 police officers. Is that force sufficient to secure the area? Koka: Well, security is good, but if we had 200 more, security would be better in Musa Qala. [Note: The ANP in Musa Qala are approved for up to 300 officers total, and a recruiting campaign is underway.] LWJ: Do you get enough support from the Afghan government? Koka: We don' t have any problems getting pay and equipment for the police force from the provincial government in Lashkar Gah. We don' t have any problems. LWJ: Can you explain who the people are who are fighting? Who is planting the bombs, attacking Marines and your police officers? Koka: There are Taliban in Musa Qala. They come in and contract people in the area to put in bombs in the ground and fight with Marines, police, and the Afghan Army. There are people who work with the Taliban in this whole area. [For example], some guy has two sons. One may be a shopkeeper, another might work with the Taliban. Musa Qala is different from other districts that have borders with other provinces, which have [foreign Taliban] coming from other provinces, and from Pakistan. The Taliban here belong to this district, they are mostly local Taliban. LWJ: Do these locals do it for money, or do they believe in the ideology? Why do they work with the Taliban? Koka: Well, I don' t know who the top leader is, and if they support [the Taliban] in Pakistan. But the Pakistanis send money, and the people here take it to plant bombs and conduct suicide bombings. It' s for money, because it' s not according to Islam. True Muslim people do not do this. LWJ: So to clarify: the motivation for joining the Taliban in Musa Qala is money and not religious ideology? Koka: I do not understand their goal, because there is no permission in the Koran to fight with innocent people. It is also caused by politics, because some local people don' t like foreign people, British, Americans, who are not Muslim, coming to this area. They have incorrect ideas that foreigners are here to take this area, and their behavior is not good, it is not in the Koran and it is not Muslim. LWJ: What do most of the people around here think of the Taliban? Koka: Local people have different opinions on the Taliban. Some people like them, and do business with them, and want them to take control of this area again. Some people 'like those whose son or brother works with the police ' like the police instead. And some people have no ties to the Taliban and no ties to the government, and they just want security, and a good place to live and work. LWJ: And so how do you get to a point where more people support your police than the Taliban? Koka: The local people like government, they like the police, they like the Afghan Army. LWJ: But you said there are three kinds of people. Why do a lot of those people like the Taliban? Koka: Well, some people want them to come back and take control again. Because the Taliban had control for seven years here, and some people want the Taliban back because they make less money now that there is a fight with the Taliban [instability]. And other bad things like drugs are coming back now that there is a fight with the Taliban. [Note: poppy cultivation increased 663% in Musa Qala District between 2005-2008, according to the UN.] LWJ: I understand the opium trade has gotten very big in Musa Qala, what is the government' s official position on the opium trade? Koka: The government has made it illegal. LWJ: But it' s so much a part of the culture and economy here. How do you change that? Koka: Drugs and opium are not permitted under Islam. Since this is the case, why do the Taliban engage in the drug trade? Drugs are Taliban activity, not government activity or Islamic activity. LWJ: But the farmers who have to put food on their table and make money ' they might not want to help the Taliban, but they have to make money. How do you get them to stop growing poppy? Koka: [Long term], drugs are not good for our economy. We need to find another way to build the economy. The international community needs to come here and help the farmers grow other crops, like wheat and other things. [ISAF and international development organizations have alternate seed programs that distribute large amounts of seed for crops other than poppy. Unfortunately, the farmers lack a distribution network as well as the ability to process or store some of these crops for sale, and don' t have easy access to the start-up credit available through the opium economy. These challenges make shifting farmers away from poppy more complex than simply distributing seed.] LWJ: What do you think of the US Marines, and what do you think of their predecessors, the British? Koka: I like both the British and the Marines, they are both good people. I spent two years with the British. They both have money, equipment and everything, and that is good. The Americans have more influence because they have more troops in Afghanistan. Both are good for me and my country, because they help us. I like the Marines because they are better fighters than the British, who don' t like to fight and attack the Taliban as much. But the British were better at getting me a flight to Lashkar Gah (the Provincial Capital) when I needed one. LWJ: Any hard feelings about the Americans [ISAF forces] putting you in jail for so long? [Koka slightly bristled at this question, and later complained to other Americans that 'all the reporter wanted to ask me about was my time in jail.' ] Koka: A lot of people were arrested back then. By the time I was released, I had no problem with the people who arrested me, I forgave them. They thought I worked with the Taliban, but I did not. The people who arrested me did not have experience with this area. LWJ: How long do you think the Americans will stay and how long