November 19, 2024 | The Jerusalem Post
What do long-range missiles in the Ukraine-Russia war mean for Israel?
The Ukraine-Russia war has escalated with Ukraine's use of long-range missiles, but what does that mean for Israel and the wars it is fighting?
November 19, 2024 | The Jerusalem Post
What do long-range missiles in the Ukraine-Russia war mean for Israel?
The Ukraine-Russia war has escalated with Ukraine's use of long-range missiles, but what does that mean for Israel and the wars it is fighting?
Ukraine fired US-made missiles into Russia, the Russian Defense Ministry claimed on November 19, according to CNN. The incident comes days after reports said the White House had said Kyiv could use US-made weapons to strike inside Russia.
Up until now, Ukraine has been tied down in essence, unable to fight a full-scale war, but forced to only fight Russian forces inside the country using some key Western-made weapons. This hasn’t prevented Kyiv entirely from striking Russia, but it means that the war is micromanaged. The Western logic is not to “expand” the war or “escalate.”
We’ve seen this Western logic applied to the war in Gaza and Lebanon as well since October 7, 2023. What this boils down to is that enemies of the West, such as Russia and Hamas, attack Western partners, friends and allies; such as Israel or Ukraine, and then the West wants to micromanage the conflict.
In most cases, this boils down to US policy because other countries don’t have the weight America does when it comes to driving key issues around these conflicts. For instance, it was the Biden administration that warned about Russia’s intention to invade Ukraine in the winter of 2021-2022. It was also the Biden administration that turned around an aircraft carrier on October 7 to deter Iran and Hezbollah from increasing attacks after the Hamas massacre.
However, this preference for micromanagement and fear of escalation has two effects. First, it likely prolongs war. Some people think that it’s better if a war doesn’t “escalate” and instead remains “small” or “contained.” But there’s nothing small about the war Iran unleashed after October 7. It mobilized the Houthis to attack ships in the Red Sea, it mobilized militias in Syria and Iraq, and it got Hezbollah to attack Israel. This is a regional war; it affects millions of people. The Ukraine war is also not contained or small. Millions have been forced from homes, with swaths of the country being devastated. It has also cemented the Iran-Russia-China relationship.
A second effect of micromanaging is that when something changes, such as the decision to let Ukraine use missiles like the US-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) inside Russia, then Moscow has a “right” to respond and escalate further. “Kyiv did not immediately respond to the report. The attack would mark the first time Ukraine has used the longer-range American weapons to strike targets deep inside Russia, and show that Kyiv has wasted little time in making use of its newly-granted powers,” CNN noted on November 19.
The Ukrainian war has cemented the Iran-Russia-China relationship
Russia will now claim it can carry out more extensive attacks, even though it is Russia that had already been attacking, has ruined part of Ukraine, and has rained down drones and missiles on Ukrainian cities.
In essence, the good intentions of not “escalating” often leads to escalation. This is also how Iran positioned itself to attack Israel directly in April and October and why Hezbollah felt it could get away with its attacks. They basically carved out a “right” to attack Israel. Hezbollah linked itself to Gaza, and so did the Houthis. Iran claimed it had a right to attack Israel because of an airstrike in Damascus. This was odd because Tehran hadn’t responded to thousands of strikes in Syria in the past.
The Islamic Republic chose escalation because it sensed that the West would restrain Israel and tell it to “take the win” after Iran’s attack. That is exactly what happened – and Iran then attacked again in October. Up until Trump’s election win on November 5, Iran was threatening even more direct attacks. Ballistic missiles that it fired are supposed to be the new norm.
We now have to see if the Ukrainian decision and the US decision regarding how Ukraine can use missiles affects the Middle East. It’s likely that Moscow did not condemn the Hamas attack on October 7 because it is now receiving Iranian drones and wanted to use the Gaza war to distract from Ukraine and take Western attention away from it.
Russia benefits from war and chaos. It benefits from war in Gaza and Lebanon. Worse, many of the weapons the IDF has found in Lebanon are of Russian origin. Moscow is tied deeply into the Middle East and wars here. Therefore it’s possible that the developments regarding missile attacks by Ukraine – and Russia’s claims it has a right to respond – could impact the Middle East.
Iran may feel empowered, and it could lead to other effects. In the past, we have made the mistake in the Middle East of not seeing how conflicts in places like Ukraine may have long-term, but as yet unseen, effects. It is clear now that what happens in Russia and Ukraine will affect the Middle East.
Seth Frantzman is the author of The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza (2024) and an adjunct fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies.