February 25, 2025 | The National Interest
The United States Must Become the AI Arsenal of Democracy
February 25, 2025 | The National Interest
The United States Must Become the AI Arsenal of Democracy
The United States confronts an adversary far more technologically savvy than any of those that came before. As with the Cold War, both Washington and Beijing view dominance over science and technology as the surest way to win in their ongoing rivalry. In both capitals, science and technology are perceived as a proxy for each nation’s capacity to translate their latent economic potential into lasting military supremacy.
The link between the laboratory and global leadership has never been stronger. The rapid proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) promises to transform the stakes of the Sino-American rivalry, supercharging the relationship between science, technology, and national power. Not since the advent of nuclear weapons has the United States confronted both a profound technological revolution and a near-peer adversary.
Facing this generational challenge will require generational leadership. To ensure military supremacy and economic prosperity for the long term, Washington must return to its earlier roots as an arsenal of democracy, working to reinforce its still-leading position as a technological power by sharing crucial computing resources while preparing its own industrial base to harness AI. This transition will require both defensive measures, such as more adroit export controls, and offensive actions, such as mobilizing Washington’s unsurpassed network of allies and partners and developing its domestic AI industrial base.
Export Controls and Strategic Alliances
Recognizing the threat, the Biden administration used ever-more stringent export controls to restrict China’s access to leading American technologies with the aim of preventing Beijing from drastically improving its military at Washington’s expense. In taking up the torch, the Trump administration should expand upon its predecessor’s strategy to ensure that future export controls substantively stymie the pace of China’s technological development. While the United States may have limited success in preventing the emergence of the next DeepSeek, Washington can hinder Chinese firms’ access to the resources necessary to fully capitalize on their breakthroughs.
This goal requires a new approach to export controls that accounts for the pace and character of technological development and the state of China’s technology ecosystem. Rather than only target commercially available components, Washington must approach its contest with China systemically and intentionally. The U.S. Department of Commerce should monitor the maturity of emerging technologies to proactively design appropriate safeguards prior to their mass diffusion into civilian life. Other U.S. interagency participants such as Treasury and State should incorporate concepts such as Technology Readiness Levels, a system of classifying technological progress, into their policy planning processes, allowing them to readily optimize export controls to counter long-term threats.
This proactive approach is well-suited to manage the challenges posed by China’s technology ecosystem. While China boasts a broad range of innovative firms, the country’s technology ecosystem remains fragile, hindered by China’s macroeconomic weakness, manufacturing challenges, computing shortages, and distortionary subsidies. The United States should exploit these enduring weaknesses by screening outbound investment into Chinese technologies while combating Beijing’s use of unfair trade practices. In so doing, America can maintain its lead in domestic manufacturing. New export controls should also target additional upstream inputs into this ecosystem, including both key raw materials used in semiconductor production and devices utilized by Chinese firms to produce large-scale training datasets.
The United States must also be prepared to transform its unsurpassed network of allies and partners into a true force multiplier against China — rather than treating it as potential security risk. By providing resources to incentivize its allies and partners to follow its stringent export controls, Washington can simultaneously starve China’s technology sector and fuel additional waves of innovation aimed at countering Beijing’s technological rise.
The Trump administration should build on its predecessor’s efforts to restrict Beijing’s access to critical AI components. Recognizing that China is actively engaged in a global campaign to beg, borrow, and steal American technology, the Biden administration launched its “Framework for AI Diffusion” to counter Beijing’s efforts. This framework limits countries’ capacities to purchase components such as advanced graphic processing units (GPUs) based on their efforts to prevent these exports from being diverted to China. By restricting exports based on countries’ demonstrated willingness to enact safeguards against Chinese intrusion, the framework is intended to effectively thwart Beijing from circumventing previous restrictions.
Restricting China’s access to critical AI technologies, however, requires the United States to account for the dynamic nature of the global AI race. While China currently lags behind America, U.S. allies and partners suddenly shut out from purchasing American technology may seek out Chinese suppliers, trading lower quality for better access. In attempting to maintain a monopoly on innovation, onerous restrictions may prevent friendly nations from capitalizing on their own revolutionary breakthroughs, leaving Washington at a loss.
Instead, the Trump administration should create a pathway for allies and partners to access advanced American technology without restrictions. By creating a transparent, rigorous definition of a Tier I country under the AI diffusion framework, along with setting out corresponding security and institutional benchmarks for accession, Washington can strengthen the capacities of its allies and partners to develop their own innovations while deriving considerable influence over the proliferation of emerging technologies.
Building a Resilient AI Industrial Base
Secondly, the United States must be prepared to invest domestically to ensure that it can translate its still-leading position into long-term dominance. This will require a series of targeted policy changes, some of which are ongoing, to strengthen America’s AI industrial base in preparation to deploy and scale future private sector innovations that will further tilt the future balance of military and economic power in Washington’s favor.
As with other industries, America’s AI industrial base is constructed on a foundation of energy, land, and labor. The development and deployment of AI is highly energy-intensive, placing significant strain on the country’s baseload electricity capacity and straining grid operators’ capacity to manage an already-complex and aging system. Data centers, often storing tens of thousands of advanced GPUs used for both training and inference, require ever more acreage, potentially frustrating other national priorities such as housing and community development.
Building the next generation of the AI workforce will require addressing challenges faced by foreign students, who are often drawn to the United States by its strong educational system and deep capital markets. These skilled individuals too often face a difficult path to achieving permanent residence and therefore leave the country, draining the United States of its newly trained workforce. Meanwhile, the ranks of those tasked with keeping these systems safe remain chronically understaffed despite surging demand.
Confronting these challenges requires sustained investment and commitment from all levels of government, starting in Washington. The Department of Energy should be tasked with producing specific and actionable recommendations, backed by congressional funding, that can rapidly scale to provide sufficient baseload to train and deploy AI systems. These recommendations should also focus on the potential role for clean energy technologies, such as solar and nuclear, to provide the flexibility and cybersecurity measures necessary to develop an AI-ready grid.
Having included Interior Secretary Doug Burgum within the National Security Council, the Trump administration must prioritize granting federal lands to data center construction. The United States must also do more to expand its domestic AI workforce. Working with Congress, President Trump should enact his campaign promise to offer every college graduate a pathway to permanent legal status with the aim of producing a pool of young, ambitious, AI-savvy professionals. These measures should be coupled with programs intended to bolster the cybersecurity workforce, such as the CyberCorps: Scholarship for Service, to safeguard American innovation.
A Clear-Eyed Strategy for the U.S.-China Tech Rivalry
With the pace and scale of its technological rivalry with China likely to accelerate within the coming years, the United States must avoid being distracted by self-imposed paranoia or launching a new Red Scare. Chinese firms, whether backed by Beijing or acting alone, will continue to innovate and may even momentarily eclipse American achievements. But rather than take Chinese victories as a sign of its permanent defeat, Washington must push ahead, confident in its capabilities and clear-eyed about its goals. The stakes are too high to do otherwise.
Jack Burnham is a research analyst in the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Jack and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Jack on X @JackBurnham802. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.