would you like them to stay? Koka: The Afghan government needs the Americans and people of other nations to stay for a longer time, because Afghanistan will be better when the Taliban is gone. But the Taliban are not our only problem ' when they are gone we will still need the American people. We need to have more electricity, good roads, better farms, and reconstruction teams to stay here and help the Afghan people. LWJ: How strong is the influence of the tribes? Koka: When the Taliban controlled things, the tribes fought each other more, but now they work together. They all work with the government. Like my guys (the police), they are from different tribes but they help all people, not just their tribe. LWJ: What' s the long term solution to securing Musa Qala and securing Helmand Province as a whole? Koka: We need a lot more troops and outposts. We need to send more troops north and south to secure the borders of Helmand Province to keep the Taliban out. That is really important for us, because the insurgent [ringleaders] are coming from outside. LWJ: What do you think of the Taliban? Your personal opinion? Koka: We need the Taliban to go far away from Musa Qala, and far away from Helmand. Because when local people try to help build the government, the Taliban threatens them and kills them. This is not good, and it is not Muslim. LWJ: How much Taliban intimidation is going on Musa Qala and how can it be stopped? Koka: There are maybe 600 Taliban north and south of Musa Qala. More of them need to die before the fighting and intimidation stops. LWJ: Why did you decide to serve your country and fight the Taliban? Koka: I wanted to help the people and build my country. LWJ: What needs to happen in order to finally secure and stabilize Afghanistan? And what do you think will happen? Koka: I think the Coalition forces need to stay longer in Afghanistan to help the people. It' s good for everyone. LWJ: So what happens if the Coalition forces begin to leave in 2011? Koka: If they leave in a year the Taliban will be strong and it will be like before ' the Taliban will take control again. If the Americans leave it will not be good. I am happy to have the Americans in my country. Look at Japan, the Marines are still there. It is very important for the Marines to stay here for a long time like that, otherwise the Taliban will become strong. July 8, 2010 Iran Heats Up: The Bazaar Strikes Back The death spiral of the Islamic Republic seems to be gathering momentum. That big fire at a major oil well I told you about last week continues unabated, with big flames and clouds of noxious bla... July 8, 2010 Gitmo Transfers are Not Risk Free Two noteworthy stories dealing with Gitmo detainee transfers came out of Europe this week. The first comes from Spain, where the daily newspaper El Mundo reports that Spanish intelligenc... July 8, 2010 Our Friends, the Saudis? Last week, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah was welcomed to the White House by President Obama. According to the Washington Post, their meeting provided an opportunity “to demonstrate the... July 7, 2010 An Arab Neo-Con? Eli Lake of the Washington Times reports: The United A... July 7, 2010 Al Qaeda appoints new commander for Afghanistan Al Qaeda has named an Egyptian as its new commander for operations in Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan after its former leader was killed in a US Predator strike in North Waziristan in May... July 7, 2010 Deceptive Gitmo Headlines Judging by some of the headlines, you’d think that the Gitmo detainee who pled guilty before a military commission today was merely a chef fo... July 7, 2010 Significance of U.S. Treasury’s Iran Sanctions The U.S. Treasury Department recently announced targeted financial sanctions on a long list of Iranian companies, people, and entities. Some of the designations specifically target Iran's nu... July 7, 2010 Bibi and Barack’s Smiles Cannot Erase Challenges to U.S-Israel Relations Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Barack Obama were all smiles in front of a sea of cameras at the White House yesterday. The president's press team was not kiddi... July 7, 2010 Al Qaeda Bodyguard And Accountant Pleads Guilty Before Military Commission Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al Qosi, a Sudanese detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, pled guilty to charges of conspiracy and material support for terrorism before a military commission today. Acc... July 6, 2010 What Can Bibi Expect from Obama Today's meeting between Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Barack Obama has the potential to repair the U.S. administration's frosty posture toward Israel. In March... July 6, 2010 California’s Problem Explained The Telegraph (U.K.) reports that... July 6, 2010 Germany Smacks Israel With Critical Resolution on Flotilla Raid All parties in the German Parliament passed a resolution last Thursday slamming the Jewish state for its interception of a flotilla heading for Gaz... July 6, 2010 Beyond Gasoline: Slamming the Door on the Iranian Regime’s Access to Energy Expertise If Europe and the United States get serious about sanctions enforcement, the Iranian regime could find itself without the energy know-how to keep its critical oil and natural gas sectors running.... July 6, 2010 The Death of A Marja The passing of Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah over the weekend marks the end of an era for Lebanese Shiism. What comes next, and who will attempt to fill his shoes as the leadi... July 6, 2010 Former Gitmo Detainee Arrested in Pakistan A former detainee held at Guantanamo Bay for nearly three years has been arrested in Pakistan on terrorism charges. Pakistani officials told Agence France Presse that