Ship Carrying Chemical for Missile Development Docks in Iran

America’s authoritarian adversaries continue to deepen their military ties.

A container ship carrying 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate from China — a precursor chemical used to make ammonium perchlorate, an important component in solid rocket fuel — docked in Iran earlier this month, as reported by CNN. The vessel, dubbed the Golbon, was operated by the Islamic Republic of Shipping Lines (IRISL). Iran’s Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), a branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (IRGC-AF), purchased this chemical. All three Iranian entities are sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department.

In late January, the Financial Times first disclosed that two vessels, the Golbon and the Jairan, were preparing to sail from China to Iran. At the time of this writing, the Jairan has yet to set sail for Iran.

Iran’s Missile Industry Is Bolstered by Foreign Sources

Despite touting “self-sufficiency” and possessing a robust domestic supply chain and a variety of industries supporting its ballistic missile program, Tehran has long looked abroad to procure materials and chemicals for its missiles.

More than a decade ago, reporters revealed efforts by sanctioned Iranian defense contractors to work with Venezuela to jointly produce components for solid rocket fuel such as nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine. Periodic reporting from German intelligence organizations from 2015 to 2021 alleged that Tehran was seeking materials that could contribute to the regime’s nuclear and/or missile programs. Fast forward to 2023, and Politico Europe exposed Iranian negotiations with Russia and China to purchase ammonium perchlorate. And in 2024, the United States sanctioned an Iranian procurement network in Oman and Turkey operating on behalf of the IRGC-AF’s SSJO to acquire “missile-applicable goods.”

China Has Been a Major Backer of Iranian Missile Development

China has played an outsized role in the evolution of Iran’s domestic arms industry. All of Iran’s anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), for example, are copies or variants of Chinese anti-ship systems. In the 1990s, China supported the regime’s efforts to develop solid-propellant ballistic missiles and provided Tehran with guidance and control technologies to help make Iran’s missiles more precise.

One Chinese national in particular, Karl Lee (a.k.a. Li Fangwei), worked with the Iranian embassy in Beijing for nearly a decade starting in 2006 to bolster Iran’s ballistic missile program through illicit shipments of gyroscopes, accelerometers, graphite cylinders, ultra-high strength steel, and high-grade aluminum alloy. Lee’s network reportedly continues to operate. One of his associates, Xiangjiang Qiao, was indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2023 for supplying the Islamic Republic with isostatic graphite, which can help Tehran develop nozzles for solid-fuel rocket motors and nosecones. China also remains a key jurisdiction for Iran to procure other military technologies with relevance to its drone program.

Iran’s Ballistic Missiles Remain a Threat

The Islamic Republic is home to the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East. The IRGC-AF is the custodian of this arsenal and last year employed nuclear-capable ballistic missiles in direct attacks on Israeli territory in April and October, the latter of which remains the largest single-day ballistic missile barrage in history. Iran continues to unveil new ballistic missile systems, such as the recently unveiled Etemad, a solid-propellant medium-range ballistic missile reportedly capable of traveling 1,700 kilometers. Tehran is also doubling down on its space program and larger-diameter solid-propellant motors, which Iran likely hopes will eventually enable it to put the European continent and the U.S. homeland within missile range.

The Trump administration has identified countering Iran’s ballistic missile program as a top priority in its recent National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2). Vigorous sanctions enforcement against procurement fronts and illicit shippers that support Iran’s missile development, be they in China or elsewhere, will be a critical component of this effort. Denying Tehran goods such as sodium perchlorate should therefore be considered low-hanging fruit and a measure of the administration’s seriousness of purpose.

Behnam Ben Taleblu is senior director of the Iran Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he is also a senior fellow. For more analysis from Behnam and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_Iran. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.