Trump Should Oppose an Interim Nuclear Deal That Lets Iran Off the Hook

“We’ll have something without having to start dropping bombs all over the place,” President Donald Trump declared on Monday.

The United States and Iran are set to meet for a fourth round of nuclear talks shortly, where the Trump administration aims to reach a deal to dismantle Tehran’s nuclear weapons program. The Islamic Republic will surely try tempting Washington to reach a so-called “interim” agreement, which could see Tehran cap its nuclear threat — albeit temporarily and superficially. The president should reject such a proposal.

Tehran might offer to limit its enriched uranium stockpile and reduce the purity level of this stock, while accepting some additional international monitoring. This would fundamentally leave intact the regime’s nuclear weapons capabilities — including advanced centrifuge-powered nuclear fuel production assets, covert efforts to construct nuclear devices, and intercontinental, nuclear-tipped ballistic missile delivery efforts.

Thus, an interim deal would fail to fulfill Trump’s, and his administration’s, repeated demands that Tehran dismantle its nuclear weapons capabilities. Much like the 2015 Obama nuclear accord with Iran — which Trump previously opposed due to its failure to block all the regime’s pathways to atomic weapons — an interim deal would also relieve pressure on Tehran just as President Trump has started rebuilding it.

In February, Trump reimposed maximum US pressure against Iran, which was in place during his first term. In March, he demanded Tehran negotiate restrictions over its nuclear program within 60 days, or face US and Israeli military strikes against its nuclear facilities. Those actions, as well as the president’s credible military build-up in the region and campaign to degrade Iran’s key proxies like the Houthis in Yemen, succeeded in bringing Iran to the negotiating table. In April, after initially refusing, Tehran participated in the first direct talks between the countries in years.

What could an interim deal that derails the president’s goals look like? The 2013 interim nuclear deal with Iran, known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), preceded the fuller 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and provides insight into what such an accord could entail. 

While the JPOA required that Tehran refrained from new advancements at its three uranium enrichment facilities and heavy water nuclear reactor, which provides a plutonium pathway to the bomb, those facilities remained intact. Although the regime permitted the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to enhance its monitoring and inspections, Tehran was not required to explain its past and possibly ongoing atomic weapons work. 

Under the JPOA, Iran halted enrichment of uranium over five percent purity but retained its stockpile of the material, while diluting half its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium. Retaining the ability to enrich uranium to five percent purity meant Tehran was still more than 70 percent of the way to making weapons-grade uranium.

Troublingly, Iran also showed it could succeed in extorting the West for massive sanctions relief. The JPOA provided the regime with the repatriation of $4.2 billion in assets seized abroad for its malign activities, as well as the ability to export precious metals, petrochemicals, and automotive goods. Before the JPOA, Tehran’s economy was reeling under Western economic pressure, but the deal, and then the 2015 JCPOA, provided more relief in return for limited and easily reversible Iranian concessions.

Today, Iran seeks similar relief as breathing room against growing domestic and economic pressure and possible US-Israeli military strikes against its nuclear facilities. The regime’s endgame has not changed: deflect pressure, buy time, and refine and maintain destructive nuclear and military capabilities. 

In addition, an interim deal today would make a mere dent in Tehran’s nuclear weapons capabilities, which advanced precipitously under President Biden’s policy of maximum deference to the regime.

Iran has now enriched uranium to 60 percent — putting it days from 90 percent purity, which is weapons-grade — and can fuel more than 17 nuclear weapons. It has installed more than 13,000 advanced centrifuges and secreted away numerous machines. Only a few hundred of these fast-enriching centrifuges are needed to make weapons-grade uranium at a secret site. The regime also restricted IAEA monitoring and ejected inspectors from key nuclear sites. 

Tehran is reportedly carrying out weaponization-related work and has a team looking to short-cut the regime’s route to nuclear weapons. It has dramatically advanced its nuclear missile-delivery program, nearing the capability to make long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles that could strike the United States.

To be sure, not all is lost — Iran is not yet nuclear weapons-armed — but Washington must bring much more to bear than a temporary fix.

Iran’s aging supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and his regime are under severe pressure at home, facing droughts, water shortages, social and political unrest, inflation, and currency devaluation. Trump’s team must seize this opportunity to achieve a maximalist accord that permanently removes Iran’s nuclear threat.

To do so, Washington must insist on nothing less than the full, verifiable, and permanent dismantlement of all three pillars of Iran’s nuclear program — including its nuclear fuel production and assets, weaponization, and missile-delivery work. If Tehran refuses, the president should consider following through on his threat of military strikes, double down on sanctions, and support the Iranian people in their quest for freedom.

Short-term fixes to address Iran’s enduring nuclear threat have failed — it’s time for the president to deliver a lasting solution.

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Follow her on X @StrickerNonpro. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.