Issa Khan, who had been deta... July 5, 2010 Wanted Taliban commander killed in shootout in North Waziristan Eight South Waziristan Taliban commanders, pictured in a wanted poster: 1. Hakeemullah Mehsud, 2. Waliur Rehman Mehsud, 3. Qari Hussain Mehsud, 4. Azam Tariq, 5. Maulvi Azmatullah,... July 4, 2010 Freedom and A Happy Fourth of July On the Fourth of July, one wants an inspiring message — a reminder of the love of freedom which has made America great, and can make it greater yet. Finding that in Washington these days is... July 3, 2010 Taliban commander linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba detained in eastern Afghanistan Banner of the Jamaat-ud Dawa, the front group for the Lashkar-e-Taiba. A combined Coalition and Afghan force detained a Taliban commander who is linked to the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, or Army of the Pure, during a raid in eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban commander, who was not named, was detained along with a Taliban facilitator and two fighters during a raid in the eastern province of Nangarhar, the International Security Assistance Force reported in a press release. "The commander is directly linked to the Taliban emir of Khogyani district and assisted with the recent influx of Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT) insurgents into the province," ISAF stated. Lashkar-e-Taiba has been linked to numerous complex attacks in eastern Afghanistan and in Kabul. Its fighters are believed to have worked with the Haqqani Network, run by Siraj Haqqani, to carry out attack attacks on Indian targets in Kabul, including two this year. Lashkar-e-Taiba fighters fought alongside al Qaeda and Taliban in multiple engagements against US and Afghan forces in the east, including the assault on the US combat outpost in Wanat in Nuristan province, Afghanistan in July 2008. Nine US troops were killed, and 15 US soldiers and four Afghan troops were wounded in the heavy fight that nearly ended in the outpost being overrun. US forces ultimately defeated the attack, but withdrew from the outpost days later. Lashkar-e-Taiba is thought to have a presence in several of Afghanistan's eastern provinces, including, Kunar, Nuristan, Nangarhar, Laghman, Paktia, Paktika, Khost. and Kabul. The terror group is known to have run training camps in Kunar and Paktia provinces up until the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Lashkar-e-Taiban also currently operates camps in Pakistan in Mansehre, Sindh, and Punjab, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan's military and the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate supportes Lashkar-e-Taiba as part of its so-called strategic depth against rival India. The terror group essential runs a state within a state of Pakistan. The sprawling Muridke complex in Punjab houses "a Madrassa (seminary), a hospital, a market, a large residential area for 'scholars' and faculty members, a fish farm and agricultural tracts. The LeT also reportedly operates 16 Islamic institutions, 135 secondary schools, an ambulance service, mobile clinics, blood banks and several seminaries across Pakistan." The Lashkar-e-Taiba has established an organization that rivals Lebanese Hezbollah. The group succeeded in providing aid to earthquake-ravaged regions in Kashmir in 2005 while the Pakistani government was slow to act. Lashkar-e-Taiba is active in fundraising across the Middle East and South Asia, and has recruited scores of Westerners to train in its camps. The most well-known western recruit is David Coleman Headley, an American citizen who helped scout the deadly November 2008 Mumbai terror assault and also plotted attacks in Europe. Like al Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Taiba seeks to establish a Muslim caliphate in southern and central Asia. Lashkar-e-Taiba "consistently advocated the use of force and vowed that it would plant the 'flag of Islam' in Washington, Tel Aviv and New Delhi," the Southeast Asia Terrorism Portal reported. Also, like al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba practices Wahabism, the radical Islamist school of thought born in Saudi Arabia. Lashkar-e-Taiba has an extensive network in southern and Southeast Asia. A senior US military intelligence official described the group as "al Qaeda junior," as it has vast resources and is able to carry out complex attacks throughout its area of operations. "If by some stroke of luck al Qaeda collapsed, LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) could step in and essentially take its place," the official told The Long War Journal in November 2008. The relationship between al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba is complex, the official noted. "While Lashkar-e-Taiba is definitely subordinate to al Qaeda in many ways, it runs its own network and has its own command structure. The groups often train in each others' camps, and fight side by side in Afghanistan." The US government designated Lashkar-e-Taiba as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2001. The Pakistani government banned the group in January 2002, but this did little to shut down its operations. The group renamed itself the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and conducted business as usual. July 2, 2010 FDD Applauds President Obama and Congress for Enacting Tough Iran Sanctions Press Release July 1, 2010 CONTACT: Judy Mayka 202-621-3948 judy@defenddemocracy.org FDD Applauds President Obama and Congress... July 2, 2010 Suicide assault team targets development office in Kunduz A Taliban suicide assault team attacked a compound run by a development contractor for USAID in the northern province of Kunduz early this morning. The attack began at about 3:30 a.m., when