Europe’s Nuclear Energy and Central Asian Uranium

The drive toward electrification coupled with the political decision to reduce fossil fuel consumption is creating a situation where, by necessity, there is renewed interest in nuclear energy. In this new environment, the role of Central Asia as a source of uranium looms large, particularly in view of the massive increase of uranium production in Kazakhstan in the past two decades, as well as the reduction  of supply to the West from other producers such as Niger, where Moscow now is a major player.

Concern and alarmism over climate change have in recent years led to highly ambitious and unrealistic expectations in Europe and most of the West of a rapid shift away from fossil fuels. This shift in turn requires a rapid expansion of the production of electricity. Increased demand for electricity is also emerging from data centers and AI and from increased electrification of transportation. Given the deficiencies of other sources of electricity such as wind and solar, a massive increase in European electricity generation will require an increase in nuclear energy production. That in turn begs the question of sourcing uranium for nuclear power.

The EU is heavily dependent on uranium imports for its nuclear raw materials, sourcing 97% from outside the union. The main sources of European uranium are Kazakhstan (26%), Niger (25%), and Canada (22%). Much of the EU’s imported enriched nuclear fuel comes from Russia, which produces the fuel mostly from uranium mined in Kazakhstan. Things were made worse following the 2023 military coup in Niger, as the ruling junta turned strongly toward Russia and away from Europe, evicting France’s uranium company Orano from one of its mines in northeastern Niger this year. As a result, Europe may find difficulty accessing natural uranium from one of its major suppliers, while simultaneously seeking to reduce its dependence on Russia for enriched uranium.

This makes the question of European access to Central Asia’s uranium highly relevant. Kazakhstan has emerged as the world’s largest producer of uranium, producing over 40% of the world’s natural uranium. It is joined by Uzbekistan, the world’s fifth-largest producer.

In November 2023, shortly following the coup in Niger, French President Emmanuel Macron visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with the issue of uranium mining and nuclear cooperation being high on the agenda. The visit served to further deepen France’s role in in the region’s nuclear sector – not only in uranium extraction in both countries, but also in response to Kazakhstan’s decision to construct a nuclear power plant of its own.

France’s ambitions received a boost last month when Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made an official visit to Paris, and stressed in an article for Le Figaro the prospect of stronger cooperation in nuclear energy.

So far, France is alone among Western powers in making a serious effort to partner with Central Asian states in nuclear energy. Paris faces stiff competition from Russia and China, both of whom are jockeying for influence in the sector. Russia’s Rosatom holds stakes in companies operating six different mines in Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan – which lacks uranium conversion facilities – relies on Russia for the conversion of uranium ore. Russia also won the contract to build Uzbekistan’s first nuclear power station.

As for China, it sources over 60% of its imported uranium from Kazakhstan, and has secured access to several joint ventures to produce uranium there, including a deal to build a nuclear fuel fabrication plant, something that helps Kazakhstan to climb the nuclear ladder and provide more value than just producing raw uranium. Chinese state companies also are working to develop mines in Uzbekistan’s Navoi region.

It would be foolish to expect Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan to reduce their ties to Russia or China in the nuclear field. The two are well aware of their need to maintain constructive relations with the two larger neighbors. But these two leading Central Asian states are mindful of maintaining a balance, which is why they are keen to make sure that other countries are also involved in their nuclear sector.

This requires that Western counterparts are actively involved in the region. Aside from France, Western powers including the U.S. have failed to act on the rising importance of Central Asia in nuclear energy.

Still, the pivotal role of Central Asia in the world uranium market further strengthens the emerging role of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as Middle Powers. While they are obviously exposed to the ambitions of Russia and China, these states have proved skillful in asserting their own interest in the region, often playing out the great powers against each other.

Kazakhstan’s role in the uranium market provides it with important leverage, especially if Astana proves able to refine its role not only as a supplier of natural uranium but also building its civilian nuclear industry and strengthening its expertise and resources into nuclear conversion. Its international status as hosting the International Low-Enriched Uranium Bank and its growing expertise in nuclear matters will go far toward this goal. Kazakhstan could potentially build a uranium conversion facility to provide feedstock for foreign enrichment plants. This would derive more value out of Kazakhstan’s uranium riches, in a field where Russia has a monopoly and there is room for growth of other producers. The growth of the Trans-Caspian transport route provides Kazakhstan with an export route for its nuclear fuel that is not controlled by either Russia or China.

The emergence of Central Asia on the nuclear energy scene remains poorly understood in the West, in spite of its importance to the rapidly shifting realities in world energy affairs. It has the potential of providing considerable geopolitical benefit to the U.S. and Europe, who aim to diversify the nuclear industry away from dependence on Russia.

Svante E. Cornell is Research Director of the American Foreign Policy Council’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. Brenda Shaffer is a faculty member of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and the Senior Advisor for Energy at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.