a suicide bomber rammed a truck packed with explosives into the outer wall of a compound used by Development Alternatives Inc., a US-based contractor for USAID. The suicide bomber breached the outer wall of the compound, and five heavily armed Taliban fighters wearing suicide vests moved into the compound and began to open fire. Afghan security forces responded to the attack and fought a pitched battle with the terrorists which lasted several hours. The five Taliban suicide bombers, an Afghan policeman, an Afghan security guard protecting the compound, and two foreigners were killed during the fighting. One German national was among those killed. The Taliban quickly took credit for the suicide assault and claimed that 55 foreign nationals were killed during the attack on a "training center," The Associated Press reported. The Taliban wildly exaggerate the effects of their attacks and resultant Coalition and Afghan casualties. In propaganda statements released on their website, Voice of Jihad, the Taliban make daily claims that scores of soldiers are killed and dozens of vehicles are destroyed. Today's suicide assault is the second in three days in the war-torn country. On June 30, a Taliban suicide assault team attempted to storm Jalalabad Airfield in the eastern province of Nangarhar. The assault was repelled and eight Taliban fighters were killed. Background on the Taliban strongholds in the north Over the past two years, the security situation in the northern provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan has deteriorated. The Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), the Haqqani Network, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan all have a presence in the two provinces and have been attacking Coalition and Afghan forces as well as NATO supply lines from Tajikistan. The Taliban and allied terror groups maintain safe havens in Baghlan and Kunduz, and control large portions of the provinces. Of the seven districts in Kunduz province, only two are considered under government control; the rest of the districts - Chahara Dara, Dashti Archi, Ali Abab, Khan Abad, and Iman Sahib - are considered contested or under Taliban control, according to a map produced by Afghanistan's Interior Ministry in the spring of 2009. Two districts in neighboring Baghlan province - Baghlan-i-Jadid and Burka - are under the control of the Taliban [see LWJ report, "Afghan forces and Taliban clash in Kunduz," and Threat Matrix report, "Afghanistan' s wild-wild North"]. Kunduz and Baghlan fall under ISAF's Regional Command North, which is led by the Germans. The Germans have been criticized by the Afghan government and Coalition partners for failing to aid in securing the north. German troops are restricted from actively engaging in major combat operations and have largely confined their forces to base. US forces have recently deployed to Kunduz and have been battling the Taliban. Kunduz has been the scene of heavy fighting over the past year. On May 13, combined Afghan and Coalition forces killed 41 Taliban fighters during operations. On April 24, combined forces killed 23 Taliban fighters in Kunduz province. The largest Taliban loss took place during an operation in Kunduz in early November 2009; the Afghan military claimed 133 Taliban fighters were killed. The most high-profile event in Kunduz took place on Sept. 4, 2009, when Coalition fighters bombed fuel tankers hijacked by the Taliban; more than 60 Taliban fighters and 40 civilians were killed. The top Taliban leaders for the two northern provinces have also been detained or killed this year. The Pakistanis reportedly detained the Taliban's shadow governors for Kunduz and Baghlan in February. In April, the Afghan military claimed that the newly-named, replacement shadow governor for Kunduz was killed along with three aides. Earlier this year, Baghlan was the scene of a local internecine battle between the Taliban and allied HIG. Seventy HIG fighters and 50 Taliban fighters were killed in fighting in the Baghlan-e-Markazi district after disagreements arose over collecting taxes. Scores of HIG fighters defected to the government after being defeated. There is no indication, however, that the taxation dispute between the two groups that spiraled into fighting has spread beyond the Baghlan-e-Markazi district. But despite the Taliban's losses in the north, the group remains in firm control of several districts. The Taliban have launched an assassination campaign and have also been accused of releasing poisonous gases in girls' schools in Kunduz. Scores of Afghan schoolgirls have been hospitalized over the past several months due to the gas attacks. July 2, 2010 They’re Stoning Another Woman to Death in Iran Even though her "confession" (adultery) came only after 99 lashes and she doesn't speak Farsi. She has retracted the confession. But you know, the rules are the rules.... July 2, 2010 Here Comes the UN’ s New ‘Gender Entity’ If there’s one thing you can count on the United Nations to do, it is to endlessly expand. Thus has the UN after the thrill of “intense eleventh hour negotiations,” cleared the last remaining “political hurdles” for the creation of what the Inter Press Service descibes as a “New Gender Entity.” Officially this new outfit will [...] July 2, 2010 Happy Birthday, Modern World That’s what the 4th is, the modern world’s birthday. Those who signed the Declaration knew it was a revolutionary event–rulers must henceforth be accountable to the people... July 2, 2010 Being American This weekend, on July 4, Americans celebrate the 234th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. Over the burgers and sweet corn, that’s always a good day to think about what, exactly...

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